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

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
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THE SĀṄKHYA CONCEPTION OF PERSONALITY

THE
SĀṄKHYA CONCEPTION OF PERSONALITY

OR

A NEW INTERPRETATION OF THE SĀṄKHYA PHILOSOPHY

By

ABHAY KUMAR MAJUMDAR, M.A.,

LATE SENIOR PROFESSOR OF PHILOSOPHY, K. N. COLLEGE, BERHAMPORE, BENGAL;
SOMETIME SENIOR PROFESSOR OF PHILOSOPHY, RIPON COLLEGE, CALCUTTA;
AND AUTHOR OF "THE OUTLINES OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY"

EDITED BY

JATINDRA KUMAR MAJUMDAR, M.A., Ph.D. (LONDON), BAR-AT-LAW,

SOMETIME (OFFG.) PROFESSOR OF PHILOSOPHY, PRESIDENCY COLLEGE, CALCUTTA

WITH A FOREWORD BY

S. RADHAKRISHNAN, M.A., D.LITT. (HON.),

KING GEORGE V PROFESSOR OF PHILOSOPHY, CALCUTTA UNIVERSITY, AND AUTHOR OF
"INDIAN PHILOSOPHY," "THE HINDU VIEW OF LIFE," "THE REIGN OF
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CONTENTS

		PAGE
Editor's Note		vii
Foreword		ix
Introduction		xiii
CHAPTER I.	The Existence of God	1
,, II.	The Existence of God (*contd.*) ...	19
,, III.	The Personality of God	52
,, IV.	The Human Personality	75
,, V.	Other Forms of Personality (A Personalistic Conception of Nature)	131

EDITOR'S NOTE

After long and arduous labour in the domain of the Sāṅkhya Philosophy, my father, the late author, wrote the present treaties during the last years of his life. Though the main theme of the treatise is a determination of the Sāṅkhya conception of personality, the readers will find in it a consideration of almost all the main doctrines of the Sāṅkhya system. The Sāṅkhya has received an idealistic interpretation in the hands of the author. The Sāṅkhya idealism, according to the author, is essentially identical with the Hegelian one and also with the Vedāntic one, especially as represented by Rāmānuja and Nimbārka. Such an interpretation of the Sāṅkhya is really fresh and bold, and an attempt on these lines has not been made before. By such an attempt the author succeeds in reconciling the age-long conflict of the Sāṅkhya with the Vedānta, which arose especially as a result of the comments of the orthodox interpreters. The main endeavour of the author has been to show the untenability of the orthodox interpretations, which have so long been in vogue, by adducing a more consistent interpretation of the various Sāṅkhya texts. His views are sought to be supported not only by the Sāṅkhya classics but also by authentic treatises like the Mahābhārata, the Bhagavadgītā, etc. It is now for the readers to judge how far the author has been successful in his bold venture.

The treatise first appeared in the form of independent articles in the pages of various well-known journals, before it took its present form. The first and second chapters appeared in the *Modern Review* (Calcutta) under the caption "A Theistic Interpretation of the Sāṅkhya Philosophy;" the

third chapter appeared in the *Calcutta Review* (Calcutta University) under the caption "The Conception of Divine Personality in the Sāṅkhya Philosophy;" the fourth chapter appeared in the *Philosophical Review* (America) under the two titles of "The Doctrine of Evolution in the Sāṅkhya Philosophy" and "The Doctrine of Bondage and Release in the Sāṅkhya Philosophy;" and the fifth chapter also appeared in the same Review under the title of "The Personalistic Conception of Nature as expounded in the Sāṅkhya Philosophy." And I have to thank the editors of these journals for kindly giving me permission to reprint and incorporate them in the present volume. The articles have been reprinted with certain additions and alterations.

In preparing this volume I have received help from various sources. I take this opportunity to tender my grateful thanks to Professor S. Radhakrishnan of the Calcutta University for kindly writing the Foreword and also ungrudgingly helping me to have the treatise undertaken for publication by the Calcutta University. I desire also to tender my very best thanks to my friend Principal P. G. Bridge of the St. Paul's C. M. S. College, Calcutta, for kindly reading through the manuscript, and to my maternal uncle Professor Deva Kumar Dutt of the Dacca Intermediate College, for kindly doing all the transliteration work, for going through the proofs and for many suggestions. I have also received some valued help from Pundit Suresh Chandra Sāṅkhya-Vedāntatîrtha, for which he also deserves my best thanks. But for the help of the above gentlemen my task would not have been so easy. I am greatly indebted to the authorities of the Calcutta University for their kindness in undertaking the publication of the present volume, and for the care they have bestowed on the work during the course of its publication.

BAR LIBRARY,
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J. K. MAJUMDAR.

FOREWORD

It is with great pleasure that I write this foreword to the late Professor Abhay Kumar Majumdar's work on the Sāṃkhya Philosophy. We are greatly indebted to his son Dr. J. K. Majumdar, himself a very competent student of Philosophy, for editing this work and making it accessible to the public. His act of filial piety has not only enriched Indian philosophical literature but has also shown that there are among us some who have the freedom of mind and boldness of thought to rethink ancient theories and develop them to new conclusions.

The interest of this work is not so much historical as metaphysical. The author has a definite view of metaphysics and it is too much to hope that his convictions have not coloured his interpretation of the Sāṃkhya system. As a matter of fact, the author develops by way of a critical restatement of the Sāṃkhya position his own metaphysical view that the world is a system of spirits, superpersonal, personal and subpersonal. Strange as such a view of the Sāṃkhya may appear to those wedded to tradition, it is sustained by a wealth of historical learning and power of philosophical criticism.

In the first two chapters the author takes up the problem of the supreme reality and argues that the prevalent opinion about the nontheistic character of the system cannot be main-

tained. The views of the Mahābhārata and the Bhagavadgītā which regard puruṣa and prakṛti as modes of the ultimate reality are pressed into service. The difficulty of the dualistic position which is unable to account for the harmony between the needs of puruṣa and the acts of prakṛti is utilised to great advantage and the suggestions of theism scattered in the texts which are regarded as supporting atheism are worked out with great skill. It cannot be denied that there is a good deal of historical support for the theistic view of the Sāṃkhya. Apart from the evidence of the Epic, we have also the later commentators Vācaspati, Vijñānabhikṣu and Nāgeśa. Vācaspati assigns to God the mysterious function of guiding the development of prakṛti by removing the obstacles to its manifestation (Īśvarasyāpi dharmādhiṣṭhānārtham pratibandhāpanaya eva vyāpāraḥ). That the *Vedānta Sūtra* regards the Sāṃkhya as upholding a line of thought which is opposed to its own monistic idealism cannot however be ignored. It is in Vijñānabhikṣu that we find an open attempt to reconcile the Sāṃkhya dualism with the monism of the Vedānta.

The author adopts the theistic interpretation of the Sāṃkhya and holds that it alone can free the Sāṃkhya system from inconsistencies. We may illustrate his general method by a reference to the question of the plurality of selves. The self, (puruṣa) is " infinite, unchangeable, all-pervasive, eternal, rational, etc." Each self has the same set of attributes and yet the Sāṃkhya admits the multiplicity of selves. The whole position becomes untenable if we do not assume the reality of one supreme self and the multiplicity of the many empirical selves which are only individualisations or differentiations of the one supreme self. The author's view-point is not wrong. The Sāṃkhya establishes the multiplicity of the embodied souls which do not rise or sink together. The transition from the plurality of empirical souls (jīva) to the plurality of eternal selves (puruṣa) is not a logical one. If the self (puruṣa) is without attributes and qualities, absolutely inactive and

impassive, unaffected by any emotion, pleasure or pain, then any definite characterisation of selves is the outcome of confusion of thought. There does not seem to be any non-empirical basis for the attribution of distinctness to the selves. If each self has the same features of consciousness and all-pervadingness, if there is not the slightest difference between one self and another, since they are all free from variety, what is there to distinguish one self from another? Multiplicity without some kind of distinction is unthinkable. A plurality of all-pervading selves is an impossible conception.[1] While this criticism is a sound one, it is difficult to believe that the authors of the Sāṃkhya were aware of it and so adopted the theory of a single supreme self to avoid the danger.

The absolute self is viewed as a self-conscious Īśvara who has as one of his constituent elements prakṛti by means of which he manifests himself in the empirical world. As a self-conscious system and the source of all activity, the absolute is regarded as a person. Since the unity is of a perfect nature, he is regarded as superpersonal. The individual soul is a differentiation of the absolute who is present entire and undivided in each jīva.

The third chapter is devoted to a discussion of the problem of human personality. The latter is not a mechanical juxtaposition of two independent entities, for such a view will involve a division of the consciousness of man from the other elements of his nature and thus make thought and life baffling mysteries. As the Sāṃkhya assumes the unity of human nature, puruṣa and prakṛti are organically related in the human self. Subject and object are aspects of a higher unity, distinctions within a whole. A pan-psychistic interpretation of prakṛti is developed in Chapter V.

[1] *Cf.* Saṃkara on *Vedānta Sūtra*, II, 3-53, Sarvagatatvānupapattiś ca bahūnām ātmanām dṛṣṭāntābhāvāt.

The work gives us a fresh interpretation of the Sāṃkhya system. Whether or not we agree with the many textual interpretations of the writer, there is no doubt that the book offers us a deeper understanding of the problems which the Sāṃkhya attempted to solve.

S. RADHAKRISHNAN.

INTRODUCTION

The word 'personality' has been used in different senses and different meanings have generally been assigned to it. But the truth seems to lie in this : The essential characteristic of a person is *self-consciousness*; but self-consciousness is not a bare or undifferentiated unity of an essence or of a substance, but a complex or differentiated unity of a system or a world. Thus, a person is a self-conscious system or world of diversified elements. Again, this system or world is not stationary, but progressive, so that a better definition would be that a person is "an active form of the whole"—a unique living centre of activity on the part of the Absolute which strives to attain its absolute unity and completeness by absorbing and assimilating, through an infinite process, the apparently foreign element of multiplicity. He is a free voluntary agent in so far only as his freedom and initiative is nothing but "the inherent effort of mind, considered as a 'world,' in the direction of unity and self-completeness, *i.e.*, individuality."

Such is the meaning that we may assign to 'personality.' Our next problem is to determine the different forms that it admits of. And for that we have to determine, in the first place, whether and in what sense the Absolute may be called a person. We may assert that the Absolute is a self-conscious, and not merely a feeling, Being. But the Absolute self-consciousness being immensely higher

and richer than the human self-consciousness, the Absolute Personality must be something different from the human personality, and for this reason the Absolute should better be called *Super-personal.* Coming then to the consideration of other forms of personality we may assert: Everything that is real and a real constituent of the world is a unique centre in and through which the Absolute Self-conscious Spirit realises itself in a unique manner and returns upon itself as a fully realised Being. In this sense everything partakes of the nature of the Absolute, and is, therefore, a perfect subject-object from its own point of view. But everything is not perfect from the beginning, it is *actually imperfect,* but *potentially perfect,* that is, capable of attaining perfection by gradual evolution. Consequently, everything, except the Absolute, is a subject-object possessing different degrees of the unity of self-consciousness. Thus we get three forms of personality: The Absolute is Super-person; the human beings are persons, and the other forms of being may be called, *en bloc,* sub-human persons, understanding by the last term persons who possess more imperfect form of self-consciousness. The doctrine of pan-psychism is, therefore, maintained, the world being a system of spirits.[1]

Now, the above conclusions have been brought to bear upon our discussions which form the subject-matter of the present treatise. What view does the Sāṅkhya maintain with regard to the meaning and forms of personality?—This forms the subject-matter of our present discussions. And at the outset of our venture it has been thought necessary to dispel a very widespread impression that the Sāṅkhya teaches atheism, or at least, agnosticism, since the establishment of a theistic Sāṅkhya is a necessary preliminary to proving that God is a person according to the same. It has been conclusively proved that the impression is entirely unfounded and based

[1] The above has been fully discussed by the author in his treatise: "The Meaning and Forms of Personality," to be published later.

upon the misinterpretation of some aphorisms of the Sāṅkhya-Pravachana-Sûtram. Numerous texts are cited from the Sāṅkhya-Pravachana-Sûtram, the Sāṅkhya-Kārikā and the Yoga-Sûtram, to prove that the Sāṅkhya System is as theistic as the Vedānta. Next an attempt has been made to show that Îśvara (God), as understood by the Sāṅkhya, is not a bare or undifferentiated unity of an essence or of a substance, but a complex or differentiated unity of a system or world. It has been shown beyond all doubt that Puruṣa and Prakṛti are not two independent realities lying side by side, as the commentators suppose them to be, but that the latter is included in the contents of the former. This leads to the conclusion that Îśvara is an all-pervading self-conscious system. It has also been shown from textual evidence that He is the ultimate Source of all activity or effort. Thus, Îśvara, as understood by the Sāṅkhya, is a Person, or rather, a Super-person, for He is a perfect Self-conscious System.

Coming next to the consideration of the human personality it has been shown that man, as understood by the Sāṅkhya, is also a self-conscious system or world; for, he is nothing but a perfect differentiation or individualisation of the Absolute Puruṣa or Îśvara. In this connexion the Sāṅkhya doctrines of Evolution, Non-discriminative knowledge, Bondage and Release, have been discussed at considerable length to show that Puruṣa in man, or the individualised Puruṣa, is none but the Absolute Puruṣa or Îśvara working and realising Himself under limitations imposed by the physical organism and its adjuncts, and striving to return upon Himself as a perfectly liberated Being. So long as He works under those self-imposed limitations He is in the state of bondage, and when by overcoming those limitations He returns upon Himself, He is said to be released. Thus, man being an individualised Puruṣa, is a person himself.

Next, the Sāṅkhya view with regard to the other forms of personality has been considered. It has been satisfactorily

proved that the Sāṅkhya view with regard to the personality of Îśvara and the evolution of the world inevitably leads one to the conclusion that all things in the manifested world are spirits possessing self-consciousness in different degrees and revealing it in widely diverse ways. They, therefore, may also be called 'persons,' but they are more imperfect forms of person than human beings.

Thus, the Sāṅkhya System speaks of three forms of personality : The Super-human Personality, which is possessed by God or Îśvara ; the human personality, which is possessed by jîvas called men ; and the sub-human personality, which belongs to all other beings and things. Therefore, according to the Sāṅkhya, the universe is a system of different grades of persons, in which Îśvara or God is the Super-person or the Person of persons, and all other persons—men and other beings and things—are His individualisations, modes or moments.

THE SĀṄKHYA CONCEPTION OF PERSONALITY

CHAPTER I.

The Existence of God.

Does the Sāṅkhya System admit the existence of God ? This is the most important question which we have to determine at the outset, seeing that there is a widespread impression that the Sāṅkhya teaches *atheism* ; that it does not not only offer any positive proof of, but positively denies, the existence of God. This impression is directly based upon some aphorisms which appear, on a superficial view, positively to declare the non-existence of God; and this impression becomes confirmed when it is found that no attempt has been made in the whole system to explain and prove any of its themes by reference to the Godhead. But such an impression seems to me to be entirely false and based upon the mis-interpretation of those aphorisms ; and on a right interpretation the system would appear to be as *theistic* as the Vedānta.

The non-theistic character of the Sāṅkhya is made to rest on two series of aphorisms—the first series consisting of the aphs. 92-99 in Chap. I of the *Sāṅkhya Pravacana Sūtram*, and the second series, aphs. 2-12 in Chap. V, *ibid.* We propose to examine, in what follows, these aphorisms one by one in order to see whether they, or at least some of them, support the impression that the Sāṅkhya denies existence to God, or confirm the opposite view.

A. (1) "On account of the non-proof of Îśvara or Lord,"[1] or, more fully, "(it is no fault in the definition of perception that it does not extend to the perception of Îśvara), because Îśvara in not a subject of proof." This is perhaps the most important of all the aphorisms referred to above on which much stress has been laid by the upholders of the theory that the Sāṅkhya teaches the non-existence of Îśvara or God, or that, at least, there is no proof of the existence of Îśvara or God. For instance, Vijñāna Bhikṣu interprets it in this way: "On account of the absence of proof in regard to Îśvara, it is no fault, the last four words following from the 90th aphorism (as the complement of the present one)."[2] And he adds: "This negation of Îśvara is, as has been already established, only in accordance with the bold assertion made by certain partisans in order to shut up the mouth of the opponents. For, if it were not so, the aphorism would have been worded thus: on account of the *non-existence* (and not, on account of the non-existence of proof of Îśvara, as we have it)."[3] Aniruddha Bhaṭṭa gives a similar interpretation. He holds: "If there were evidence or proof to establish (the existence of) Îśvara, then the consideration of the perception of Him would properly arise. But no such proof exists."[4] Both of these commentators, therefore, maintain that there is no proof of the existence of Îśvara, though they do not deny positively His existence. So that, according to them, though the aphorism does not positively affirm *atheism*, it, at least, affirms *agnosticism*. But it is curious that they do not expressly say what sort of proof of the existence of God the aphorism denies. The Sāṅkhya admits three kinds of proof, of which *Testimony* or *Authoritative Statement* (Āptavacanam)

[1] "ईश्वरासिद्धेः।" सां. प्र. सू. १ अ. ९२

[2] "ईश्वरे प्रमाणाभावान्न दोष इत्यनुवर्त्तते।"

[3] "अयं चेश्वरप्रतिषेध एकदेशिनां प्रौढ़वादेनैवेति प्रागेव प्रतिपादितम्। अन्यथा ह्यीश्वराभावादित्येवोच्यते।"

[4] "यदीश्वरसिद्धौ प्रमाणमस्ति, तदा तत्प्रत्यक्षचिन्ता उपपद्यते। तदेव तु नास्ति।"

is one; and it asserts that whatever cannot be proved by perception and inference may be proved by Testimony. (*Vide, Sāṅkhya Kārikā*, ver. 6.) It is well known that the testimony of the Śruti proves the existence of Îśvara; so that when the Sāṅkhya says that there is no proof of His existence, it must mean some other proof. What is, then, that proof? If we carefully examine the context of the aphorism we find that it has been introduced only to show that by *sense-perception* (pratyakṣa) God's existence cannot be proved. Vijñāna Bhikṣu himself says that this aphorism is introduced as a reply to the contention: "But, still, (an opponent may say) the definition does not extend to the perception of Îśvara by yogins, devotees, etc., because, being eternal, the perception of Him is not produced through contact."[1] From this it is evident that, it is not proof *in general*, but proof by *sense-perception* only, that is said to be impossible. And it is undoubtedly true that Îśvara or God, who is eternal and infinite, cannot be perceived by the organs of senses. Thus, the *true* interpretation of the aphorism is, "there being no proof by sense-perception of the existence of Îśvara."[2] Although Vijñāna Bhikṣu has tried to obviate the inconsequence of his erroneous interpretation by adding that the aphorism affirms, not the *non-existence* of God, but the *non-existence of the proof* of the existence of God, these two interpretations come practically to the same thing, or at best, as I have said, lead to *agnosticism*, though not to positive atheism.

That Vijñāna Bhikṣu's interpretation is mistaken may be shown more clearly, if we compare it with two other aphorisms, *viz.*, (*a*) "the purposive creativeness of Prakṛti is through proximity to Îśvara, as is the case of a loadstone;"[3]

[1] "ननु तथापीश्वरप्रत्यक्षेऽव्याप्तिः तस्य नित्यत्वेन सन्निकर्षाजन्यत्वात्।"

[2] "ईश्वरस्य असिद्धेः इन्द्रियप्रत्यक्षप्रमाणाभावात्।"

[3] "तत्सन्निधानादधिष्ठातृत्वं, मणिवत्।" सां. प्र. सू. १ अ, ९६

and (*b*) " (actual) creativeness is of the Antaḥkaraṇa, because it is lighted up by Îśvara, as is the case with the iron."[1] In both of these aphorisms we meet with the word '*tat*'; what does it really imply? Both Aniruddha and Vijñāna maintain that it refers to puruṣa or the finite soul. But if we examine it more closely we find that it really refers to Îśvara, not to the puruṣa at all. The aphorist first speaks of Îśvara in aphorism 93, and all the subsequent aphorisms seem to have evident bearing on the same theme, having regard to the fact that in no one of them he speaks of puruṣa, *i.e.*, the finite self. So that, if we read each of them with the rest, it evidently follows that the word 'tat' in aphs. 96 and 99, like the word 'tat' occurring in aph. 93, must indicate Îśvara occurring in aph. 92. Moreover, this interpretation is further strengthened when it is compared with the interpretation of the Sāṅkhya Philosophy as given in the Śāntiparva of the Mahābhārata in connection with the conversation between Vaśiṣṭha and Janaka, and between Yājñavalkya and Janaka.

(2) "As we do not know any other Puruṣa by sense-perception except the released and the confined, the existence of Îśvara, who is above sense-perception, is not proven."[2] Vijñāna has explained it differently; he maintains that as Îśvara can be neither released from afflictions nor bound by them, *nor be anything of a different character*, there is no proof of His existence. Aniruddha also offers a similar explanation. But what do they mean by the expression, 'Îśvara *cannot be anything of a different character*'? Is He not eternally free (nityamukta), and therefore something of a different character? The real meaning is, that there is no something of a different character which can be known by sense-perception, because every *perceivable puruṣa* is either released or confined. Hence what the aphorism really means to prove

[1] "अन्तःकरणस्य तदुज्ज्वलितलाक्षीहवदधिष्ठाढत्वम्।" सां. प्र. सू. १ अ. ९९
[2] "मुक्तबद्धयोरन्यतराभावान्न तत्सिद्धिः।" सां. प्र. सू. १ अ. ९३

is that the existence of Îśvara cannot be proved by sense-perception. And this explanation only is consistent with that given to the preceding aphorism. This aphorism, therefore, confirms our previous conclusion.

(3) "As every perceptible embodied puruṣa is either released or confined, Îśvara is above the proof of sense-perception."[1] This aphorism evidently bears the same meaning as the preceding one. According to Vijñāna the word 'asatkaratvam,' occurring in this aphorism, means 'akṣamatvam,' *i.e.*, incapacity to effect anything. But it is difficult to understand how this meaning arises. It should mean 'asiddhatvam,' *i.e.*, absence of proof, and this meaning only is consistent with that of the preceding aphorism. Here no query arises with regard to creation (सर्गः), because that will make it quite unconnected with the preceding one, and will raise a new problem all on a sudden. Aniruddha also says that this aphorism explains the very same position as the preceding one.

(4) "(The sacred texts, which speak of Îśvara, are) either glorifications of the free Self, or homages paid to the perfect Ones (Vijñāna); or glorifications either of the free-like Self, or of one made perfect by yoga."[2] This aphorism is introduced as a reply to such queries as these: In numerous texts in the Śruti, the Smṛti and the Purāṇas there are stories to the effect that the devotees and yogins *saw* Îśvara, uttered words in His praise and adored Him; and also of the worship of Brahmā, Viṣṇu, Maheśvara and all the incarnations regarded as Îśvara: if He is really imperceptible, how were these possible? The reply does not mean to say that there is no Îśvara, but simply that 'Îśvara' there means the liberated souls or the souls made perfect by yoga, because they, having attained exaltation and perfection, may be regarded as Îśvara. Therefore, the aphorism clearly implies that those facts do

[1] "उभयथाप्यसत्करत्वम्।" सां. प्र. सू. १ अ. ९४
[2] "मुक्तात्मनः प्रशंसा, उपासा सिद्धस्य वा।" सां. प्र. सू. १ अ. ९५

not stand in the way of the theory that the existence of Îśvara cannot be proved by sense-perception. But it should be very carefully remembered here that this aphorism does not deny the truth of those texts of the Śruti, etc., where the real Îśvara is mentioned.

(5) "The purposive creativeness of Prakṛti is due to her proximity to Îśvara, as is the case of a gem or loadstone."[1] This aphorism is an answer to the question: How is Îśvara imperceptible, if He is always present in Prakṛti and guides her in her evolution? And it means to say that as a piece of iron acquires the power of attracting another piece of iron by virtue of its proximity to a loadstone, which itself remains inactive, so Prakṛti acquires the power of evolution by virtue of her proximity to Îśvara, who Himself remains inactive. Here we should carefully remember the real meaning of the word 'tat.' I need not repeat what I have said before in this connection. [See above (1).]

(6) "In the case of all particular effects the creativeness is of the Jîvas."[2] This aphorism clears up the meaning of the preceding one; it means to say that the Jîvas, *i.e.*, the finite puruṣas, are the direct creators of all particular effects Îśvara having nothing to do with them, at least directly. But it may be objected that if that is so, why has the Śruti made such false declaration that Îśvara has voluntarily created the world? The answer is given below.

(7) "Those teachings of the Vedas were meant for those who were perfect and of exceptional intellectual power, and who were, therefore, perfectly competent to understand their true meaning; and those teachings conveyed to them exactly what they meant."[3]

Now, another objection may be raised: If Îśvara be entirely unqualified and above all attachment to Prakṛti,

[1] "तत्सन्निधानादधिष्ठातृत्वम्, मणिवत्।" सां. प्र. सू. १ अ. ९६
[2] "विशेषकार्य्येष्वपि जीवानाम्।" सां. प्र. सू. १ अ. ९७
[3] "सिद्धरूपवोद्ध त्वाद्वाक्यार्थोपदेशः।" सां. प्र. सू. १ अ. ९८

how can Prakṛti acquire the power of creation by coming into contact with Him? The answer is given below.

(8) "(Actual) creativeness is of the Antaḥkaraṇa, because it is lighted up by Îśvara, as is the case with iron."[1] Or, more fully, as iron acquires the power of heating and burning other things by virtue of its proximity to fire, so Antaḥkaraṇa acquires the power of creation by virtue of its proximity to Îśvara. Here, too, the real meaning of the word 'tat' should be carefully ascertained. Aniruddha and Vijñāna both understand by it puruṣa or the finite self. But it appears, after careful examination, to mean Îśvara. The reasons are these: the argument begins with the aph. 92, which denies the proof of the existence of Îśvara by sense-perception, and all the succeeding aphorisms are introduced to confirm the conclusion by the refutation of all possible objections. Therefore, the whole argument, of which all the aphorisms hitherto considered are mere parts, is directly concerned with Îśvara, not at all with the finite puruṣa: that is to say, Îśvara, not the finite puruṣa, is the direct and main subject of the whole argument. Of course, in aph. 97 it speaks of Jîvas, but of that incidentally only. So that, it is more reasonable to understand by 'tat,' Îśvara, and not the finite puruṣa, inasmuch as only that will keep the continuity of the whole argument in tact.

B. Let us now come to the consideration of the second series of aphorisms on which the non-theistic character of the Sāṅkhya is based. Of these aphorisms at least two, to wit, the 16th and the 17th, are usually quoted in support of the contention. We should, therefore, examine them carefully. Vijñāna Bhikṣu supposes that these aphorisms are meant to refute the contention of the opponents that there are other proofs of the existence of Îśvara. He observes: "There are *pūrvapakṣins* or opponents who maintain that what has been

[1] "अन्तःकरणस्य तदुज्ज्वलितलाङ्गोहवदधिष्ठातृत्वम्।" सां. प्र. सू. १ अ. ९९

declared before, to wit, that there is no proof of the existence of Îśvara (Lord)—is not justified, because there is proof of His existence by means of His being the giver of the fruits of acts."[1] Aniruddha Bhaṭṭa remarks: "The non-existence of Îśvara has been established before. The author now states the argument (nyāya)."[2] Vedāntin Mahādeva makes a similar supposition. But it is very difficult to understand how such a supposition arises at all. A closer examination of the aphorisms conclusively shows that their purpose is quite different. In this instance the whole argument is intended to establish not that Îśvara does not exist, but that He does not exist as the designer, creator and governor of the world, at least directly, as some people say; and begins with the aphorism—

(9) "Not because (the cause is) directed by Îśvara (that there is) the resulting of fruits, (but) because the production thereof (takes place) by means of karma."[3] Vijñāna comments: "When the cause is superintended by Îśvara, there is the resulting of the transformation in the shape of the fruit of acts,—this is not proper, because of the possibility of the resulting of fruits by means alone of the necessary karma. Such is the meaning."[4] Aniruddha maintains: "Were Îśvara an independent creator, He could create without (the aid of) karma (but that is not so). If you say that He creates, having karma as an auxiliary, then let karma itself be (the cause), what need of Îśvara? Nor can an auxiliary obstruct the power of the principal agent, since, in that case, there would be a contradiction of its independence. Moreover, activity is seen to proceed from egoistic and altruistic motives. Neither can any egoistic motive belong to Îśvara. And were

[1] "ईश्वरासिद्धेरिति यदुक्तं तन्नोपपद्यते कर्म्मफलदाटतया तत्सिद्धेरिति ये पूर्व्वपक्षिणस्तान्निराकरोति।"

[2] "पूर्व्वसिद्धम् ईश्वरासत्त्वम्, इदानीं न्यायेनाह।"

[3] "नेश्वराधिष्ठिते फलनिष्पत्तिः कर्म्मणा तत्सिद्धेः।" सां. प्र. सू. ५ अ. २

[4] "ईश्वराधिष्ठिते कारणे कर्म्मफलरूपपरिणामस्य निष्पत्तिर्न युक्ता। आवश्यकेन कर्म्मणैव फलनिष्पत्तिसम्भवादित्यर्थः।"

His motives altruistic, then, He being compassionate, there would be no justification for a creation which is full of pain. Nor is there any activity which is purely altruistic, because, such activity proceeds from a desire for selfish gain, even by means of doing good to others, etc. Therefore, let karma alone be the cause of the world."[1] Vedāntin Mahādeva also comments in a similar strain. He observes: "Does Îśvara create by depending upon karma, or does He create by not depending upon it? In the former case let karma alone be the cause, and not Îśvara. In the latter case, there will be contradiction to His independence. Further, is the activity of Îśvara egoistic, or is it altruistic? It is not the former, because it is postulated (in the very conception of Îśvara) that all His desires have been fulfilled. It is not the latter, since there is no reason for His activity in a painful creation, when He is compassionate."

The above comments, it is evident, only show that what is denied is not the existence of Îśvara, but His causality as the giver of the fruits of actions. That the actions produce their own consequences *naturally*; that, therefore, there is no need of Îśvara for that purpose; and that the activities on the part of Îśvara involve contradiction;—these are what the aphorism purports to assert.

(10) "Because of his own benefit, (Îśvara's) causality (will be) like that of man."[2] As every man does an act for the sake of his own benefit, so Îśvara's act of creation will be for His own benefit, which is absurd, because, being perfect, He cannot want any benefit for Himself. Therefore, He is not the real giver of the fruits of actions. Remember that this aphorism does not mean to say that Îśvara is non-existent.

[1] "यदि ईश्वरः स्वतन्त्रः कर्त्ता, कर्म्मणा विनापि कुर्य्यात्? अथ कर्म्मसहकारी कुरुते, कर्म्मैव अस्तु, किम् ईश्वरेण? न च सहकारी प्रधानशक्तिं बाधते, स्वातन्त्र्यविघातात्। किञ्च स्वार्थपरार्थाभ्यां प्रवृत्तिः दृष्टा। न च ईश्वरस्य स्वार्थम् अस्ति। परार्थत्वे कारुणिकस्य दुःखमयसृज्यनुपपत्तिः। न च परार्थप्रवृत्तिः, परोपकारादिनापि स्वार्थलाभात् प्रवृत्तेः। तस्मात् कर्म्मैव जगत्कारणम् अस्तु?"

[2] "स्वोपकारादधिष्ठानं लोकवत्।" सां. प्र. सू. ५ अ. ३

(11) "Otherwise (Îśvara will be) like the human lord."[1] If Îśvara is supposed to do acts for His own benefit, He would be no better than a human lord. Therefore, also, He cannot be regarded as the giver of the fruits of actions. This aphorism, too, does not mean to assert that He is non-existent.

(12) "If, still, such a human lord be regarded as Îśvara, He is so in name only, *i. e.*, there is no difference between Him and man."[2] This aphorism, too, says nothing against the existence of God.

(13) "Without Rāga or passion, causality is not established, because Rāga is the invariable and unconditional cause in all activity."[3] This aphorism means to assert that if Îśvara be regarded as an agent, passion must exist in Him. But—

(14) "On (the admission), again, (of) connection with Rāga (He will) not (be) eternally free."[4] This aphorism together with the preceding proves that Îśvara cannot be the creator; because, if He be so, He will possess passion, which will be inconsistent with His eternally free nature. These two aphorisms, therefore, simply deny His creativeness or agency, not His existence.

(15) "If you say that His passion arises out of His connection with the powers of Prakṛti, then there will be the implication of His attachment."[5] This aphorism purports to assert that Îśvara is *unattached*, as He is said to be in the Śruti. He, therefore, cannot have passion arising out of His connection with Prakṛti.

(16) "If it be said that Îśvara may be regarded as the governor or creator of the world, simply by reason of His mere existence, although He does not actually do anything,

[1] "लौकिकेश्वरवदितरथा।" सां. प्र. सू. ५ अ. ४
[2] "पारिभाषिको वा।" सां. प्र. सू. ५ अ. ५
[3] "न रागादृते तत्सिद्धिः प्रतिनियतकारणत्वात्।" सां. प्र. सू. ५ अ. ६
[4] "तदयोगेऽपि न नित्यमुक्तः।" सां. प्र. सू. ५ अ. ७
[5] "प्रधानशक्तियोगाच्चेत् सङ्गापत्तिः।" सां. प्र. सू. ५ अ. ८

then everything may be called Îśvara, because the term 'Îśvara' will then have no meaning."[1] Aniruddha and Vijñāna understand by *sattā* the existence of Prakṛti, and, consequently, interpret the aphorism in different ways. But the result is the same, namely, that the causality of Îśvara is not proven. It should be noticed here that if their interpretation were true, the proper wording would have been, —'if, by reason of the existence of Pradhāna or Prakṛti.'[2] The word 'sattā' should, therefore, mean the existence of Îśvara, not of Prakṛti.

The three following aphorisms (17-19) are introduced to show that by neither of the three kinds of proof, as recognised by the Sāṅkhya system, at least the *direct causality* of an eternal Îśvara can be proved. But they are usually quoted as the evidence against His existence. So they should be very carefully examined.

(17) "On account of the absence of proof there is no evidence of the *causality* of an eternal Îśvara."[3] But Aniruddha, Mahādeva and Vijñāna all explain this aphorism as meaning that there is no perceptual evidence for the *existence* of an eternal Îśvara. Aniruddha explains the aphorism thus: "On account of the non-existence of perceptual proof, or of the evidence by Sense-perception, the *existence* of an eternal Îśvara is not proven."[4] Mahādeva comments thus: "'तत्सिद्धिः,' *i. e.*, the proof of the *existence* of Îśvara. Because the non-existence of the evidence by Sense-perception is well-known." Vijñāna annotates thus: "'तत्सिद्धिः,' *i. e.*, the establishment of an eternal Îśvara. In respect of Îśvara, to be sure, there is no evidence of Sense-perception. Hence, Inference and Testimony must be

[1] "सत्तामात्राच्चेत् सर्व्वेश्वर्य्यम्।" सां. प्र. सू. ५ अ. ९
[2] "प्रधानसत्तामात्राच्चेत्" वा "तच्छक्तामात्राच्चेत्।"
[3] "प्रमाणाभावान्न तत्सिद्धिः।" सां. प्र. सू. ५ अ. १०
[4] "प्रत्यक्षप्रमाणाभावात् (न तत्सिद्धिः)।"

intended to be the proofs supposed here, and they are not possible. Such is the meaning."[1] The last part of the above annotation is explicitly stated in the 18th and 19th aphorisms. It should be noted here that the word 'tat' is understood by them to mean the *existence of an eternal Îśvara*. But this certainly is not its real meaning. All the preceding aphorisms have been so long concerned with refuting the arguments offered for proving the *causality* of Îśvara: nowhere, as we have already shown, has there been any attempt to disprove His existence. Then, there is no reason why the aphorist suddenly introduces such an aphorism as this in order to disprove that. This not only breaks the continuity of the whole argument, which begins with aphorism 9 and ends with aphorism 19, suddenly at the middle, but is positively inconsistent with the last aphorism (*i.e.*, the 19th) which, as we shall show, explicitly states that according to the Śruti, Prakṛti is the cause of the world, not the eternal Îśvara; that is to say, what the Śruti denies is the *causality* of Îśvara, not His *existence*. But, in fact, neither the existence, nor the causality, of Îśvara can be proved or disproved by sense-perception, for, Îśvara, who is infinite and eternal, cannot be perceived by the sense-organs, so that the evidence of sense-perception is, by itself, incompetent to prove or disprove the *existence* of such an Îśvara. But it may still be contended that, like the existence of Îśvara, His *causality* also cannot be proved or disproved by sense-perception; for, how can we know by our sense-organs, that Îśvara is or is not the cause of the world? If He is eternal and infinite, and thus beyond the reach of our sense-organs, how can anything positive or negative be asserted with regard to even His causality? Thus, the aphorism itself is meaningless, and therefore out of place or inappropriate. In short, it has no bearing on the argument introduced by the aphorist for disproving the causality or the

[1] "तत्सिद्धिर्नित्येश्वरे तावत् प्रत्यक्षं नास्तीत्यनुमानशब्दावेव प्रमाणे वक्तव्ये ते च न सम्भवत इत्यर्थः।"

agency of Îśvara as the giver of the fruits of actions, etc. For this reason, I think, its true meaning is that in it the aphorist states in a *general* way that there is no proof whatever of the causality or agency of Îśvara, and then proceeds to state, more explicitly, in the following aphorisms the absence of the only two other proofs, *viz.*, Inference and Testimony, that are properly applicable in this instance. The next two aphorisms have real bearing upon the argument. The aphorist then proceeds to state them.

(18) "On account of the non-existence of any connection or relation (of Îśvara with Prakṛti), there is no inference, too, (about His causality or agency)."[1] By the term 'sambandha' all the three commentators, namely, Aniruddha, Mahādeva and Vijñāna, understand 'vyāpti,' *i.e.*, pervasion, which means *universal connection or going together* of two things, and is the essential condition of an inference. Aniruddha comments thus: "Since the pervasion or the universal going together (of two things) must be based upon previous perception, in the absence thereof, how can there be the apprehension of such universal relation? Nor can there be the apprehension of such universal relation in the case of one which is wholly unconnected or above all relation."[2] Mahādeva annotates thus: "On account of the absence of *vyāpti*, *i.e.*, pervasion, (there is no inference also of Îśvara)." Vijñāna explains thus: "*Sambandha* = *vyāpti* = pervasion or universal connection; *abhāva* = absence. Thus, in the syllogism—

1. Whatever is an effect, has Îśvara as its cause,
2. Consciousness and the rest are effects (which are pervaded by a cause),
3. Therefore, they must have Îśvara as their cause:

there can be no such inference in respect of Îśvara, since there is no observed pervasion or universal connection between

[1] "सम्बन्धाभावान्नानुमानम्।" सां. प्र. सू. ५ अ. ११

[2] "प्रत्यक्षपूर्व्वकत्वात् व्याप्तेः, तदभावात् कुतः सम्बन्धग्रहः? न च असाधारणस्य सम्बन्धग्रहः।"

Him and any effect (such as Consciousness, etc., for instance). Such is the meaning. "[1]

Thus, the gist of all the above commentaries is that there being no pervasion or universal connection between Îśvara and any of the effects in the world, that can be proved by sense-perception, which ultimately supplies all the premises of an inference, no inference can be drawn in respect of Him, inasmuch as one thing can be inferred from another only when they are universally and inseparably connected with each other, but if no such connection can be proved to exist, no inference can be drawn from one about the other. The case is exactly the same with Îśvara and any of the effects, *e.g.*, Consciousness, etc., found in the world; for, He is *asanga* or unattached or unconnected with anything of the world. Admitting that Îśvara has no attachment with the world (but really, as we shall prove, He has at least an *indirect* connection with it), what we can at most prove is the non-existence of His *causality*, not of Himself. The gist of the inference clearly and unquestionably shows that the *causality* of Îśvara cannot be proved from the premises supplied by sense-perception, which is, according to the Sāṅkhya the ultimate source of all premises from which an inference can be drawn. But it does not and cannot purport to indicate anything concerning the *existence* of Îśvara, for the simple reason that the disproof of His causality does not imply in any way the disproof of His existence : He may not be a cause, but that does not necessarily imply that He does not exist also : He may exist, though He may not be a cause ; that is, He may exist in another form, for instance, as an indifferent spectator (साक्षी). If we deny or disprove that A is the cause of B, we do not, of course, deny or disprove the existence of A, unless A's causality and existence are identical, which certainly is not

[1] "सम्बन्धो व्याप्तिः, अभावोऽसिद्धिः। तथा च महदादिकं सकर्तृकं कार्यत्वादित्याद्यनुमानेष्व-प्रयोजकत्वेन व्याप्यत्वासिद्धा नेश्वरेऽनुमानमित्यर्थः।"

true. Therefore, the interpretation of this aphorism offered by the above commentators as purporting to disprove the *existence* of Îśvara, is not only erroneous, but perverted. The aphorist is emphatic on this point in the next aphorism, which is—

(19) " The Śruti *also* speaks of the world as the product of Pradhāna or Prakṛti."[1] All the commentators interpret this aphorism in their own peculiar ways. Aniruddha comments thus : " There is the Śruti : ' from Pradhāna or Prakṛti is the world produced.' Therefore, the proofs demonstrative of the *existence* of Îśvara are apparent, and not real."[2] It is very difficult to understand how the inference of the *non-existence* of Îśvara follows from the fact of the world's being the product of Prakṛti. The fact that the real cause of the world is Prakṛti only proves, if it proves anything, that its real cause is not Îśvara ; but it does, by no means, prove that Îśvara is *non-existent* ; nor does it indicate or suggest any such conclusion. Whence does then Aniruddha draw such an absurd and preposterous inference ? He has certainly misunderstood the essential gist of the argument as a whole. It is certainly strange. Vijñāna interprets it in this way : "In respect of the web of creation, there exists the Śruti or Vedic declaration of its being the product of Prakṛti, but not of its having an intelligent being as its cause ; for example, One unborn (Prakṛti) having the colour of red, white and black, the procreatrix of manifold progeny like unto herself."[3] Here he plainly tells us that the Śruti denies only the causality of Îśvara, and not His existence. And this is confirmed by his quoting another text from the Śruti, to wit, ' Îśvara is the witness, intelligent, alone, and

[1] "श्रुतिरपि प्रधानकार्यत्वस्य।" सां. प्र. सू. ५ अ. १२

[2] "प्रधानात् जगत् उत्पद्यते इति श्रुतिः अस्ति। तस्मात् ईश्वरसाधकप्रमाणानि आभासानि।"

[3] "प्रपञ्चे प्रधानकार्यत्वस्यैव श्रुतिरस्ति न चेतनकारणत्व। यथा, अजामेकां लोहितशुक्लकृष्णां बह्वीः प्रजाः सृजमानां स्वरूपाः।"

devoid of the *guṇas*,'[1] which implies that Îśvara *exists* and possesses those attributes only, and not any such attribute as that of causality, as some say. He makes another curious admission, namely: "This denial of Îśvara is a mere prauḍhi-vāda or bold assertion made with the object of evoking dispassion in respect of the condition of being Îśvara, and also with the object of demonstrating that there can be Release even without the knowledge of Îśvara."[2] This admission evidently shows that, according to him, the aphorism does not *really* mean to deny the existence of Îśvara, but, yet, seems to deny it from some ulterior motives as stated above. This is, no doubt, a very curious and ugly way of avoiding some inconsequences which will follow from such denial, because it is palpably inconsistent with the numerous declarations, to the contrary, of the Śruti. So that, it is impossible to deny the existence of Îśvara, inasmuch as it is proved by the third kind of proof, to wit, the Testimony (आप्तवचनम्), which is admittedly the testimony of the Sruti. We are, therefore, bound to reject the interpretations offered by Aniruddha and Vijñāna.

From this somewhat long discussion we are now in a position to gather the results we have arrived at. It is now evident that the main object of the discussions as set forth in both the series of the aphorisms is, by no means, to disprove the existence of Îśvara, nor even that there is no proof of the existence of Him. The object of the discussions as set forth in the first series aims simply at showing that sense-perception is not competent to reveal the existence of Îśvara, that we cannot know Him by means of the organs of sense; and there are two significant aphorisms, to wit, the 5th and the 8th, which, as we have conclusively shown, *positively assert* the existence of Îśvara. Whereas, the object

[1] "साक्षी चेता केवलो निर्गुणश्च।"

[2] "अयं चेश्वरप्रतिषेध ऐश्वर्ये वैराग्यार्थमीश्वरज्ञानं विनापि मोक्षप्रतिपादनार्थं च प्रौढ़िवादमात्रम्।"

of the discussions set forth in the second series, is of a quite different nature. It aims simply at showing that the *direct cause* of the world is really Prakṛti, and not Îśvara, who is only *indirectly* associated with her, and that, as even the Śruti says that the *direct cause* of the world is Prakṛti, there is neither scriptural nor any other authoritative evidence to prove that Îśvara is the *direct cause* of the world. Of course, Îśvara may be called the *indirect* (गौण:) cause, for Prakṛti has acquired the power of causality by virtue of her proximity to Him, but in Himself Îśvara is beyond all attachment and eternally free. This is, in fact, all that the Sāṅkhya has to teach in those aphorisms. It is, therefore, most strange and inexplicable that such able commentators as Aniruddha, Mahādeva and Vijñāna have been so misled as to extract from them a theory which is absolutely inconsistent with the teachings of the Sāṅkhya Philosophy as expounded by other and far more authentic treatises; and what is more, even with Vijñāna's own assertion, that "the Lord, in the person of Kapila, taught, by this Viveka-Śāstra, Lessons on Discrimination between the Self and the Not-Self, consisting of Six Books, valid arguments, not conflicting with the Veda."[1]—(Preface to the Commentary by Vijñāna Bhikṣu on the Sāṅkhya Philosophy.) Again, "Now, in order to teach a complete system of valid arguments for the purpose of Manana, intellection, that is, assimilation, differentiation and elaboration, in thought, of the truth, thus heard, *i.e.*, learnt, from the Veda, there appeared on earth Nārāyaṇa, in the person of Kapila, as the author of the Sāṅkhya System of Thought, for the purpose of annihilation of the infinite sufferings of all jîvas or embodied selves: I bow down to Him."[2]—(*Vide* the Preface.) Many other similar texts may

[1] "श्रुत्यविरोधिनीरुपपत्ति: षड़ध्यायीरूपेण विवेकशास्त्रेण कपिलमूर्त्तिर्भगवानुपदिदेश।"

[2] "तस्य श्रुतस्य मननार्थमथोपदेष्टुं, सद्युक्तिजालमिह साङ्ख्यकृदाविरासीत्।
नारायण: कपिलमूर्त्तिरधीक्षदुःखक्षीणाय जीवनिवहस्य नमोऽस्तु तस्मै॥"

be quoted from the preface, but these are sufficient for our present purpose. We should notice two things in the above quotations : First, if the Lord, in the person of Kapila, taught the Sāṅkhya Philosophy, how could He teach a doctrine palpably inconsistent with the Veda, which undoubtedly declares the existence of Îśvara in numerous texts ? It should be remembered also that in the Tattwa-Samāsa, Panchaśikha-Sûtram and Sāṅkhya-Kārikā, there is absolutely nothing which purports to say that Îśvara does not exist, or that there is no evidence of His existence ; but rather as we shall presently see, there are *positive* evidences of the existence of Îśvara, not only in them, but also in the Sāṅkhya-Pravachana-Sûtram itself.

CHAPTER II.

The Existence of God. (*Continued.*)

We have examined and discussed so far only those aphorisms of the Sāṅkhya-Pravachana-Sûtram which appear to deny the existence of God or Îśvara. But there are other aphorisms which seem to affirm the existence of God, and thus supply positive evidence for such existence. We now propose to examine and discuss them. We have shown before that in the aphorisms 96 and 99 of the Sāṅkhya-Pravachana-Sûtram the existence of Îśvara has been admitted. But there are other aphorisms also which are more clear and emphatic. Consider the aphorisms 56 and 57 in Chapter III, *ibid.*[1] The former should be read with two preceding aphorisms in order that its true meaning may be clearly understood. They are : "It is not through the absorption into the cause that the end is accomplished, because, just as in the case of one who has dived, there is a rising again ;" [2] and "Though Prakṛti is not an effect, or not directed by another to act, yet, the rising again takes place through her being *subordinate*." [3] Now a question arises : To what is Prakṛtī *subordinate* ? Vijñāna explains it thus : "Through her being under the rule of the object of Puruṣa. Under the influence of the object of Puruṣa in the form of the manifestation of the discrimination (between Prakṛti and Puruṣa), one absorbed into Prakṛti is raised up again by her. Such is the meaning." [4] 'Pāravaśyāt' has been explained as

[1] "स हि सर्व्ववित् सर्व्वकर्त्ता"। सां. प्र. सू. ३ अ. ५६। "ईदृशेश्वरसिद्धिः सिद्धा।" सां. प्र. सू. ३ अ. ५७।

[2] "न कारणलयात् कृतकृत्यता मग्नवदुत्थानात्।" सां. प्र. सू. ३ अ. ५४।

[3] "अकार्य्यत्वेऽपि तदृयोगः पारवश्यात्।" सां. प्र. सू. ३ अ. ५५।

[4] "पारवश्यात् पुरुषार्थतन्त्रत्वात्। विवेकख्यातिरूपपुरुषार्थवशेन प्रकृत्या पुनरुत्थाप्यते स्वलीन इत्यर्थः।"

'puruṣārthatantratvāt,' *i.e.*, through her being under the rule of the object of Puruṣa: this is quite an unnatural meaning. The word 'pāravaśya' is derived from the word 'paravaśa' which means 'under the influence of another'; so that, 'pāravaśya' should mean *subjection to another.* Aniruddha gives exactly this meaning, for he means by 'pāravaśyāt' 'paratantratvāt,' *i.e.*, on account of subjection to another; and by 'paraḥ' he means 'ātmā,' *i.e.*, the Self or Soul. Now, the question is, who is that Self? The answer is given in the next aphorism: "He is the all-knower and all-doer."[1] The word 'sa,' *i.e.*, 'he', evidently implies Îśvara, for He only can be all-knower and all-doer. But Vijñāna gives a different interpretation. He observes: "For, he who was, in a previous creation, absorbed into the Cause (*i. e.*, Prakṛti), becomes, in another creation, the Ādi or Original Puruṣa, (bearing the character of) Îśvara or the Lord, all-knowing and all-doing; because, by reason of his absorption into Prakṛti, it is but fitting that he alone should reach the status of Prakṛti."[2] Thus, according to Vijñāna, 'sa,' *i.e.*, 'he,' refers to Puruṣa, and not to Îśvara at all. But by this interpretation he has committed some serious mistakes. The Puruṣas, who are absorbed into Prakṛti during the *pralaya*, are those who have not as yet been released, not those who have been already released; and only the *unreleased* Puruṣas rise in the following creation and act according to their previous instincts. Now, the question is, how can those unreleased Puruṣas, those who are still under the bondage and have not as yet attained self-knowledge, can become the all-knowing and all-doing Îśvara? Moreover, it should be noted that 'sa' has a singular number, and therefore indicates *a single* Puruṣa. Now, the question is, which one

[1] "स हि सर्व्ववित् सर्व्वकर्त्ता।" सां. प्र. सू. २ अ. ५६।

[2] "स हि पूर्व्वसर्गे कारणलीनः सर्गान्तरे सर्व्ववित् सर्व्वकर्त्तेश्वर आदिपुरुषो भवति प्रकृतिलये तस्यैव प्रकृतिपदप्राप्तौचित्यात्।"

of those numerous Puruṣas becomes all-knowing and all-doing Îśvara? Either all of them, or none must be so. Again, Vijñāna himself admits, in his explanation of the next aphorism, that it is universally admitted in the Śruti and the Smṛti that there is proof of an eternal Îśvara by means of proximity.[1] The aphorism runs thus: "The existence of such an Îśvara is proved or admitted."[2] The word 'Îdṛśa' here connects it with the preceding aphorism, and means 'such' *i.e.*, all-knowing and all-doing. But Vijñāna's interpretation of 'sa' makes these two aphorisms quite unconnected with each other; because, if 'sa' refers to puruṣa, 'sarvavit,' *i. e.*, all-knowing, and 'sarvakartā,' *i.e.*, all-doing, should qualify him, and cannot qualify Îśvara, *i.e.*, Lord, in the second aphorism. In that case the word 'Îdṛśa' will have no meaning, or will have quite an unnatural meaning. These considerations lead us to the conclusion that the word 'sa' refers to Îśvara.

Aniruddha also offers exactly the same interpretation of the aphorism 56. He observes: "Of what form, one may ask, is the Supreme Self? To this the author replies: He is all-knower and all-doer;—such 'abhimāna,' *i.e.*, self-consciousness, arises through its being reflected in Prakṛti."[3] He offers the following interpretation to the aphorism 57:[4] "Let the agency (of the Supreme Self) be just real (instead of being reflectional): what need, one may ask, of the supposition of (its being a) reflection? It follows, therefore, that the very Îśvara that is conceived in the Nyāya Darśana exists. In regard to this, the author says: If (you mean to say that) the Self, as conceived by us, is the Îśvara, let it be so. But there is no evidence in favour of (the

[1] "सान्निध्यमावेश्वरस्य सिद्धिस्तु श्रुतिस्मृतिषु सर्व्वसम्मतेत्यर्थः।"

[2] "ईदृशेश्वरसिद्धिः सिद्धा।" सां. प्र. सू. ३ अ. ५७।

[3] "परः आत्मा किंरूपः? इत्यत्र आह, स हि सर्व्ववित् सर्व्वकर्त्ता॥ प्रकृतिप्रतिबिम्बितत्वात् एवम् अभिमानः।"

[4] "ईदृशेश्वरसिद्धिः सिद्धा।" सां. प्र. सू. ३ अ. ५७।

existence of an Îśvara as) conceived in the Nyāya Darśana. And this has been declared in the aphorism (Book I, 92): 'Because Îśvara is not a subject of proof,' and also in the aphorism (Book II, 1): '(Of) Prakṛti (the agency, or the becoming the procreatrix is either) for the release of the released (or for her own sake).'"[1] Here Aniruddha clearly admits that the Self spoken of in the preceding aphorism (*i.e.*, aph. 56), and as conceived by him, *i.e.*, conceived as becoming all-knowing and all-doing through its being *reflected* in Prakṛti, is the Îśvara, and what he denies is the existence of that Îśvara as conceived by the Nyāya Darśana, *i.e.*, as conceived to be *really*, not reflectionally, all-knowing and all-doing. Also consider herewith the aphorism 116, Chapter V, to wit: "During trance (or absolute absorption), profound sleep, and release (Puruṣa rests in) the condition of being of the form of Brahman (Îśvara)."[2] Here especially mark the word 'Brahmarûpatā.' What does it really mean? Aniruddha comments on it thus: "The condition of having a similar form with Brahman, on account of non-perception of external objects anywhere, but not the condition of being of the very form of Brahman."[3] Vedāntin Mahādeva gives it the following interpretation: "The condition of being of the form of Brahman," *i.e.*, "the not-feeling of pain." Vijñāna explains it thus: "Brahmarûpatā is the resting by being full of its own svarûpa, or intrinsic form, by reason of the disappearance, through the dissolution of the modification of Buddhi (intelligence), of the limitations caused by them as its upādhi or external investment."[4]

[1] "तात्त्विकम् एव कर्तृत्वं भवतु, किं प्रतिविम्बकल्पनया? तथा च न्यायाभिमतः एव ईश्वरः अस्ति? इत्यत्राह—यदि अस्मदभिमतः आत्मा ईश्वरः, भवतु। न्यायाभिमते च प्रमाणं नास्ति। एतच्च प्रथमाध्याये "ईश्वरासिद्धेः" इति सूत्रे वर्णितम्। द्वितीयाध्याये "विमुक्तविमोक्षार्थम्" इति सूत्रे स्वार्थं परार्थत्वेन प्रधानप्रवृत्तेः इति उक्तम्। अत्र स्वार्थस्य गौणत्वम्।"

[2] "समाधि-सुषुप्ति-मोक्षेषु ब्रह्मरूपता।"

[3] "ब्रह्मणा सह तुल्यरूपता, सर्वत्र च बाह्यासंवेदनात्, न तु ब्रह्मरूपता।"

[4] "ब्रह्मरूपता बुद्धिवृत्तिविलयतत्कृतोपाधिकपरिच्छेदविगमेन स्वस्वरूपपूर्णतयावस्थानम्।"

And he adds: "And in our Śāstra the word 'Brahman' denotes conscious or intelligent existence in general, which is all-full, and devoid of limitation, impurity, and the like, caused by the upādhi or external investment; but not, as in the Brahma-Mîmāṃsā (Vedānta), merely a particular Puruṣa characterised by being the Lord''.[1] In this aphorism, it is admitted, at least by Aniruddha and Mahādeva, that the author of the Sāṅkhya recognises the existence of Brahman or Îśvara, whose very form, or a form similar to it, the Puruṣa assumes in trance, profound sleep and release, wherein he is free from any external investment or embodiment which may impose limitations upon him. This also proves that the Puruṣa does not differ from Brahman or Îśvara *essentially*, but differs from Him only when he takes an external investment or embodiment, that is, when he becomes *united* with Prakṛti and her evolutes. If we consider these admissions carefully we can easily find that there is only one Absolute Puruṣa, called Brahman or Îśvara, who by uniting Himself with Prakṛti, assumes numberless different investments or embodiments, and thereby differentiates Himself into infinite number of jîvas or individual Puruṣas. Vijñāna's interpretation seems to be erroneous, for, if all the Puruṣas attain *Brahmarūpatā* as interpreted by him, in trance, profound sleep and release, what distinction remains between them? Do they not become exactly alike, and thereby one and the same thing? How can they be exactly alike, and yet remain many? Manyness implies distinction, and without distinction there can be no manyness. So that Vijñāna's own interpretation leads to the fact that all Puruṣas are *ultimately one and the same*, *i.e.*, they are only different modes, moments or differentiations of one and the same Puruṣa: there is only one Puruṣa, to wit, Brahman or

[1] "अस्मच्छास्त्रे च ब्रह्मशब्द उपाधिकपरिच्छेद-मालिन्यादिरहित-परिपूर्णचेतनसामान्यवाची न तु ब्रह्ममीमांसायामिवैश्वर्योपलक्षितपुरुषमात्रवाचीति विवेक्तव्यम्।"

Îśvara, who differentiates Himself into, or appears in the forms of innumerable puruṣas, called jîvas. Thus, the last part of his interpretation is likewise erroneous.

Vedāntin Mahādeva means by 'sa hi' "प्रकृतिपदार्थः," *i.e.*, the thing called Prakṛti, and that alone. This is still more absurd. He supposes that "in the present aphorism the author discredits the view that there must exist some Intelligent Being as the superintendent of the Non intelligent Prakṛti, and that He must be all-knowing and all-doing." He further adds: "Because, as it belongs to Prakṛti, to undergo transformation, it is quite possible for her to transform as the modification of knowledge. Such is the idea." But it is difficult to understand how such a supposition arises at all. We have found that in the immediately preceding aphorism (*i.e.* aph. 55), the question arises: To whom is Prakṛti *subordinate*? and that the answer is given in the present aphorism; this is the view of both Aniruddha and Vijñāna. So that, Mahādeva's supposition is quite unreasonable and irrelevant, because it makes the present and the preceding aphorisms quite unconnected with each other. Another difficulty arises: How can Prakṛti, which is non-intelligent, be *all-knowing*? Mahādeva's explanation is curious. He tells us that as Prakṛti *alone* is capable of transformation, she can transform herself into being intelligent, and therefore, all-knowing. But he evidently forgets that Prakṛti can transform herself *only consistently* with her essential nature, and that nature being *unintelligent*, she *cannot* transform herself in such a way as to be *intelligent*, because it will then violate the law of transformation or evolution. It may, of course, be asked; How does then arise the evolute Mahat or Buddhi, *i.e.*, Consciousness or Intelligence, which is the first evolute of Prakṛti? If Prakṛti herself is non-intelligent, how does she give rise to Consciousness or Intelligence? The reply is, it is a well-known teaching of the Sāṅkhya that evolution of

Prakṛti takes place by virtue of her *union* (संयोगः) with the conscious or intelligent Puruṣa and that the consciousness or intelligence of Prakṛti is *apparent*, being due to the *reflexion* of his consciousness or intelligence upon her, just as the redness of a crystal vase is due to the reflexion of the redness of a flower. Thus, Prakṛti's consciousness or intelligence is *borrowed* and *apparent*. In her essential nature she is unconscious and unintelligent. (This is only the popular interpretation of the Sāṅkhya view, but we shall prove in the sequel that it has a deeper meaning.) But it may still be contended that after her becoming conscious and intelligent she may also become *all-knower*. But that is impossible, for, all-knower means one who knows everything, and Prakṛti as an all-knower must know that before she became all-knower, she did not know anything,—she was unconscious and unintelligent—that is to say, before she was conscious and intelligent she was conscious and intelligent, which is absurd and self-contradictory. For these reasons we must reject Mahādeva's interpretation and hold that 'sa' refers to the Supreme Self or Îśvara, as is held by Aniruddha, and not to Prakṛti.

We may, therefore, conclude that the Self to whom Prakṛti is subordinate and under whose influence she rises again to act or create, is none but the all-knowing and all-doing Îśvara. Now, a difficulty may arise: The Sāṅkhya, in agreement with the Śruti, upholds that Îśvara is *inactive* (निष्क्रियः). How, then, can He be *all-doing*? The reply is, as Prakṛti acts under His influence and guidance, He may, *at least indirectly*, be called all-acting or all-doing or the *ultimate source* of all agency or activity, just as a king, to quote a simile from the Sāṅkhya itself, is called a fighter, although he does not *actually* fight, but his soldiers do so under his order and guidance. This is the common answer, but I shall prove in the sequel that

Îśvara is the *real doer*, and Prakṛti is His *instrument* only.

Let us now turn to a more authentic treatise on the Sāṅkhya Philosophy, I mean the Sāṅkhya-Kārikā. Is there any positive evidence in it with regard to the existence of Îśvara? I think there is. In two significant verses it is positively declared that there is *one* Absolute Puruṣa, *i.e.*, the Supreme Self, as there is *one* Absolute Prakṛti. Examine these two verses: "The manifested is caused, non-eternal, limited, changeful, multiform, dependent, attributive, conjunct and subordinate; the Unmanifested is the reverse."[1] (Verse 10.) "The manifested has trine constituents, and is indiscriminative, objective, generic (*i.e.*, enjoyable by all souls), irrational and productive. So also is Prakṛti. *Soul is the reverse in these respects as in those.*"[2] (Verse 11.) Mark the last sentence. This means that Puruṣa or Soul possesses attributes which are opposite to those possessed by the Manifested, and, therefore, are these: Puruṣa is uncaused, eternal, all-pervading, unchanging, *one*, independent, indissoluble, uncombined, self-governed, destitute of the three constitutive factors, discriminative, subjective, specific or individual, rational and unproductive. In this list we should mark one attribute of Puruṣa, namely, *One*; Soul or Puruṣa is said, here, to be *one*; this is a very significant word and has been the cause of much dispute among the annotators. Therefore, upon its true interpretation entirely depends the solution of the problem whether Soul is one or many. Gauḍapāda says: "The manifested is multiform, the Unmanifested is single, so is Puruṣa also *single*."[3] Vāchaspati gives a different interpretation.

[1] "हेतुमदनित्यमव्यापि सक्रियमनेकमाश्रितं लिङ्गम्।
सावयवं परतन्त्रं व्यक्तं, विपरीतमव्यक्तम्॥"

[2] "त्रिगुणमविवेकि विषयः सामान्यमचेतनं प्रसवधर्मि।
व्यक्तं तथा प्रधानं तद्विपरीतस्तथा च पुमान्॥"

[3] "अनेकं व्यक्तमेकमव्यक्तं तथा च पुमानप्येकः।"

He holds: "Let it be that Puruṣa, like Prakṛti, is uncaused, eternal, etc.; he, like the manifested, is also *many*. If so, why do you say that Puruṣa is opposite to the manifested? For this, it is said (that Puruṣa is) like the manifested *also*. Here 'cha' means 'api.'"[1] This interpretation of Vāchaspati arises, as he says, from verse 18, which declares the multitudinousness of Puruṣa. The Sāṅkhya-Chandrikā confirms the interpretation. Prof. Wilson seems to side with Vāchaspati and observes: "The general position, that the properties of soul are the reverse of those of the products of nature, requires, however, some modification in one instance. A discrete principle is said to be multitudinous, many, *aneka*; consequently soul should be single, *eka*; and it is so, according to the Sāṅkhya-Bhāṣya. On the other hand, the Sāṅkhya-Tattwa-Kaumudî makes soul agree with discrete principles, in being multitudinous.....The Sāṅkhya-Chandrikā confirms the interpretation, 'The phrase *tathā cha* implies that (soul) .. ..is analogous to discrete principles in manifold enumeration.' This is, in fact, the Sāṅkhya doctrine, as subsequently laid down by the text, verse 18, and is conformable to the Sūtra of Kapila; 'Multitude of souls is proved by variety of condition:' that is, 'the virtuous are born again in heaven, the wicked are regenerated in hell; the fool wanders in error, the wise man is set free.' Either, therefore, Gauḍapāda has made a mistake, or by his *eka* is to be understood, not that soul in general is one only, but that it is single, or several, in its different migrations; or, as Mr. Colebrooke renders it (R. A. S. Trans., Vol. I, p. 31), 'individual.' So in the Sûtras it is said, 'that there may be various unions of one soul, according to difference of receptacle, as the etherial element may be confined in a variety of vessels.' This singleness of soul applies therefore to that particular

[1] "स्यादेतत् अहेतुमत्त्व-नित्यत्वादिप्रधानसाधर्म्यमस्ति पुरुषस्य, एवमनेकत्वं व्यक्त-साधर्म्यम्। तत्-कथमुच्यते तद्विपरीतः पुमानित्यत आह तथा चेति, चकारः अप्यर्थः॥"

soul which is subjected to its own varied course of birth, death, bondage, and liberation; for, as the commentator observes, 'one soul is born, not another (in a regenerated body).' The singleness of soul therefore, as asserted by Gauḍapāda, is no doubt to be understood in this sense."

Vāchaspati's interpretation seems to be strained and inconsistent with the tenor of the verses 10 and 11. If *tathā cha* means really ' like the manifested also,' it is very difficult to see why such likeness should be in respect of one attribute only, to wit, *anekatvam*, and not in respect of the other attributes as described in verse 10. If the Puruṣa resembles the manifested in being *many*, why should he not do so in being caused, non-eternal, limited, etc., also ? Vāchaspati does not explain this distinction. But, yet, it may be contended by others that the attributes of being caused, etc., are not applicable to Puruṣa; Puruṣa cannot be conceived to be caused, etc., for, if he were so caused, etc., he would be one of the manifested ; and this would be manifestly inconsistent with verse 3, where it is expressly stated that Puruṣa is different from both Prakṛti and the effects or the manifested.[1] The reply to this contention is, if Puruṣa is distinct from the manifested, he is also distinct from Prakṛti, but, yet, he resembles the latter in being uncaused, etc. Why should he not then resemble the manifested in being caused, etc. ? The retort will, of course, be that two contradictory sets of attributes cannot be possessed by one and the same thing. That is not true. One and the same thing may possess opposite qualities. Really there are no 'opposites' but only ' differents ' ; all things have their own places in the universe, and when they are in their own places, they are perfectly consistent with one another : opposition and inconsistency arise only when they are misplaced. So that, apparently opposite things may be juxtaposed without

[1] "न प्रकृतिर्न विकृतिः पुरुषः ।"

contradiction by being placed in their *own* positions. Thus, Prakṛti, which is admittedly *one, contains the conditions of being many*, for, otherwise, she could not be differentiated into many. If she were *mere* one—abstract one—bare or homogeneous identity, couped and confined absolutely within herself, she could not go out of herself into the many. Consequently, her *oneness* includes the ground and condition of *manyness*—she is one-in-many. Similar is the case with her other attributes ; she is uncaused and caused, eternal and non-eternal, infinite and limited, etc., at the same time. If she were *merely* uncaused, eternal, infinite, etc., and did not contain the ground and condition of being caused, non-eternal, limited, etc., nothing which is caused, non-eternal, limited, etc., could come out of her ; there could be no creation or evolution. But the author of the Sāṅkhya is intelligent enough to maintain that Prakṛti is not such a *bare* unity, but she is a complex unity of various constitutive elements, called Sattva, Rajas and Tamaḥs. In fact, Prakṛti, as the whole, contains attributes *peculiar* to herself and so far differs from the manifested, and also those attributes possessed by the manifested as her parts or evolutes, and so far resembles them. This view is not inconsistent with the teachings of the Sāṅkhya, and the Sāṅkhya doctrine of *Causality* corroborates it : thus, in verse 9 it is said : " Effect subsists (in the cause antecedently to its operation) ; for what exists not, can by no operation of cause be brought into existence. Materials, too, are selected which are fit for the purpose : everything is not by every means possible : what is capable does that to which it is competent ; and the effect is of the same nature with the cause." [1] In this verse particularly mark ' kāraṇabhāvāt,' *i.e.*, 'the effect has the same characteristics as the cause has,' [2] (Gauḍapāda), or

[1] "असदकरणादुपादानग्रहणात् सर्व्वसम्भवाभावात् ।
शक्तस्य शक्यकरणात् कारणभावाच्च सत्कार्य्यम् ॥"

[2] "कारणं यल्लक्षणं तल्लक्षणमेव कार्य्यमपि ।"

'from the fact that the effect has the same essential nature as the cause'[1] (Vāchaspati). Now, if we apply this doctrine to Prakṛti and her products, how can we say that she is *merely* one, uncaused, eternal, etc., and that the products are *merely* many, caused, non-eternal, etc.? If the cause and effect are of the same nature, they must possess common characteristics, though after the manifestation the effect assumes a new form and comes to possess also some other characteristics by virtue of which it differs from the cause. But this does not imply that those other characteristics are such that their ground and conditions are not in the cause; for, if they were not in the cause, the effect would contain some characteristics the cause of which was not its cause, but something else; that is to say, its own cause was not its *adequate* cause and would require to be supplemented by some other cause. What would that other cause be in the case of the manifested? The Sāṅkhya does not recognise any other cause than the Prakṛti; so that, Prakṛti must be recognised as the *only adequate* cause; that is to say, the cause which contains the ground and conditions of all the characteristics possessed by the manifested. This conclusively shows that Prakṛti possesses two antagonistic sets of attributes—one set she possesses in her own essential capacity, to wit, as the *whole*, and another set, in her other capacity, to wit, as the products or differentiations.

The above argument shows that a thing may possess contradictory attributes, and in fact, everything in the world possesses contradictory attributes; for instance, everything is *one* thing possessing *many* attributes—everything is a *single whole* constituted by *many* parts or elements; or, in other words, everything is *one-in-many*—*unity-in-variety*. The same is exactly true of Puruṣa; he is *one-in-many*, *uncaused-in-the caused*, *eternal-in-the non-eternal*, *infinite-in-the finite*, etc.: he is

[1] "कार्यस्य कारणात्मत्वात्।"

one Puruṣa differentiated into *many* Puruṣas; he is the *uncaused* cause of all the *caused* effects; he is *eternal*, appearing as and in all *non-eternal* things and beings; he is *infinite* including all *finite* things, etc. If the Puruṣa were a *bare* or *abstract one*—a bare undifferentiated identity—there could be no *many* Puruṣas: if he were merely *uncaused*, containing no ground and conditions of the caused, there could be nothing *caused*; if he were *merely eternal* and *infinite*, containing no ground and conditions of the *non-eternal* and the *finite*, there could be nothing that is non-eternal and finite. Or, in other words, though Puruṣa is *essentially* one, uncaused, eternal, infinite, etc., yet, he *appears* to be many, caused, non-eternal, finite, etc. And there is an interpretation of 'tadviparîtastathā cha pumān,' which confirms the above inference. It may mean that *Puruṣa is both opposite and analogous to them*. This interpretation seems to me to be true and sound. I shall dilate upon this point in the sequel. The interpretation offered by Prof. Wilson and Dr. Colebrooke that Puruṣa is one in the sense that he remains 'single' or 'individual' throughout his numerous migrations is evidently absurd.

The whole difficulty seems to arise from the *apparent* impossibility of reconciling verses 10 and 11 with verse 18. The latter runs thus: "Because birth, death, and the organs are severally allotted, and because activity is not simultaneous, and also because the factors are found unequally, the multiplicity of souls is established."[1] This verse, it is evident, tries to prove the multiplicity of souls, which is, therefore, apparently inconsistent with verses 10 and 11, where the unity or singleness of soul is declared. From this *apparent* inconsistency arises the attempt to modify the meaning of the latter consistently with that of the former. But no attempt has been made to reconcile them without modifying the meaning

[1] "जन्ममरण-करणानां प्रतिनियमादयुगपत् प्रवृत्तेश्च।
पुरुष-बहुत्वं सिद्धं त्रैगुण्य-विपर्य्ययाच्चैव॥" सां. का. १८।

of either. Are the verses really inconsistent? I do not think so. The truth is, verses 10 and 11 (we should always read these two together) speak of Puruṣa in his *absolute* character, *i.e.*, of the Parama-Puruṣa or the Absolute Soul, while verse 18 speaks of Puruṣas in their *relative* and *individual* character, *i.e.*, of Jîvas as associated with external investments or embodiments. Or, in more familiar words, the former speak of Îśvara or the Infinite Self, and the latter speeks of human or individual souls. It may be objected that the Sāṅkhya recognises only twenty-five categories, one of which is Puruṣa ; so that, it speaks of only one kind of Puruṣa, not two, and that one kind of Puruṣa must be that who is associated with the manifested, *i.e.*, the Consciousness or Intelligence, Self-consciousness, Manaḥ, the ten organs of sense, etc., and is, therefore, *multitudinous*. This is certainly not true. We have already found that the Sāṅkhya-Pravachana-Sûtram speaks of two kinds of Puruṣa, the Infinite Puruṣa or Îśvara and the finite and confined puruṣas or Jîvas. Similar is the case with the Sāṅkhya-Kārikā. It is true that the latter does never even mention the word 'Îśvara' in any of its verses, but it is perhaps because the word 'Îśvara' bears different meanings, and especially it is not used in the Śruti as equivalent to Brahman, the truly Absolute Self ; or it may be because the Sāṅkhya-Kārikā does not recognise any essential distinction between the Absolute and the human soul, the latter being nothing but the individualisation or differentiation of the former. But whatever might be the reasons, it is certainly no sound argument that as the Sāṅkhya-Kārikā does not mention the word 'Îśvara,' it does not recognise His existence at all. I am going to show that by the word 'Puruṣa' or the Soul, the Sāṅkhya-Kārikā means sometimes the Brahman and sometimes the Jîvas.

Let us examine verse 18 a little more closely, and we shall find that the reasons for which it declares Puruṣa to be multitudinous, do not really prove him to be so. Birth, death, the

organs, activities, and the three guṇas, all belong to or are adjectives of Prakṛti, or more properly, of her evolutes, and none of them belongs to Puruṣa, inasmuch as, being essentially eternal and infinite, he cannot be born, nor can he die ; being all-pervading, he cannot have any organs of sense ; being inactive (निष्क्रियः), he cannot act; and being non-composite, he cannot have the guṇas. Therefore, what the different allotments of birth, death, and the organs, the unsimultaneous character of activities and the inequality of the three guṇas really establish, is not the multiplicity of Puruṣa, but that of the *upādhis* or external investments in and through which Prakṛti manifests herself when conjoined with Puruṣa. We should be more explicit on this point, because it is the most important one. The *concrete* man has two sides or aspects : he has a *rational* side, and he has also a *non-rational* or *natural* side, the latter including, according to the Sāṅkhya, everything which is found in man except his Self or Soul ; or, in the words of the Sāṅkhya, he has a side which is represented by *Puruṣa*, and he has also a side which is represented by Prakṛti in the shapes of the external investments, namely, the Consciousness or Intelligence, the Self-consciousness, the Manaḥ, the ten organs of sense, the five subtile Elements, and the five gross Elements. The concrete man is the synthesis or union of Puruṣa and Prakṛti—of the Self and the Not-Self—of the Subject and the Object. In short, the concrete man is a *subject-object*. Puruṣa or the Self or the Subject in him is infinite, unchangeable, eternal, all-pervading, inactive (in the ordinary sense), and beyond all attachments ; but Prakṛti or the Not-Self or the Object in him is *actually* finite, changeable, temporal, non-pervasive, active and attached. Birth, death, etc., are, therefore, characteristics of the latter side of man, while the former is above and beyond them all. Thus, we find that verse 18 does not mean to establish the multiplicity of Puruṣas which is impossible, but the multiplicity of the *upādhis* or investments

in and through which Prakṛti becomes associated and conjoined with Puruṣa, thereby giving rise to multitudinous jîvas or human beings. Furthermore, it is evident that verse 18 indirectly establishes the *unity* or *oneness* of Puruṣa, and thus confirms what is affirmed in verses 10 and 11 with regard to his oneness.

But it may still be asked: As verse 18 clearly declares the multiplicity of Puruṣas (पुरुषबहुत्वम्), how can this be reconciled with his unity or singleness? Or, in other words, *how can Puruṣa be one and many at the same time*? This is undoubtedly one of the most important problems of metaphysics. This raises the old problem of *the one and the many*. The instance in point is man himself; man himself is one and many at the same time. He is the unity of Puruṣa and Prakṛti—of the self and the not-self; he is a subject-object. In whatever way, whether by proximity or otherwise, these two distinct and opposite realities are unified in man, it cannot be denied that he is a unity-in-variety—a one-in-many. But only this will not solve the problem. We are to prove that there is one Absolute Puruṣa and that all other Puruṣas are nothing but His individualisations or differentiations. In this way only can we solve the problem of the one and the many. What does the Sāṅkhya say about it? In the Sāṅkhya-Kārikā and also other treatises on the Sāṅkhya, Puruṣa is defined *in a general way*, although they assert that there are many Puruṣas; that is, the individual Puruṣas are not *separately* defined, but they have a *general* definition. They are all infinite, unchangeable, all-pervasive, eternal, rational, etc., that is, they all have exactly the same set of attributes. Thus, they are all *exactly the same*, but, yet, they are distinct and many. How is that possible? That may be possible only on the supposition that there is *really one* Puruṣa and all other Puruṣas are His *individualisations* or *differentiations*. Or, in the words of the Sāṅkhya, every *particular* Puruṣa is the Absolute Puruṣa in so far as He is associated and bound up with Prakṛti *in a*

particular way. This is the reason why the Sāṅkhya calls every particular Puruṣa infinite, eternal, all-pervasive, etc. No other solution is possible. For, every Puruṣa is perfect, and yet, there are numerous Puruṣas,—these two assertions are inconsistent, if we suppose the Puruṣas to be absolutely *different* and *independent*, inasmuch as they will then limit one another by virtue of their absolute differences, and will thus destroy their own perfection. Many beings perfect in the same sense and in the same way, and yet absolutely different, is a self-contradictory assertion.

If we now turn to the Sāṅkhya-Sûtram we find the same conclusion about it. After establishing the multiplicity of the Souls (*vide* Chap. I, 149, and Chap. VI, 45) it says: "From differences of upādhis or investments also arises the appearance of multiplicity of the one Self, as of Ākāśa by reason of water-pots, etc."[1] Aniruddha and Vijñāna suppose that this aphorism represents the view of the Vedāntins which the author of the Sāṅkhya means to refute. But there is no evidence to defend their views. Compare this aphorism with the following aphorism: "The teaching of the Śruti about the going of Puruṣa is in respect of his external investment, as in the case of the Sky."[2] Vijñana explains this aphorism as follows: "There are, of course, Vedic declarations about going with reference to the Puruṣa. But these should be regarded as having been made certainly in accordance with the arguments and teachings of the Śruti and the Smṛti about the universality or all-pervading character of the Puruṣa, and, therefore, only with reference to his connexion with an external investment, in the same way as motion may be attributed to the sky. Such is the meaning. On this point, the evidence is as follows: 'As the sky, enveloped within the water-pot, seems to

[1] "उपाधिभेदेऽप्येकस्य नानायोग आकाशस्येव घटादिभिः"। (सां सू. १, १५०)
[2] "गतिश्रुतिरप्युपाधियोगादाकाशवत्"। (सां सू. १, ५१)

move while the water-pot is carried (from place to place), (whereas, in reality) the water-pot is removed, and not the sky, so the jîva, the embodied Self, which is like the sky (in this respect).'—*Brahma Bindu Upaniṣad*, 13."[1] Read this with aphorism 59, Chap. VI, which runs thus: "And, in accordance with the Śruti about its going, though the Self is all-pervading, there takes place, in the course of time, its connexion with the place of Experience, through conjunction of the Upādhi—just as in the case of the sky."[2] Here Vijñāna evidently admits that those aphorisms represent the views of the author of the Sāṅkhya that the Soul is essentially one, eternal and all-pervading, but appears to limit itself by embodiment and thereby appears to be distinct. Thus we find that the interpretation given to the aphorism 150 (Chap. I) by Vijñāna is evidently mistaken and inconsistent with his interpretation of the last two aphorisms. To avoid misunderstanding we should also read aphorisms 151-154, which are connected with the aph. 150.

The aphorism 151 runs thus: "The Upādhi or investment is different, but not the holder thereof."[3] What this really means is, just as the Ākāśa appears to be different on account of the differences of its *upādhi*, for instance, water-pot, etc, but really it remains identically the same, so the Soul remains essentially the same, though it appears to be different by reason of its different embodiments. Aniruddha and Vijñāna interpret it in a different way consistently with their interpretation of aphorism 150. But we have shown that their interpretation of aph. 150 is erroneous, and therefore, their interpretation of the present one is also erroneous.

[1] "या च गतिश्रुतिरपि पुरुषेऽस्ति सा विभुत्वश्रुतिस्मृतियुक्तानुरोधेनाकाशस्येवोपाधियोगादेव मन्तव्येत्यर्थः। तत्र च प्रमाणम्—'घटसंवृतनाकाशं नीयमाने घटे यथा।
घटो नीयेत नाकाशं तद्वज्जीवो नभोपमः॥"

[2] "गतिश्रुतेश्च व्यापकत्वेऽप्युपाधियोगाद्देशकालाभो व्योमवत्"।

[3] "उपाधिभिर्भिद्यते न तु तद्वान्।"

The aphorism 152 is: "Thus, there is really no imputation of contradictory attributes to the Soul which is present everywhere by its unity."[1] This aphorism is an answer to the objection that if the Soul be really one, how can it become multiple and thereby can it have contradictory attributes, namely, unity and variety at the same time? Aniruddha and Vijñāna have given to this aphorism a different interpretation; but our remark on it will be the same as that on the preceding.

The aphorism 153 runs thus: "Being the property of another, *i. e.*, Prakṛti, it (the property of multiplicity) is only imposed upon the Soul, but really it does not belong to the latter on account of its unity or oneness."[2] Or, in plain language, the aphorism means to assert that the attribute of multiplicity *really* belongs to Prakṛti; but when she becomes conjoined and associated with Puruṣa, who is essentially one, the latter appears to be different and multitudinous. Or, in the words of modern philosophy, the One Absolute Soul appears to be differentiated into numerous Souls. Aniruddha and Vijñāna give a different interpretation, but it is as mistaken as their interpretations of the preceding aphorisms.

The aphorism 154 is this: "There is no contradiction (by the Sāṅkhya theory of multiplicity of Puruṣas), of the Vedic declarations of non-duality (of Puruṣa), because the reference (in these declarations) is to the *genus* (of Puruṣa)."[3] This aphorism raises a new problem and suggests a solution of the difficulty raised in connection with the interpretation of verses 10, 11 and 18 of the Sāṅkhya-Kārikā, as mentioned before. Some suggest that by the unity of Puruṣa is meant the unity of the *genus*, whereas by the plurality of Puruṣas is meant the plurality of the *species*. That is to say, when

[1] "एवमेकत्वेन परिवर्त्तमानस्य न विरुद्धधर्माध्यासः।"

[2] "अन्यधर्मत्वेऽपि नारोपात् तत्सिद्धिरेकत्वात्।"

[3] "नाद्वैतश्रुतिविरोधो जातिपरत्वात्।"

the Puruṣa is called *one*, it is regarded as the *genus*, and when the Puruṣas are called *many*, they are regarded as the *species*, or more properly, *individuals*. But we should guard ourselves against the confusion which may arise from the two meanings of the word 'genus.' In Formal Logic, *genus* is an *abstract notion* representing only the common attributes possessed by a class of objects. Thus, *genus* is not a concrete reality, but a group of attributes; while the *individuals* are the concrete things or beings possessing those attributes. In this sense of 'genus' and 'individuals,' what are *real* and *concrete* are the *individual* Puruṣas, and the One Puruṣa is nothing but an *abstract notion*, expressing the common attributes of the individual Puruṣas, and has, thus, no existence as a *real concrete object*. This is certainly not the true meaning of the One Puruṣa, as we have shown before. The term 'genus' has another meaning: In metaphysics 'genus' is not an abstract notion, but a *concrete reality*—the true reality, of which the individual things are only differentiations, modes or moments. (Hegel and the Neo-Hegelians.) In this sense of genus and species, the One Absolute Puruṣa is the true concrete reality, and all the individual Puruṣas are His individualisations or differentiations, and are, therefore, as real as the former. This is the meaning of the terms 'genus' and 'species' with the author of the Sāṅkhya-Kārikā also, when he speaks of Puruṣa as both one and many at the same time. It must be noted here that those who contend that the notion of the unity of Puruṣa is an abstract genus-notion, representing only the common attributes of the concrete individual Puruṣas, completely forget that according to the Sāṅkhya there are no *differentiating* attributes by which the Puruṣas may be distinguished from one another; and we have already proved that the only so-called differentiating attributes, to wit, birth, death, etc., are *not* the attributes of Puruṣas, but of the physical bodies or investments with which they are associated. So that, in the absence of any differentiating attribute

or attributes, there cannot be a *multitude* of Puruṣas: in short, there must be *one* and *only one* Puruṣa associated with numberless different investments, and thereby differentiating Himself into a multitude of Puruṣas or Jîvas.

Let us now turn to the Yoga-Sûtram of Patañjali. This system of philosophy is admitted on all hands to be the most important *supplement* to the Sāṅkhya System, and is regarded also as a Sāṅkhya Philosophy.[1] It is, therefore, needless to add that a thorough knowledge of the Yoga Philosophy is an indispensable requisite for the proper understanding of the Sāṅkhya System. The elaborate commentary of Yoga-Sûtram by Vyāsa is generally recognised to be an invaluable aid, not only to an accurate and thorough comprehension of it, but also of the Sāṅkhya System, as a whole. And some regard that commentary as the best one. The Pātañjala Darśana is generally called the *Seśvara Sāṅkhya*, *i.e.*, the *theistic* Sāṅkhya, to distinguish it from the *Nirîśvara Sāṅkhya*, *i.e.*, the *atheistic* Sāṅkhya. But it is difficult to understand the reasons for such a distinction: for, we have already shown conclusively that Kapila's Sāṅkhya is not atheistic, and the

[1] For instance, it is said by the great sage Vaśiṣṭha :—"यदेव योगाः पश्यन्ति साङ्ख्यैस्तदनुगम्यते। एकं साङ्ख्यञ्च योगञ्च यः पश्यति स बुद्धिमान्॥" *i. e.*, "that which the Yogins behold is exactly what the Sāṅkhyas strive after to attain. He, who sees the Sāṅkhya and the Yoga systems to be one and the same, is said to be gifted with intelligence." (*Vide* Śānti-parvan of the Mahābhārata, Chap. 305, 19.) The same view is repeated in Chap. 307, *ibid*: "यदेव शास्त्रं साङ्ख्योक्तं योगदर्शनमेव तत्," *i.e.*, "verily, the precepts that have been explained in the Sāṅkhya treatises are at one with what have been laid down in the Yoga scriptures." The same thing is said by the great sage Yājñavalkya (*vide* Chap. 316, *ibid*),—"नास्ति साङ्ख्यसमं ज्ञानं नास्ति योगसमं बलम्। तावुभावेकचर्य्यौ च उभावनिधनौ स्मृतौ॥ पृथक् पृथक् प्रपश्यन्ति येऽप्यबुद्धिरता नराः। वयन्तु राजन् पश्याम एकमेव तु निश्चयात्॥ यदेव योगैः पश्यन्ति तत् साङ्ख्यैरपि दृश्यते। एकं साङ्ख्यञ्च योगञ्च यः पश्यति स तत्त्ववित्॥" *i. e.*, "there is no knowledge like that of the Sāṅkhyas. There is no power like that of the Yoga. These two prescribe the same practices and ought to be remembered as immortal or as destroyer of death. Those men, who are not intelligent, consider the Sāṅkhya and the Yoga systems to be different from each other. We, however, O king, certainly regard them as one and the same. What the Yogins have in view is the very same which the Sāṅkhyas also have in view. He who sees both the Sāṅkhya and the Yoga systems to be one and the same is to be considered as conversant with the truth."

texts quoted above[1] from the Mahābhārata also show that there is no distinction between the Sāṅkhya and the Yoga as they teach the same precepts. Perhaps the reasons are these: that such a distinction is either due to the misleading and erroneous interpretations of some aphorisms of the Sāṅkhya-Pravachana-Sûtram, which we have already discussed, or to the fact that in Kapila's Sāṅkhya Îśvara has not been recognised as necessary for the liberation of the human Soul or Puruṣa, which is the primary theme; but in Patañjali's Sāṅkhya (*i.e.*, the Yoga System) such a recognition has been explicitly and emphatically made. Therefore, by 'Nirîśvara Sāṅkhya' we should mean, if we accept the phrase, that which does not recognise the need of Îśvara for the liberation of the human Soul, and by 'Seśvara Sāṅkhya' that which recognises such a need. In several places the Pātañjala Darśana emphasises such a need. We now propose to consider them.

(1) "Or, by virtue of the worship of Îśvara with a special kind of devotion, meditation and its results can be attained within a shorter time."[2] (2) "Who is that Îśvara over and above Prakṛti and Puruṣa?"[3] (3) "Îśvara is *that particular* Puruṣa, who is 'untouched by the vehicles of affliction, action and fruition,' or eternally free from pains, actions, fruits of actions and the desires or instincts arising therefrom."[4] Here mark the phrase 'that particular Puruṣa' (Puruṣaviśeṣa). Vyāsa comments on it in this way: "(The significance of calling Îśvara that particular Puruṣa is) that there are many liberated Souls who have attained liberation by freeing themselves from the three kinds of Bondage, but Îśvara is not like them, for, He had no such Bondage before, nor will have it in the future; liberation implies that there was Bondage

[1] *Vide ante*, p. 39 foot note.

[2] "ईश्वरप्रणिधानाद् वा।" (पातञ्जलदर्शनम्, समाधिपादः, २३)

[3] "अथ प्रधानपुरुषव्यतिरिक्तः कोऽयमीश्वरो नामेति?" (पा. दं समां २३, व्यासभाष्यम्)

[4] "क्लेशकर्मविपाकाशयैरपरामृष्टः पुरुषविशेष ईश्वरः।" (पा. द. समां २४)

before; but no such Bondage was possible for Him,—He never had any Bondage. Moreover, those Puruṣas, who become absorbed into Prakṛti, attain some sort of liberation from pains, etc., but they, too, return to a state of Bondage: but that is not possible for Îśvara,—He is eternally free and established in Himself."[1] (4) "In Him the seed of the omniscient is not exceeded."[2] (5) "He is the Teacher of the Ancients too, not being limited by time."[3] There is reference to Îśvara in other aphorisms also, *e.g.*, in aphorisms 1 and 32 of Sādhana Pāda, and in aphorism 6 of Vibhûti Pāda, but they need not be quoted here. The aphorisms quoted above are sufficient to show that Pātañjala Darśana recognises the existence and the need of Îśvara for the liberation of the human Souls; it is also evident that it recognises two kinds of Puruṣas—the *Absolute Puruṣa* and the *Individual Puruṣa*. What is the relation between these two kinds of Puruṣas we shall consider in the sequel. But it should be noted here that the Pātañjala Darśana does not assert that Îśvara is *indispensably necessary* for the liberation of human Souls, but it only asserts that worship of Him with special devotion helps them to attain liberation within a short time. Mark the word 'vā,' *i.e.* 'or,' which signifies that there are other means to liberation, of which the worship of Îśvara is one. In this connexion read especially the aphorisms 21 and 22 of the Samādhi Pāda. Thus, really, there is not much difference between the Sāṅkhya and the Pātañjala in this respect.

A very good account of the Sāṅkhya Philosophy is found in Chaps. 301-318 of the Śāntiparvan of the Mahābhārata. In Chap. 301 the Sāṅkhya System is extolled in a highly elevated

[1] "कैवल्यं प्राप्तास्तर्हि सन्ति च बहवः केवलिनः; ते हि वीथि बन्धनानि क्षित्वा कैवल्यं प्राप्ताः। ईश्वरस्य च तत्सम्बन्धो न भूतो न भावी; यथा मुक्तस्य पूर्व्वा बन्धकोटिः प्रज्ञायते, नैवमीश्वरस्य। यथा वा प्रकृतिलीनस्य उत्तरा बन्धकोटिः सम्भाव्यते, नैवमीश्वरस्य; स तु सदैव मुक्तः सदैवेश्वर इति॥"

[2] "तत्र निरतिशयं सर्व्वज्ञबीजम्।" (पा. द. समा २५)

[3] "पूर्व्वेषामपि गुरुः कालेनानवच्छेदात्।" (पा. द. समा २६)

tone, and the Sāṅkhya knowledge is described in very eloquent words, and even identified with the Brahman Himself.[1]

There we find that far from denying the existence of Brahman or Îśvara, the Sāṅkhya System identifies the knowledge described in it with Him and declares itself as the very form of Him; even the knowledge as existing in the Vedas, which is admittedly *theistic*, is described to be derived from the Sāṅkhya System. This is further confirmed by the following verses embodying what the great sage Vaśiṣṭha said: "Above the twenty-four categories already referred to is the twenty-fifth called Viṣṇu (or Îśvara). That Viṣṇu, on account of the absence of all *guṇas*, is not a category, though as that which permeates all the categories, He has been called so by the wise. The Unmanifest Twenty-fourth

[1] 'साङ्ख्या राजन्महाप्राज्ञा गच्छन्ति परमां गतिम्। ज्ञानेनानेन कौन्तेय तुल्यं ज्ञानं न विद्यते॥
अत्र ते संशयो मा भूत् ज्ञानं सांङ्ख्य परं मतम्। अचरं ध्रुवमेवोक्तं पूर्णं ब्रह्म सनातनम्॥
अनादिमध्यनिधनं निर्द्वन्द्वं कर्तृ शाश्वतम्। कूटस्थचैव नित्यञ्च यदहन्ति मनीषिणः॥
* * * *
अमूर्त्तेस्तस्य कौन्तेय साङ्ख्यं मूर्त्तिरिति श्रुतिः। अभिज्ञानानि तस्याहुर्मतं हि भरतर्षभ॥
* * * *
ज्ञानं महत्यद्धि महत्सु राजन् वेदेषु साङ्ख्येषु तथैव योगे।
यच्चापि दृष्टं विविधं पुराणे साङ्ख्यागतं तन्निखिलं नरेन्द्र॥
यच्चेतिहासेषु महत्सु दृष्टं यच्चार्थशास्त्रे नृप शिष्टजुष्टे।
ज्ञानञ्च लोके यदिहास्ति किञ्चित् साङ्ख्यागतं तच्च महन्महात्मन्॥"

i.e., "The Sāṅkhyas, O King, are gifted with great wisdom. They attain the highest end by means of this kind of knowledge. There is no other knowledge, O Kaunteya, that is equal to this. About this you must not entertain any doubt; the knowledge described in the Sāṅkhya is considered as the highest. That knowledge is said to be immutable, eternal and the *perfect Brahman Himself*; it has no beginning, middle and end; it is above all dispute and the *eternal cause* of the universe; it stands fully and without decrease of any kind; it is uniform and everlasting. Thus are its praises recited by the wise....The Śrutis say, O son of Kunti, that the Sāṅkhya System *is the form of that Formless One.* It is said, O Bharatarṣabha, that *the knowledge taught by the Sāṅkhya is the knowledge as taught by the Brahman*....That high knowledge, O king, which is in persons conversant with the Brahman and that which is in the Vedas, and that which is seen in other scriptures, and that in Yoga, and that which may be seen in the various Purāṇas, are all, O monarch, *derived* from the Sāṅkhya Philosophy. Whatever knowledge is seen to exist in great histories, whatever knowledge is, O king, in the Science of Economics as approved by the wise, whatever other knowledge exists in this world—all these originate, O great king, from the high knowledge that is found in the Sāṅkhya Philosophy."

(*i.e.*, Prakṛti) caused all that are mortal and manifest and exists in their forms or bodies; but the Twenty-fifth (*i.e.*, Puruṣa) is formless. Though a Soul, He exists in all hearts and in all forms; He is free, conscious, eternal, and though Himself formless, assumes all forms. Uniting with Prakṛti, which is the cause of creation and absorption, He also assumes the agency of creation and absorption. And on account of such union He, who is eternal, exists in time, and though, in reality, shorn of all *guṇas*, yet comes to be invested therewith. It is in this way that the Great Soul, through *ignorance*, thinks Himself to be the cause of creation and destruction (really absorption), changeful, and identical with Prakṛti"[1] (*Ibid*, Chap. 302, vers. 38-42.) In these verses it is evidently admitted that Puruṣa, who is described to be the twenty-fifth category or principle, is really Viṣṇu or Îśvara, for He is not, in reality, a category; He exists in all hearts and forms, *not in a particular heart and form only*; He assumes all forms and the agency in all creation and absorption. Thus, it is declared that the individualised Puruṣas or the human beings are nothing but the Absolute Puruṣa or Brahman *connected* with different investments and *acting* at different finite centres in different ways. This last fact is very clearly explained by an analogy in the following verse, declared to be the saying of the same great sage Vaśiṣṭha: "As the worm that makes the cocoon binds itself completely on all sides by means of the threads it itself weaves, so the Absolute Puruṣa, though really above all *guṇas*, invests Himself on all sides with them."[2] (*Ibid*, Chap. 303, 4.)

[1] "पञ्चविंशतिमो विष्णुर्निस्तत्त्वस्तत्त्वसंज्ञितः। तत्त्वं संश्रयणादेतत्तत्त्वमाहुर्मनीषिणः॥
यन्मर्त्यमसृजद्ब्रह्म तत्तन्मूर्तेरधितिष्ठति। चतुर्विंशतिमोऽव्यक्तो ह्यमूर्तः पञ्चविंशकः॥
स एव हृदि सर्व्वासु मूर्त्तिष्वतिष्ठतेत्मवान्। केवलश्चेतनो नित्यः सर्व्वमूर्त्तिरमूर्त्तिमान्॥
सर्गप्रलयधर्म्मिण्या स सर्गप्रलयात्मकः। गोचरे वर्तते नित्यं निर्गुणं गुणसंज्ञितम्॥
एवमेषो महानात्मा सर्गप्रलयकोविदः। विकुर्व्वाणः प्रकृतिमानभिनन्यत्यबुद्धिमान्॥"

[2] "कोषकारो यथात्मानं कोटः समवरुन्धति। सूत्रतन्तुगुणैर्नित्यं तथायमगुणो गुणैः॥"

Let us also consider what the same great sage Vaśiṣṭha said in the following verses in which the existence of the Absolute Puruṣa or Îśvara is more explicitly admitted : " When the individual Puruṣa comes to think of those *guṇas* as belonging to Prakṛti, then only, on account of his conquering them, he sees the Absolute Puruṣa or Îśvara."[1] (*Ibid*, Chap. 305, 30) Again, " When one begins to study and understand properly the twenty-five categories or principles, one then understands that the *oneness* of Puruṣa is consistent with the scripture (the Sāṅkhya System) and his multiplicity is opposed to it. These are the separate characteristics of the categories or principles and what is above and beyond them ; the wise have said that the categories or principles are the twenty-five evolutes ; what is not an evolute or what is above and beyond the evolutes is the twenty-sixth, *i.e.*, the Absolute Puruṣa or Brahman or Îśvara. The twenty-five evolutes are called categories or principles, and what is beyond them is the eternal Îśvara."[2] (*Vide ibid*, vers. 37-39.) It should be noted here that even the twenty-fifth category, called Puruṣa (*i.e.*, the individual Puruṣa), is also regarded as an evolute, while he has been said before to be *identical*, in essence, with the Absolute Puruṣa. The discrepancy is apparent only ; for, the individual Puruṣa being the Absolute Puruṣa in so far as He is invested with the three *guṇas*, he may be viewed from two standpoints : in so far as he is *individualised*, he may be regarded as an *evolute*, and in so far as he is viewed as apart from and shorn of that investment, he is one and the same with the Absolute Puruṣa. The *identity* between the individual and the Absolute Puruṣa is more explicitly stated in these verses : " The Supreme Soul alone is my friend. I can make friendship with Him. Whatever be my nature and

[1] "यदा त्वेष गुणानेतान् प्राकृतानभिमन्यते । तदा स गुणहान्यै तं परमेवानुपश्यति" ॥

[2] "पञ्चविंशतिनिष्ठोऽयं यदा सम्यक् प्रवर्त्तते । एकत्वं दर्शनञ्चास्य नानात्वञ्चाप्यदर्शनम् ॥
तत्त्वनिस्तत्त्वयोरेतत् पृथगेव निदर्शनम् । पञ्चविंशतिसर्गन्तु तत्त्वमाहुर्मनीषिणः ॥
निस्तत्त्वं पञ्चविंशस्य परमाहुर्निदर्शनम् । सर्गस्य वर्गमाचारं तत्त्वं तत्त्वात् सनातनम्" ॥

whoever I may be, I am capable of being like Him and can become at one with Him : I see my similarity with Him : I am, indeed, like Him. He is pure ; and it is clear that I am also of the same nature."[1] (*Ibid*, Chap. 307, vers. 26 and 27.)

The same thing we find in the conversation between the great sage Yājñavalkya and Janaka about the Sāṅkhya Philosophy.[2] From this it is plain that the Sāṅkhya System admits the existence of the Absolute Puruṣa or Îśvara. But in one verse it seems to cast some doubt upon the above inference. That verse is this : " In the Sāṅkhya System no category or principle above the twenty-fifth is admitted. That which the Sāṅkhyas consider as their highest principle has been duly described (by me). In the Yoga System it is said that Brahman, which is the very essence of knowledge, becomes the Individual Puruṣa only when invested with ignorance. In the Yoga scriptures, therefore, both the Brahman and the Individual Puruṣa are spoken of."[3] (*Ibid*, Chap. 307, vers. 45 and 46.) It is here positively asserted that the Sāṅkhya

[1] "अयमत्र भवेदस्मिन् सह मे च्छमम् । साम्यमेकत्वमायाती यादृशस्तादृशस्त्वहम् ॥
तुल्यतामिह पश्यामि सदृशोऽहमनेन वै । अयं हि विमली व्यक्तमहमौदृशकस्तथा" ॥

[2] "अव्यक्तरूपी भगवान् यतधा च सहस्रधा । यतधा सहस्रधा चैव तथा शतसहस्रधा ।
कोटिशश्च करोत्येष प्रत्यगात्मानमात्मना" ॥

i.e. " the Unmanifest Îśvara transforms Himself (literally, the inner soul) by Himself into hundreds and thousands and millions and millions of forms." (*Ibid*, Chap. 314, verse 2.) Again,

"यदानुपश्यत्यनेऽव्यक्तमहन्यहनि कश्यप । तदा स केवलीभूतः षड्विंशमनुपश्यति ॥
अन्यश्च शाश्वतोऽव्यक्तसंज्ञान्यः पञ्चविंशकः । तस्य द्वावनुपश्येतां तमेकमिति साधवः ॥
ते नैतन्नाभिनन्दन्ति पञ्चविंशकमच्युतम् । जन्ममृत्युभयोद्विग्नाः साङ्ख्याश्च परमैषिणः ॥"

i. e. " O Kāśyapa, if one continually reflects on the nature of the Individual Soul and its connexion with the Supreme Soul, he then succeeds in divesting him of the three kinds of pain and in seeing the Supreme Soul. The Eternal and Unmanifest Supreme Soul is considered by men of little understanding as distinct from the individual soul. But the wise see both of them as truly one and the same. Frightened by repeated births and deaths, the Sāṅkhyas and Yogins consider the Individual Soul and the Supreme Soul to be one and the same." (*Ibid*, Chap. 318, vers. 55-57.)

[3] "पञ्चविंशात् परं तत्त्वं पश्यते न नराधिप । साङ्ख्यानान्तु परं तत्त्वं यथावदनुवर्णितम् ॥
बुद्धमप्रतिबुद्धत्वाद्बुध्यमानञ्च तत्त्वतः । दृश्यमानञ्च बुद्धञ्च प्राहुर्योगनिदर्शनम् ॥ "

System does not recognise the existence of any other principle above and beyond the Individual Puruṣa: it is only the Yoga System which does so positively. But we have already shown that in numerous other verses it is clearly admitted that the Sāṅkhya System recognises the existence of the twenty-sixth principle, called Brahman or Îśvara. How can we, then, reconcile these two contradictory assertions? The reconciliation is possible in many ways. In the first place, the true reading of the verse may be different; in the second place, it may be an *interpolation*; in the third place, it is not wholly inconsistent with the verses previously cited. This verse may mean that the Twenty-fifth (*i.e.*, Puruṣa) is the highest category or principle, and what is above and beyond it is *not a category* (**निस्तत्त्वम्**), and is called by a different name, to wit, Brahman or Îśvara; and therefore, if the Sāṅkhyas do not read a category in addition to the twenty-five, no inconsistency will be committed. Moreover, having regard to the fact that all the categories or principles (even the Individual Puruṣa) are evolutes or manifestations (**सर्ग**:) of the Supreme Puruṣa, as has been distinctly stated in the preceding verses, it is no fault with the Sāṅkhya System if it omits to enumerate the latter as a category or principle. Again, it has been distinctly said in the previous verses that the Individual Puruṣa, who is the twenty-fifth category, is none but the Supreme Puruṣa as invested with the three *guṇas*, and that he is, therefore, able to be one and the same with the latter after casting off that investment. Now, after stating all these facts, if the Sāṅkhya omits to mention the name of the Supreme Puruṣa as an additional category or principle, there is no fault in the system; still less does it involve inconsistency in its assertions. Moreover, it should be remembered that in the previous verses it has been repeatedly and emphatically asserted that the Sāṅkhya and the Yoga Systems are one and the same, that is, whatever is taught by the one is also taught by

the other; but the Yoga System speaks of the Supreme Puruṣa, and this is sufficient to show that even though the Sāṅkhya System does not *directly* speak of Him (which is not true, as we have shown before), it at least *indirectly* does so; and still less does it deny or fail to recognise His existence. These considerations dispose of the apparent contradiction mentioned above.

In the second chapter of the Bhagavadgîtā, which is a part of the Bhîṣmaparvan of the Mahābhārata, the doctrine of the Sāṅkhya Philosophy with regard to the true nature of the human Soul and its relation to the Supreme Soul is clearly described. Let us consider those verses wherein that doctrine is expounded: "This Soul cannot be cut into pieces, cannot be burnt, cannot be moistened and dried up: it is eternal, all-pervasive, immovable, unchangeable, without beginning, unmanifest, unthinkable and supersensible."[1] (Vers. 24 and 25.) Such a description as this will only suit the Supreme Soul, for only the Supreme Soul is *truly* all-pervasive (**सर्व्वगत**:), while the Individual Soul is connected with only a particular investment (*i.e.*, the body and its adjuncts); and this interpretation is confirmed by the following verse: "This Soul, which is present in the bodies of all creatures, is always indestructible; for this reason you should not, O Bhārata, lament their death."[2] (Verse 30.) Along with this read also verse 17, which runs thus: "Know that Soul, by which all the universe is pervaded, to be indestructible; none is able to destroy it which is incapable of any increase and decrease."[3] It should be noted here that commentators like Śaṅkara and others agree that

[1] "अच्छेद्योऽयमदाह्योऽयमक्लेद्योऽशोष्य एव च। नित्यः सर्व्वगतः स्थाणुरचलोऽयं सनातनः।
अव्यक्तोऽयमचिन्त्योऽयमविकार्य्योऽयमुच्यते॥"

[2] "देही नित्यमवध्योऽयं देहे सर्व्वस्य भारत। तस्मात् सर्व्वाणि भूतानि न त्वं शोचितुमर्हसि॥"

[3] "अविनाशि तु तद्विद्धि येन सर्व्वमिदं ततम्। विनाशमव्ययस्यास्य न कश्चित् कर्त्तुमर्हति॥"

the terms 'tat' and 'yena' refer to Brahman or the Supreme Soul. In the last verse of that chapter the whole thing has been made completely clear. That verse is this: "O Pārtha, such is the rest in Brahman, and he who attains that state does not get again into the bewilderment of the world; he who rests in Him even at the time of death attains complete union with Him." [1] (Verse 72.) Similar verses are met with also in Chap. 13. For instance, "The Puruṣa (Soul), who exists in this body, is said to be above and beyond Prakṛti, the seer, agreeable and permissive, the lord, the enjoyer, the Supreme Îśvara and the Supreme Soul." [2] (Verse 22.) Similarly, "He sees aright who sees the Supreme Lord (Puruṣa) to be indestructible even in destructible things and to be existent equally in all things and beings." [3] (Verse 27.) The following verses in Chap. 14 are more emphatic: "Prakṛti is my (*i.e.*, of Îśvara) womb whereinto I throw my semen: from that, O Bhārata, spring all beings and things. O son of Kunti, Prakṛti is the mother (or the material cause) and I (*i.e.*, Îśvara) am the father (*i.e.*, the efficient cause) of all the forms that are generated in all classes of things and beings." [4] (Verses 3 and 4.) Thus, according to the Bhagavadgîtā also, the Sāṅkhya System acknowledges the existence of Brahman or the Supreme Soul of whom the Individual Souls or Puruṣas are only differentiations or individualised or specialised forms: or, in other words, *the Individual Puruṣas are but the Supreme Puruṣa or Brahman in so far as He is invested with the three guṇas.*

[1] "एषा ब्राह्मी स्थितिः पार्थ नैनां प्राप्य विमुह्यति। स्थित्वास्यामन्तकालेऽपि ब्रह्मनिर्वाणमृच्छति॥"
[2] "उपद्रष्टानुमन्ता च भर्त्ता भोक्ता महेश्वरः। परमात्मेति चाप्युक्तो देहेऽस्मिन् पुरुषः परः॥"
[3] "समं सर्व्वेषु भूतेषु तिष्ठन्तं परमेश्वरम्। विनश्यत्स्वविनश्यन्तं यः पश्यति स पश्यति॥"
[4] "मम योनिर्महद्ब्रह्म तस्मिन् गर्भं दधाम्यहम्। सम्भवः सर्व्वभूतानां ततो भवति भारत॥
सर्व्वयोनिषु कौन्तेय मूर्त्तयः सम्भवन्ति याः। तासां ब्रह्म महद्योनिरहं बीजप्रदः पिता॥"

In the course of a conversation between Kapila and his mother Devahūti about the Sāṅkhya Doctrine, as recorded in the Bhāgavata Purāṇa, we find a similar assertion with regard to the existence of Brahman or Îśvara. Consider the following verses: "When the chitta becomes free of the impurities caused by lust, greed, etc., arising out of such consciousness as 'this is I,' 'that is mine,' etc., and thereby becomes pure, and remains indifferent to both pleasure and pain, then the Individual Puruṣa beholds the Supreme Puruṣa (Brahman or Îśvara) who is above and beyond Prakṛti, free from the three kinds of pain, always self-revealing, subtile, indivisible, with a mind filled with wisdom, dispassion and devotion; and he indifferently sees also Prakṛti who has now become powerless." [1] (Skandha 3, Chap. 25, vers. 15-17.) Consider also the following verses: "Puruṣa is the infinite Soul which is divested of the three *guṇas*, above and beyond Prakṛti, supersensible, self-revealing, and by which the universe is manifested. That Puruṣa, out of play only, freely enjoys the subtile and divine Prakṛti who posseses three *guṇas* and is united with Him. Beholding her who creates various self-like creatures, He at once becomes stupefied through ignorance. In this way, by thinking her as His self, He comes to regard Himself as the performer of the actions which are really performed by the *guṇas* belonging to her. On that account, He, who is not the agent but only the witness, the lord, and full of bliss, comes to undergo the process of migration and to be put under bondage and subjection." [2] (*Ibid*, Chap. 26, vers. 3-7.) In this

[1] "अहंममाभिमानोत्थैः कामलोभादिभिर्मलैः। वीतं यदा मनः शुद्धमदुःखमसुखं समं॥
तदा पुरुष आत्मानं केवलं प्रकृतेः परं। निरन्तरं स्वयं ज्योतिरणिमानमखण्डितम्॥
ज्ञानवैराग्ययुक्तेन भक्तियुक्तेन चात्मना। परिपश्यत्युदासीनं प्रकृतिञ्च हतौजसम्॥"
[2] "अनादिरात्मा पुरुषो निर्गुणः प्रकृतेः परः। प्रत्यग्धामा स्वयं ज्योतिर्विश्वं येन समन्वितम्॥
स एष प्रकृतिं सूक्ष्मां दैवीं गुणमयीं विभुः। यदृच्छयैवोपगतामभ्यपद्यत लीलया॥
गुणैर्विचित्राः सृजतीं सरूपाः प्रकृतिं प्रजाः। विलोक्य समुहे सद्यः स इह ज्ञानगूहया॥
एवं पराभिध्यानेन कर्त्तृत्वं प्रकृतेः पुमान्। कर्म्मसु क्रियमाणेषु गुणैरात्मनि मन्यते॥
तदस्य संसृतिर्बन्धः पारतन्त्र्यञ्च तत्कृतं। भवत्यकर्त्तुरीशस्य साक्षिणो निर्वृतात्मनः॥"

connexion one thing should be carefully noted: Prakṛti has here been called *divine* (दैवी), and Puruṣa has also been called *above and beyond* Prakṛti (प्रकृतेः परः). Śrîdhara Swāmin, the eminent commentator of Bhāgavata, makes the following observations on these two words: "On account of her possessing two different powers of covering and projecting, Prakṛti is of two kinds: By virtue of her capacity for covering, she is the investment of the creatures (jîvas) called *ignorance* (अविद्या): and by virtue of her capacity for projection, she is called *divine power* (पारमेश्वरी माया). On account of His having two distinct forms such as those of *jîva* (creature) and *Îśvara* (the Supreme Soul), Puruṣa, too, is of two kinds: He is called a *jîva*, when He migrates from body to body through His identification with Prakṛti: and He is called Îśvara when He evolves the world by subjugating Prakṛti."[1] The other commentators have not questioned the reasonableness of the above remarks. They may, therefore, be accepted as true. Now, from those verses it is quite evident that Îśvara *exists*, and that He is the real cause of the world, while Prakṛti is only His *instrument*, and the Individual Puruṣas (jîvas) are none but Himself as invested with the three *guṇas* through *ignorance*.

The following verses are more emphatic on the existence of Îśvara: "Those (twenty-four) categories or principles enumerated (by the wise) have been said by me to be the abode of Brahman as qualified by the three *guṇas*; the twenty-fifth is called *Kāla*. Some say that *Kāla* is a power of Brahman or the Supreme Soul which causes dread in the mind of creatures that are confused by self-consciousness arising out of their connexion with Prakṛti; some others say that He, who prompts Prakṛti, when her three *guṇas* reach the state

[1] "तव चावरणविक्षेपशक्तिभेदेन प्रकृतिर्द्विधा तवावरणशक्त्या सैव जीवोपाधिरविद्या। विक्षेपशक्त्या सैव माया पारमेश्वरी। पुरुषश्च जीवेश्वररूपेण द्विविधः तव यः प्रकृत्याविवेकेन संसरति स जीवः। यस्तु प्रकृतिं वशीकृत्य विश्वसृष्ट्यादि करोति स परमेश्वरः॥"

of equipoise, to creative activity, is Îśvara and is also called *Kāla*. Îśvara may be defined to be that who, by His own super-natural power, exists in the inside of all creatures as their guiding principle, without being Himself touched by their affections, and outside as *Kāla*."[1] (*Ibid*, vers. 14-17.)

We shall also see in the next chapter in connexion with the discussion about the personality of Îśvara that the Upaniṣads as well, which derive, as we shall prove, their metaphysics from the Sāṅkhya, further corroborate the fact that the Sāṅkhya does not teach *atheism* or *agnosticism* at all, but it positively and emphatically admits and declares the existence of Îśvara or God.

[1] "एतावानेव संख्यातो ब्रह्मणः सगुणस्य च।
प्रभावः पौरुषः प्राहुः कालमेके यतो भयं।
प्रकृतेर्गुणसाम्यस्य निर्विशेषस्य मानवि।
अन्तः पुरुषरूपेण कालरूपेण यो बहिः।
सन्निवेशो मया प्रोक्तो यः कालः पञ्चविंशकः॥
अहङ्कारविमूढस्य कर्तुः प्रकृतिमीयुषः॥
चेष्टा यतः स भगवान् काल इत्युपलक्षितः॥
समन्वेत्येष सत्त्वानां भगवानात्ममायया॥"

CHAPTER III.

The Personality of God.

The essential characteristics of personality may be said to be two, or rather, one, expressible in two forms; and they are: (1) *Self-consciousness* or consciousness of a centre of reference, and (2) a self-conscious centre of activity or effort, otherwise called *Will*. These are the general characteristics of all forms of personality. But self-consciousness is not a simple or undifferentiated unity of an essence or substance, but a complex or differentiated unity of a 'system' or 'world'—a unity-in-multiplicity; and such a unity is not perfect everywhere, it is so only in God. Thus, God being a perfect unity of self-consciousness, He may properly be called *super-personal*. When, on the other hand, we say that God is a perfectly unified centre of all activity or effort, we mean the same thing, only expressed in a different form. Or, in short, God is a perfect intellect and a perfect will. If these characteristics constitute the personality of God, does the Sāṅkhya also attribute the same characteristics to Him? If the answer be in the affirmative, then the Sāṅkhya must be held to regard God as personal, and if, on the other hand, the answer be in the negative, then the Sāṅkhya must be held to regard God as impersonal. Let us consider which one of these two views it really maintains as its own.

We have found above that the Sāṅkhya defines Puruṣa *in a general way*. We should consider the definition very carefully. The Sāṅkhya-Kārikā defines Puruṣa in this way: "The Manifested is caused, non-eternal, limited, changeful, multiform, dependent, attributive, conjunct (and) subordinate.

The Unmanifested is the reverse."[1] (Verse 10.) "The manifested has trine constituents, and is indiscriminative, objective, generic, irrational and productive. So also is Nature. Soul is the reverse in these respects as in those."[2] (Verse 11.) 'Tadviparîtastathā cha pumān' may also be rendered in this way: 'reverse in *all* respects, but also appear to be analogous in those.' From these two verses we may gather the attributes of Puruṣa: He is *uncaused, eternal, all-pervading, unchanging, one, independent, irresolvable, uncombined and self-governed.* In these respects he resembles Nature (Prakṛti); but he has other attributes in which he differs from her. These adjectives are: *destitute* of the three *guṇas* or constitutive factors, *discriminative, subjective, specific or individual, rational,* and *unprolific.* We should also read another verse along with these two, namely, the verse 19, which runs thus: "And from that contrariety (before specified) Soul is proved to be a *witness, eternally free, neutral, perceiving* and *inactive.*"[3] If we turn to the Sāṅkhya-Sūtram we find the following attributes affirmed of Puruṣa: He is *eternal, all-pervading,* (Chap. I, aph. 12), *free from all association* (*ibid,* aph. 15), *eternally pure or unchangeable, eternally enlightened* and *eternally released* (*ibid,* aph. 19). The other treatises on the Sāṅkhya do not differ, even slightly, from the Sāṅkhya-Kārikā with regard to the attributes of Puruṣa. We may, therefore, accept the list of the attributes as given by the latter to be final.

Let us now carefully examine the above attributes. Puruṣa (the Absolute Self) is *rational, intelligent, eternally enlightened*; He is, therefore, a *Self-conscious Being.* But self-consciousness is, as we have seen, not a bare unity, but a system or whole, or what is called a unity-in-multiplicity. Is Puruṣa a bare unity—a unity of a substance, or the unity of a

1 "हेतुमदनित्यमव्यापि सक्रियमनेकमाश्रितं लिङ्गम्। सावयवं परतन्त्रं व्यक्तं विपरीतमव्यक्तम्॥"
2 "त्रिगुणमविवेकि विषयः सामान्यमचेतनं प्रसवधर्मि। व्यक्तं तथा प्रधानं तद्विपरीतस्तथा च पुमान्॥"
3 "तस्माच्च विपर्य्यासात् सिद्धं साक्षित्वमस्य पुरुषस्य। कैवल्यं माध्यस्थ्यं द्रष्टृत्वमकर्तृभावश्च॥"

system ? We should notice two other attributes : Puruṣa is called *subject*, and Prakṛti, *object*. Thus, Puruṣa is a Self-conscious Subject who has Prakṛti as object. But this alone does not make Puruṣa a unity-in-multiplicity—a system or a world ; Prakṛti may be entirely distinct from, and outside of, Puruṣa : in that case, even though Puruṣa may know her, yet He will not have her included in His contents. Thus, Puruṣa will be bereft of all contents, Prakṛti including, according to the Sāṅkhya, all the contents which He may know, and reduced to a bare unity. Therefore, to make Puruṣa a system, or world, Prakṛti must somehow be included in His contents. For that purpose the Sāṅkhya adds another adjective, *viz.*, *all-pervasive*. Puruṣa is not only a Self-conscious Subject, but also *an all-pervading consciousness* or *Subject*, that is, *He includes Prakṛti in His nature*. Thus, the *real concrete* Puruṣa is *an all-pervading Self-conscious System or World* of which Prakṛti is an element. He is, in other words, an *organic synthesis* of the Subject and the Object, of the Self and the Not-Self, or, in short, a *Subject-Object*. Prakṛti also is called *all-pervading*, but she is an *all-pervading Object* or *Not-self*. If there be an all-prevading Subject, there must also be an all-pervading Object as its correlate. And the concrete Absolute is, thus, an *organic synthesis*. What would be the logical consequences of this conclusion we shall see in the sequel.

In the meantime we should clear up some difficulties. Puruṣa is also called *free from all attachment or association* (असङ्गः) and *eternally released* (नित्यमुक्तः). If Prakṛti be included in the contents of Puruṣa, how can these adjectives be applicable to Him ? The answer is, that they are applicable, because they express only the *particular aspect*, and not the whole nature of Puruṣa. Puruṣa is not only *immanent* in Prakṛti, but also *transcendent* over her ; a self-conscious subject not only includes its object, but also knows itself as *distinct* from and *unexhausted* in respect of its contents by

the latter, just, for instance, as our Self includes all our ideas, feelings, willings, etc., and yet has not its contents exhausted by them : the former fact makes the subject *immanent* in, and the latter, *transcendent* over, the object. In so far as Puruṣa is transcendent, He is *eternally released*, *i. e.*, not under the influence of Prakṛti or the Not-Self, and also free from all attachment or association with her. It is only in this sense that the Absolute Puruṣa or Brahman is spoken of, in the Śruti, as eternally released and free from all attachment with Prakṛti. We should always remember that the Sāṅkhya definition of Puruṣa differs very little from that given in the Śruti, and those who are conversant with the latter know well that according to Nimvārka and Rāmānuja those attributes express only the *transcendent* (निर्गुणः) aspect of Brahman or the Absolute Puruṣa. There are other attributes of similar nature, to wit, *inactive*, *unchangeable*, *unprolific* and *specific or individual*, all of which express the *transcendent* aspect of Puruṣa. But in so far as the Absolute Puruṣa is *immanent* in Prakṛti, He must also possess the attributes of *activity*, *changefulness*, *productivity* and *individuality*, these being the attributes of the latter in so far as she is manifested. Thus, the Absolute Puruṣa, *in His wholeness*, has two sets of attributes apparently opposed to each other, one set expressing His *transcendent* aspect, and the other, His *immanent* aspect. Or, we may express the whole fact in another way : As a whole or system, the Absolute Puruṣa is *eternally free*, because there is nothing outside Him which can bind Him ; no doubt, He is bound by His contents (including Prakṛti), but in that case He is bound by what lie within Himself, by what are His own, that is to say, by Himself ; but ' self-bound ' is another name for ' free.' He is *free from all attachment or association*, for, there is nothing outside Him to be associated with : *inactive*, because, being self-complete, He has no want or purpose to be fulfilled, or no end to be realised, and therefore, He has no desire or volition which is implied in all activity called volun-

tary and human: *unchangeable*, because there is nothing outside Him which can change His nature, so that, as a whole, He is eternally unchanged: *unprolific*, because all production implies change, but He is eternally complete: *specific or individual*, because a systematic whole is the true individual. But as the parts (*i.e.*, all things and beings in the universe) are His own individualisations or differentiations, specific centres of His own activity, He possesses also the attributes of them. This fact is indicated by the phrase, 'tathācha pumān,' *i. e.*, Puruṣa is also analogous to the manifested (व्यक्तम्) in all those respects. In this connexion we may say that the Absolute is not only a perfect intellect, but also a perfect will, understanding by the latter a *perfect spontaneity* or a *perfectly spontaneous active principle*. In this sense the Absolute Puruṣa is *active*, but His activity does not imply any want, purpose, desire or volition; it is perfectly spontaneous. There are other evidences in the Sāṅkhya itself which point to the fact that though Puruṣa and Prakṛti are *distinct*, they are *inseparable* elements of One Absolute Whole, or they are *correlative* aspects of a Higher Synthesis. Consider the following:

(*a*) "The bondage of Puruṣa is not due to Prakṛti, for she herself is under His control." [1] (*Sāṅkhya-P.-Sûtram*, Chap. I. 18). Here it is positively affirmed that Prakṛti is *not independent* of Puruṣa, but entirely under His control. This assertion clearly shows that Puruṣa and Prakṛti are not two independent realities, but the latter is an element of the former, for, of two things wholly independent and unrelated one cannot be entirely under the control of another.

(*b*) "Without the conjunction of Prakṛti (there can be) no conjunction of Bondage in Puruṣa who is, by nature, eternally pure, enlightened and unconfined." [2] (*Ibid*, 19.) In the preceding aphorism it is asserted that Prakṛti is not the *direct*

[1] "प्रकृतिनिबन्धनाचेन्न तस्यापि पारतन्त्र्यम् ॥"

[2] "न नित्यशुद्धबुद्धमुक्तस्वभावस्य तद्योगस्तद्योगाहृते।"

cause of Bondage; here it is asserted that the *direct cause* is her *conjunction* with Puruṣa. Now, a question naturally suggests itself here: What is the cause of this conjunction between Puruṣa and Prakṛti? Prakṛti cannot be the cause of it, because, then, she will be the real cause of the Bondage, which will be inconsistent with the previous assertion of her non-causality in this respect. Puruṣa also cannot be the cause, because, He, being eternally free, cannot bind Himself. The Sāṅkhya says that the real cause is the *aviveka*, *i. e.*, non-discrimination or the absence of any knowledge on the part of Puruṣa about His distinction from Prakṛti. But this answer is absurd, because *aviveka* cannot pertain to Him, who is eternally enlightened. The true answer is, that the *conjunction is eternal*, and being eternal, it is *eternally uncaused*, for what is eternal cannot have any cause. The conjunction is *an ultimate fact*, because Puruṣa and Prakṛti are the inseparable elements of One Whole and co-exist from eternity; and therefore, no question about its origin may arise. Thus, the conjunction being eternal, the Bondage is also *eternal*, *i. e.*, the Absolute Puruṣa is eternally bound up with Prakṛti. What is, then, Release? As Bondage is the result of the *identification* of the Absolute Puruṣa with Prakṛti, so is Release the result of the knowledge of the *distinction* between them. Release does not mean *absolute separation* between them, because that is impossible. The Sāṅkhya does not entertain that view. Thus, the Absolute Puruṣa is both eternally bound up and eternally released. But He is bound up, not by anything external, but by what is internal, by His own elements, *i.e.*, in so far as He is *immanent* in His elements, He identifies Himself with them: He is released in so far as He *transcends* the elements —He knows Himself *distinct* from, and unexhausted in respect of His contents by, the elements. Therefore, Bondage and Release of the Absolute Puruṣa are *eternal*—eternally *correlative* aspects of His nature. Or, in other words, His bondage is His freedom or release, because it is due to His

own elements, and therefore, due to His own self (स्वाधीनता). But Bondage and Release have a different meaning for the Individual Puruṣas or men, which we shall explain in the sequel.

(*c*) "The agency or causality of Prakṛti is due to her proximity to Îśvara, as is the case of a loadstone."[1] (*Ibid*, 96.) Let us examine this aphorism carefully. As a piece of iron derives its power of attraction by virtue of its *proximity* to a loadstone, so Prakṛti derives her power of evolution by virtue of her proximity to Îśvara. Here proximity is described as an essential condition of acquiring such a power. But the analogy is inadequate and misleading. Proximity is a kind of space-relation, which can subsist between a loadstone and a piece of iron, both of them being in space. But how can it subsist between Îśvara and Prakṛti? In the first place, proximity implies an interval, however small, between two things; but there cannot be any interval or distance between Îśvara and Prakṛti, both of them being all-pervading, and included in each other. In the second place, proximity is possible between things which are in space, but Îśvara is admittedly *above* space. (*Cf.* Aph. 13.) Though, thus, the analogy is inappropriate, it contains one important truth: A piece of iron derives its power of attraction from a loadstone which must itself possess such a power before it can transfer it to the piece of iron; similarly, Prakṛti derives her power of evolution from Îśvara, who must Himself possess the power before it is transferred to Prakṛti. This aphorism, thus, admits that the Absolute Puruṣa possesses the power of evolution, but instead of exercising it Himself He transfers it to Prakṛti. A similar analogy is given in aphorism 99, which runs thus: "The actual causality is of the Antaḥ-karaṇa, because it is lighted up by the Absolute Puruṣa, as is the case with the iron."[2]

[1] "तत्सन्निधानादधिष्ठातृत्वं, मणिवत्।"
[2] "अन्तःकरणस्य तदुज्ज्वलितत्वाल्लोहवदधिष्ठातृत्वम्।"

Here, too, the point of the analogy is that Antaḥ-karaṇa (which is an evolute of Prakṛti) derives its power of causation from Îśvara, as the iron derives its power of burning from fire; and that, therefore, Îśvara possesses the power of causality, as the fire does the power of burning. If the fire did not possess such a power, the iron also could not derive it; similarly, if Îśvara did not possess the power of causality, Antaḥ-karaṇa, too, could not derive its power of evolution. Let us consider also aphorism 164.[1] Here, too, it is stated that the causality of Prakṛti is derived from the influence or affection of Puruṣa, which is, again, due to her proximity to the self-conscious Principle. In aphorism 51[2] of Chap. III, Prakṛti is described as a *born-slave* to Puruṣa. There are numerous other aphorisms which point to the same fact, and need not be cited here.

Sometimes the word 'saṁyoga,' *i. e.*, union or conjunction, is used to express the relation between Puruṣa and Prakṛti, by virtue of which the latter derives her power of evolution from Puruṣa. Thus, in the Sāṅkhya-Kārikā we have the following: "In order that Soul may contemplate Prakṛti and be released, the union of the two, like that of the lame and the blind, takes place; (and) thence creation springs."[3] (Verse 21.) It is curious that the Sāṅkhya-Kārikā exclusively uses the word 'saṁyoga,' *i.e.*, union, and the Sāṅkhya-Pravachana-Sūtram, the word 'sānniddhya,' *i.e.*, proximity, to indicate the relation. But the former seems to be more appropriate than the latter for reasons stated above. However, we should note one significant assertion in the verse cited above. Puruṣa is likened to a lame, and Prakṛti to a blind man, each of whom is altogether helpless without the other for the purposes of evolution. But according to the Sāṅkhya the

[1] "उपरागात् कर्तृत्वं चित्सान्निध्यात्तित्सान्निध्यात्।"
[2] "कर्मवैचित्र्यात् प्रधानचेष्टा गर्भदासवत्।"
[3] "पुरुषस्य दर्शनार्थं कैवल्यार्थं तथा प्रधानस्य। पङ्ग्वन्धवदुभयोरपि संयोगस्तत्कृतः सर्गः॥"

evolution is *eternal*, and therefore, the union of Puruṣa and Prakṛti is also *eternal* ; that is to say, Puruṣa and Prakṛti are *eternally united*, and are, therefore, two eternally correlated aspects of a Higher Synthesis—of One Absolute Whole. This point we have already proved from a different standpoint.

Before we conclude, we should consider two attributes which are affirmed of both Puruṣa and Prakṛti. They are, 'independent' and 'self-governed' (*vide* vers. 10 and 11 of the *Sāṅkhya-Kārikā*). If Prakṛti be independent and self-governed, how can she be inseparably related to Puruṣa ? But we have, on the contrary, proved by citing numerous texts that they are inseparably related and two eternally correlated aspects of a Higher Synthesis. How can we then reconcile these two seemingly contradictory assertions ? If we think about the matter more closely we find that there is really no inconsistency. We can view the nature of Prakṛti from two standpoints : Prakṛti possesses some attributes in common with Puruṣa, and also possesses some other attributes in respect of which she differs from Him. Thus, there are both identity and distinction between them. As far as they are *identical*, they are inseparably related, and, therefore, mutually supported or dependent ; as far as they are *distinct* and *opposed*, they are unrelated, and therefore, mutually unsupported or independent. Thus, Prakṛti is *independent* of Puruṣa from *a particular standpoint*, *i. e.*, she is *relatively* independent, absolute independence being out of the question, for if she had really such an independence, she would fall outside Puruṣa, and thus limiting Him would make Him limited or finite. Two things absolutely independent and yet analogous and all-pervading, is a self-contradictory expression. Prakṛti should, therefore, be called *relatively independent*. Prakṛti is also called *self-governed* ; but 'self-governed' is the same as 'independent.' Thus, Prakṛti is only *relatively self-governed*. This disposes of the remaining difficulties.

It is, no doubt, true that the whole tenor of the Sāṅkhya Philosophy is to maximise the distinction or opposition, and to minimise the relation, between Puruṣa and Prakṛti. To a less intelligent or careless reader the Sāṅkhya would appear to be a rigorously pluralistic system ; but to a more careful and intelligent one it would appear that the system, as a whole, is relatively pluralistic, teaching in many places, though less prominently, the unity of an Absolute Principle underlying the plurality. We shall revert to this point when dealing with human personality.

Let us now turn to the Yoga-Sûtram, which is also called a Sāṅkhya Philosophy, to see what view it entertains with regard to the personality of God or Îśvara. In this connexion we shall examine more carefully those aphorism of the Yoga-Sûtram which we have considered before, as in them Patañjali has mainly discussed the nature of Îśvara. These are aphorisms 23-26 [1] of the Samādhi Pāda. We have mentioned before two essential characteristics which constitute the personality of Îśvara, to wit, (*a*) perfect self-consciousness, or a centre of reference of all objects, and (*b*) perfect will or a centre of activity which is directly or indirectly the source of all activities in the world : Or, in other words, the personality of Îśvara consists in a *perfect intellect* and a *perfect spontaneity*. I shall show that these two characteristics are found to be described in the above aphorisms. In aphorism 25 [2] it is said that the seed of omniscience has reached its acme (**पराकाष्ठा**) in Îśvara, that is to say, He is described to be a perfect Intellect or a perfect Self-conscious Being. This inference is further confirmed by aphorism 26 where Îśvara is described to be the Original Preceptor (**आदिगुरुः**) of all other first-born preceptors, *e.g.*, Brahmā, etc. The meaning of this is that Îśvara is the original or ultimate Source of all knowledge and

[1] "ईश्वरप्रणिधानाद् वा" ।२३। "क्लेशकर्मविपाकाशयैरपरामृष्टः पुरुषविशेष ईश्वरः" ।२४। "तत्र निरतिशयं सर्व्वज्ञबीजम्" ।२५। "पूर्व्वेषामपि गुरुः कालेनानवच्छेदात्" ।२६।

[2] "तत्र निरतिशयं सर्व्वज्ञबीजम्" ।

truth. All these conclusively show that Îśvara is *a perfect self-conscious Being*, who is all-knowing and the ultimate Source of all knowledge and truth. From this all-knowing character of Îśvara follows His *eternity* and *infinity*, inasmuch as an all-knowing Being cannot be limited in time and space. If He were so limited, He could not know all; He could not know what was outside and beyond the limit, and thus, could not be an all-knower. Is He also a perfect Will? In aphorism 24 Îśvara is described to be a particular Puruṣa, eternally free from pains, actions, fruits of actions, and desires arising from them. Here He is described to be *destitute of actions and desires, i.e.*, of will, as ordinarily understood. Let us quote *in extenso* the comments made by Vyāsa on this aphorism: "Kleśas (pains) are avidyā (ignorance) and the rest; Karmans (actions) are vices and virtues; vipāka is the fruits of actions; āśayas are desires following therefrom. Though they are qualities of the *manaḥ*, yet they are called the qualities of Puruṣa, because he is the enjoyer or knower of their fruits or consequences, just as the victory or defeat, which really belongs to the actual fighters, is usually ascribed to their master. That *particular* Puruṣa, who is free from the enjoyment of those fruits or consequences, is called Îśvara. But there are many other Puruṣas called *kevalins*, who have also attained liberation called *kaivalya*; they have attained kaivalya by freeing themselves from three kinds of bondage. Îśvara had no connexion with those three kinds of bondage in the past, nor will have any in the future. As by "the liberation" is understood innumerable previous bondages, so is not the case with Îśvara. Or, as it will be possible for the absorbed into the Prakṛti to have innumerable future bondages, so will not be the case with Îśvara, for He is eternally free and eternally Îśvara."[1] Now, it is evident from the above that Îśvara is

[1] "अविद्यादय: क्लेशा:; कुशलाकुशलानि कर्माणि; ततफलं विपाक:; तदनुगुणा वासना आशया:। ते च मनसि वर्त्तमाना: पुरुषे व्यपदिश्यन्ते, स हि ततफलस्य भोक्तेति; यथा जय: पराजयो वा योद्दषु वर्त्तमान: स्वामिनि व्यपदिश्यते। योऽनेन भोगेन अपरामृष्ट:, स पुरुषविशेष ईश्वर:। कैवल्यं प्राप्तास्तहिं सन्ति च बहव:

eternally free from all vicious and virtuous actions, as well as from all desires arising from them. Actions also imply desires as their *motives*; but desires and actions are essential characteristics of will; it, therefore, follows that Îśvara has no will. But this is not the real inference for the following reasons: (*a*) In aphorism 23[1] it is positively asserted that Îśvara shows kindness to the yogins by enabling them to attain samādhi and its fruits in a shorter time. Let us examine Vyāsa's comments upon it: "When a yogin worships Îśvara with a special kind of devotion He *does kind deeds* to him at the moment of his meditation, and on account of that meditation the yogin's attainment of samādhi and its fruits becomes instantaneous."[2] Consider, then, aphorism 26.[3] In this aphorism it is clearly asserted that Îśvara is *the original preceptor* (आदिगुरु:) of all the first-born preceptors, *e.g.*, Brahmā and the rest, because He is above time, while they were born in time and had a limited longevity. It is manifest from this that Îśvara is not absolutely *inactive*, for He is the *ultimate instructor* of all knowledge and truth. This fact is made more explicit and emphatic in the commentary of Vyāsa on the aphorism 25.[4] Vyāsa holds: "Even though He (*i.e.*, Îśvara) has no want so far as He Himself is concerned, yet He has want in the shape of doing good to the Jîvas: the latter want is this: I shall liberate the entangled Puruṣas during the Kalpa-pralaya and the Mahāpralaya by means of instruction about knowledge and religion. It is likewise said: 'The primeval Seer, (incarnated) through the

केवलिन:; ते हि बीजे बन्धनानि छित्त्वा कैवल्यं प्राप्ता:। ईश्वरस्य च तत्सम्बन्धो न भूतो न भावी; यथा मुक्तस्य पूर्व्वा बन्धकोटि: प्रज्ञायते, नैवमीश्वरस्य। यथा वा प्रकृतिलीनस्य उत्तरा बन्धकोटि: सम्भाव्यते, नैवमीश्वरस्य; स तु सदैव मुक्त: सदैवेश्वर इति।"

[1] "ईश्वरप्रणिधानाद् वा।"

[2] "प्रणिधानात् भक्तिविशेषात् आवर्ज्जित ईश्वरस्तमनुगृह्णाति अभिध्यानमावेण, तदभिध्यानादपि योगिन आसन्नतम: समाधिलाभ: फलञ्च भवतीति।"

[3] "पूर्व्वेषामपि गुरु: कालेनानवच्छेदात्।"

[4] "तच्च निरतिशयं सर्व्वज्ञबीजम्।"

medium of an artificial mind, (as) the mighty divine sage (Kapila), out of compassion (towards all entangled Puruṣas), revealed the (Sāṅkhya) doctrines, in a systematic way, to Āsuri, who desired to know them.' "[1] From this it is conclusively proved that Îśvara is not conceived by the Yoga-Sûtram as absolutely *inactive*.

(*b*) How, then, is this last assertion to be reconciled with the previous one ? In the aphorism 24[2] it is asserted that Îśvara is eternally free from actions and their consequent desires : in other aphorisms, to wit, 23, 25 and 26, it is held that He is not wholly inactive and destitute of desires : He does some acts and has some desires. How can we reconcile them ? The reconciliation is easy. When Îśvara is said to be eternally free from actions and desires, these actions are *good* or *bad*, *virtuous* or *vicious*, actions ; and the desires are those which arise out of them. Now, those actions and desires are possible only for man : the epithets 'good' or 'bad,' 'virtuous' or 'vicious,' are not applicable to the actions of Îśvara, for He is above duties and virtues. The sense of duty is the sense of the conflict between Reason and Inclinations—between the Higher or rational Self in man and his Lower or passional Self ; and virtue is nothing but a habit of doing duty. In Îśvara no such struggle is possible, because He has no such passions and desires, which resemble those which arise from the physical wants and appetites of man : Îśvara is perfectly rational and perfectly realised, so that His actions cannot be called good or bad, virtuous or vicious in the same sense in which human actions are so called : Or, more appropriately, those epithets are wholly inappli-

[1] "तस्यात्मानुग्रहाभावेऽपि भूतानुग्रहः प्रयोजनम्, ज्ञानधर्मोपदेशेन कल्पप्रलयमहाप्रलयेषु संसारिणः पुरुषान् उद्धरिष्यामीति। तथाचोक्तम् 'आदिविद्वान् निर्माण-चित्तमधिष्ठाय कारुण्यात् भगवान् परमर्षिरासुरये जिज्ञासमानाय तन्त्रं प्रोवाच' इति ॥"

[2] "क्लेशकर्मविपाकाशयैरपरामृष्टः पुरुषविशेष ईश्वरः।"

cable to His actions. This proves that Îśvara is not inactive, but that He *acts*, and His acts should not be called good (कुशलम्) or bad (अकुशलम्), virtuous or vicious ; and therefore, He is eternally free *only* from those actions to which those epithets are applicable. Again, divine actions, as we have found, are not prompted by desire, purpose, end or motive, as ordinarily understood, because such a desire, etc., arise out of human conditions which are absent in Îśvara : His actions are *perfectly spontaneous*. The same is true of desires : Îśvara has, no doubt, desires, but these desires are not determined by, or follow from, the good or bad actions, because He is eternally free from such actions. Like His activities, His desires also are *perfectly spontaneous*, and are not determined by any wants. In short, the activities, desires, etc., of Îśvara are of a quite different nature, the most imperfect resemblance of which is found in the most highly developed life as that of a saint or prophet. Thus we find that the two *apparently* inconsistent assertions are not really so ; they are both true so far as they go. We may, therefore, conclude that, according to the Yoga-Sûtram, Îśvara is a perfect Self-consciousness or Intellect ; He is, therefore, both a *perfect Intellect* and a *perfect Will*. Thus, He is a *person*, or rather *superperson* (Puruṣa-viśeṣa).

From the verses quoted above from the Śāntiparva of the Mahābhārata it can be inferred that Îśvara is not only a Self-conscious Spirit, but also a Will, that is, an Active Principle. There are several other verses which go to confirm the above conclusion.[1]

[1] *E. g.*, " दिवसान्ते गुणानेतानग्रेत्यैकोऽवतिष्ठते। रश्मिजालमिवादित्यस्तत्काले नियच्छति ॥
एवमेषोऽसकृत् सर्व्वं क्रीड़ार्थमभिमन्यते। आत्मरूपगुणानेतान् विविधान् हृदयप्रियान् ॥
एवमेतां विकुर्व्वाणः सर्गप्रलयधर्म्मिणीम्। क्रियां क्रियापथे रक्तस्त्रिगुणां त्रिगुणाधिपः ॥"

i.e., " When the time comes for Universal Dissolution, all existent objects and *guṇas* are withdrawn by the Supreme Soul, which then exists alone like the sun withdrawing at evening all his rays ; and when the time comes for Creation, He once more creates and

But one point should be made clear in this connexion. Although in the above[1] verses it is definitely and distinctly asserted that Îśvara or the Supreme Soul is the *real cause* of

spreads them out like the sun shedding his rays when the morning comes. Thus the Supreme Soul, for the sake of sports, repeatedly considers Himself invested with all these conditions, which are His own forms and *guṇas* infinite in number and agreeable to Himself. It is thus that the Supreme Soul, though really above the *guṇas*, becomes attached to the path of acts and creates, by modification, Nature invested with the conditions of birth and death, and at once with all acts and conditions which are characterised by the three *guṇas*." (Śānti P. Chap. 303, verses 31-33.) Again,

"स लिङ्गान्तरमासाद्य प्राकृतं लिङ्गमत्रणम्। त्रणद्वाराण्यधिष्ठाय कर्म्मणात्मनि मन्यते ॥"

i.e., "Although the Supreme Soul is not subject to changes of any kind, and is the active principle that sets nature (Prakṛti) in motion, yet entering a body which is united with the senses of knowledge and actions, He considers all the acts of those senses as His own." (*Ibid*, ver. 48.)

" अप्रबुद्धमथाव्यक्तमगुणं प्राहुरीश्वरम्। निर्गुणञ्चेश्वरं नित्यमधिष्ठातारमेव च ॥"

i. e., " The Supreme Soul is said to be that who is above the attribute of Ignorance or Error, who is Unmanifest and beyond all *guṇas*, who is called the Supreme, who *ordains* all things, who is Eternal and Immutable, and overrules Nature and all her *guṇas*." (Chap. 305, ver. 32.) Still again,

" सर्गप्रलय एतावान् प्रकृतेर्दृश्यसत्तम। एकत्वं प्रलये चास्य बहुत्वञ्च यदास्रजत् ॥
एवमेव च राजेन्द्र विज्ञेयं ज्ञानकोविदैः। अधिष्ठातारमव्यक्तमस्याप्येतन्निदर्शनम् ॥
एकत्वञ्च बहुत्वञ्च प्रकृतेरर्थतत्त्वतः। एकत्वं प्रलये चास्य बहुत्वञ्च प्रवर्त्तनात् ॥
बहुधात्मा प्रकुर्व्वीत प्रकृतिं प्रसवात्मिकां। तञ्च चेवं महानात्मा पञ्चविंशोऽधितिष्ठति ॥
अधिष्ठातेति राजेन्द्र प्रोच्यते यतिसत्तमैः। अधिष्ठानादधिष्ठाता चेत्याहामिति नः श्रुतम् ॥
चेत्तं जानाति चाव्यक्तं चेत्तञ्च इति चोच्यते ॥ अव्यक्तिके प्रविशति पुरुषश्चेति कथ्यते ॥....."

i.e., " O best of Kings, this is the manner in which the Creation and the Destruction of Nature takes place; the Supreme Being is all that remains when Universal Destruction takes place, and it is He who assumes various forms when Creation begins. This is even so, O king, as ascertained by men of knowledge. It is Nature that causes the Over-presiding Soul to thus assume diversity and revert back to unity. Nature also herself has the same marks. One f ully conversant with the nature of the categories knows that Nature also assu mes the same sort of diversity and unity, for when destruction comes she reverts into unity and when creation takes place she assumes diversity of form. The Soul makes Nature which contains the principles of production or growth and assumes various forms. Nature is called Kṣetra (or soil). Above the twenty-four categories or principles is the Soul which is Great. It presides over that Nature or Kṣetra. Hence, O great King, the foremost yatis say that the Soul is the Presider. Indeed, we have heard that on account of the Soul's presiding over all Kṣetras, He is called the Presider. And because He knows that Unmanifest Kṣetra, He is, therefore, also called Kṣetrajña. And because also the Soul enters into Unmanifest Kṣetra, He is called Puruṣa."...(Chap. 306, vers. 33-37.)

[1] *Vide* foot-note.

the manifested world, yet in some other verses the opposite view seems to be entertained. For instance, consider the following verses : " That which is shorn of the *guṇas*, O dear lord, is incapable of being made to be possessing the *guṇas*. Listen, however, to me as I explain to you what is endued with the *guṇas* and what is not. Great Munis conversant with the truth about principles say that when Soul seizes the *guṇas* like a crystal catching the reflexion of a red flower, He is said to be possessed of the *guṇas*; but when freed from them like the crystal freed from reflexion, He is seen in His real nature, which is above all guṇas." [1] (Chap. 315, 1-2.) Again, "On account, again, of His being the witness of everything, and on account, also, of there being nothing else than Him, as also for His consciousness of oneness with Nature (Prakṛti), yatis endued with ascetic success, conversant with the spiritual science, and freed from fever of every sort, consider Him as existing by Himself without a second." [2]

The same fact is declared in a more emphatic way by Yājñavalkya in his conversation with Janaka :

"अव्यक्तरूपा भगवान् शतधा च सहस्रधा। शतधा सहस्रधा चैव तथा शतसहस्रधा।
कोटिशश्च करोत्येष प्रत्यगात्मानमात्मना ॥"

i.e., " The Unmanifest Îśvara transforms His supersensible Self by Himself into hundreds and thousands and millions and millions of forms." (Chap. 314, ver. 2.) Again,

"कर्त्तृत्वाच्चापि तत्त्वानां तत्त्वधर्म्मा तथोच्यते। कर्त्तृत्वाच्चापि सर्गाणां सर्गधर्म्मा तथोच्यते।
कर्त्तृत्वाच्चापि योगानां योगधर्म्मा तथोच्यते ॥ कर्त्तृत्वात् प्रकृतीनाञ्च तथा प्रकृतिधर्म्मिता।
कर्त्तृत्वाच्चापि बीजानां बीजधर्म्मा तथोच्यते ॥ गुणानां प्रसवत्वाच्च प्रलयत्वात्तथैव च।....."

i.e., "On account of the Supreme Soul's supremacy over the categories, He is said to partake of their nature; on account also of His agency in the matter of creation, He is said to possess the quality of creation. On account of His agency in the matter of Yoga, He is said to possess the quality of Yoga. For His supremacy over those particular principles known by the name of Nature, He is said to possess the character of Nature. For His agency in the matter of creating the seeds, He is said to partake of the nature of those seeds. And because He causes the several principles or *guṇas* to come into being, He is said to be subject to decay and destruction...." (Chap. 315, vers. 7-9.)

[1] "न शक्यो निर्गुणत्वात गुणीकर्त्तुं विशाम्पते। गुणवांश्चाप्यगुणवान् यथातत्त्वं निबोधसे ॥
गुणैर्हि गुणवानेव निर्गुणश्चागुणस्तथा। प्राहुरेवं महात्मानो सुनयस्तत्त्वदर्शिनः ॥"

[2] "उपेत्यत्वादनन्यत्वादभिमानाच्च केवलम्। मन्यन्ते यतयः सिद्धा अध्यात्मज्ञा गतज्वराः ॥"

(*Ibid*, ver. 9.) But if we examine the above verses carefully we find no inconsistent assertions made in them. The Sāṅkhya Philosophy has, as we have said, all along entertained two apparently opposed views with regard to the Soul (Puruṣa) : The Soul, it maintains, has two aspects or sides—*transcendent* (**निर्गुणः**) and *immanent* (**सगुणः**). So far as the Soul is *immanent* in the manifested world, He is called *saguṇa*, or invested with the three *guṇas*, that is, assuming numberless finite forms ; and so far as He is *transcendent* over the manifested world, He is called *nirguṇa*, or divested of the three *guṇas*, that is, existing in His own pure essential form (**स्वरूपः**). We have already discussed, at considerable length, the reasonableness of such a distinction and found that there is no inconsistency involved in it.

If we now come to Bhagavadgîtā we meet with similar assertions. Sometimes the Supreme Soul is spoken of as *nirguṇa* and sometimes as *saguṇa*. Consider, for instance, the following : "The Supreme Soul, though devoid of all the senses, appears to be occupied in their functions ; though unattached to anything, He is all-sustaining, and though devoid of all the *guṇas*, He is the experiencer of them all. Though Himself whole and undivided, He exists in all things as if He were divided ; He should be regarded as the *creator*, the sustainer and the destroyer of all things. Prakṛti (Nature) is said to be the cause of the body and the senses, while Puruṣa is said to be the cause of the experience of happiness and misery. O Bharatarṣabha, know the union between the Kṣetra (Prakṛti) and the Kṣetrajña (Puruṣa) to be the real cause of all the animate and inanimate things. He sees truly who considers the activities done everywhere as due to Prakṛti, and that Puruṣa is inactive or non-agent. The Individual Puruṣa attains the status of Brahman when he beholds all the distinct creatures to be existent in one and the same Soul, and understands the origination of the

universe to be due to that one Supreme Soul."[1] (Chap. 13, verses 14, 16, 20, 26, 29 and 30.)

Turning to Śrîmad-Bhāgavata we find also similar expressions. Examine, for instance, the following verses : "In this way identifying Himself with Prakṛti, Puruṣa thinks Himself as the agent of the actions really performed by her *guṇas*. For that reason, His migration, bondage and subjection are due to that identification, although He Himself is non-agent, lord, witness and full of bliss. Know Prakṛti to be the cause of the body and the senses, and Puruṣa, who is above and beyond Prakṛti, to be the cause of the experience of happiness and misery. On account of being unchangeable, inactive and devoid of the *guṇas*, like the reflexion of the sun in water, Puruṣa, though residing in Prakṛti, remains unstained by the *guṇas*. But when that Puruṣa becomes attached to them, He gets stupefied by self-consciousness and thinks Himself to be the agent. O woman,[2] He is Îśvara, called Kāla, who prompts Prakṛti, when her *guṇas* attain the state of equilibrium, to the act of creation. When the Supreme Soul or Îśvara threw His semen (in the form of consciousness) into the womb of Prakṛti agitated by the influence of the previous actions of the jîvas, she gave birth to the category of Mahat (consciousness or intelligence) prolific of multifarious manifestations. When the category

[1] "सर्व्वेन्द्रियगुणाभासं सर्व्वेन्द्रियविवर्ज्जितम् ।
असक्तं सर्व्वभृच्चैव निर्गुणं गुणभोक्तृ च ॥" (१४)
"अविभक्तञ्च भूतेषु विभक्तमिव च स्थितम् ।
भूतभर्तृ च तज्ज्ञेयं ग्रसिष्णु प्रभविष्णु च ॥" (१६)
"कार्य्यकारणकर्तृत्वे हेतुः प्रकृतिरुच्यते ।
पुरुषः सुखदुःखानां भोक्तृत्वे हेतुरुच्यते ॥" (२०)
"यावत् संजायते किञ्चित् सत्त्वं स्थावरजङ्गमम् ।
चेत्र-चेत्रज्ञसंयोगात्तद्विद्धि भरतर्षभ ॥" (२६)
"प्रकृत्यैव च कर्म्माणि क्रियमाणानि सर्व्वशः ।
यः पश्यति तथात्मानमकर्त्तारं स पश्यति ॥" (२९)
"यदा भूत-पृथग्भावमेकस्थमनुपश्यति ।
तत एव च विस्तारं ब्रह्म सम्पद्यते तदा ॥" (३०)

[2] Kapila's mother to whom the verses were addressed.

of Mahat, thus generated from the semen of the Supreme Soul, underwent changes, it gave birth to the three kinds of self-consciousness (अहङ्कारः) characterised by the power of activity." [1] (Skandha, 3, Chap. 26, 6-8 ; *ibid*, Chap. 27, 1 ; Chap. 26, 16, 18 and 22.)

Let us now turn to the Brahma-Sûtram where some assertions are made which seem to go against our contention that Îśvara and Prakṛti are inter-dependent and mutually inclusive. Examine the following aphorisms : (1) "Prakṛti being dependent on Îśvara, is capable of acting to realise an end, *i.e.* of creation." [2] (Chap. I, pāda 4, aph. 3.) Nimbārka comments on this in this way : "Pradhāna or Prakṛti as described in the Upaniṣads, being dependent on the Supreme Cause (*i.e.* Îśvara), is capable of purposive action, *i.e.*, creation, whereas Pradhāna as described in the Sāṅkhya, being independent of Him, cannot be so : such is the difference." [3] Here it is distinctly stated that Prakṛti is, according to the Sāṅkhya, *independent* of Îśvara. It is difficult to understand wherefrom that conclusion is

[1] "एवं पराभिध्यानेन कर्त्तृत्वं प्रकृतेः पुमान् ।
कर्म्मसु क्रियमाणेषु गुणैरात्मनि मन्यते ॥
तदस्य संसृतिर्बन्धः पारतन्त्र्यञ्च तत्कृतम् ।
भवत्यकर्त्तुरीशस्य साक्षिणो निर्वृतात्मनः ॥
कार्य्यकारणकर्त्तृत्वे कारणं प्रकृतिं विदुः ।
भोक्तृत्वे सुखदुःखानां पुरुषं प्रकृतेः परम् ॥" (स्कन्ध ३, अः २६, श्लो: ६-८)
"प्रकृतिस्थोऽपि पुरुषो नाज्यते प्राकृतैर्गुणैः ।
अविकारादकर्त्तृत्वान्निर्गुणत्वाज्जलार्कवत् ।
स एष यर्हि प्रकृतेर्गुणेष्वभिविषज्जते ।
अहङ्कारविमूढात्मा कर्त्ताहमिति मन्यते ॥" (अः २७, श्लो: १)
"प्रकृतेर्गुणसाम्यस्य निर्विशेषस्य मानवि ।
चेष्टा यतः स भगवान् काल इत्युपलक्षितः ॥
दैवात् क्षुभितधर्म्मिण्यां स्वस्यां योनौ परः पुमान् ।
आधत्त वीर्य्यं सासूत महत्तत्त्वं हिरण्मयम् ॥" (अः २६, श्लो: १६, १८)
"महत्तत्वादिकुर्व्वाणाद्भगवद्वीर्य्यसम्भवात् ।
क्रियाशक्तिरहङ्कारस्त्रिविधः समपद्यत ॥" (श्लो: २२)

[2] "तदधीनत्वादर्थवत् ।"

[3] "श्रौपनिषदं प्रधानं परमकारणाधीनत्वादर्थवदानर्थक्यं पराभिमतस्य तस्येति भेदः ।"

drawn. I have conclusively proved by citing numerous texts that Îśvara and Prakṛti are, according to the Sāṅkhya, *mutually inclusive* and *eternally united* ; Prakṛti is nothing but an element or power of Îśvara as much according to the Sāṅkhya as according to the Upaniṣads. This is, therefore, undoubtedly a strange misunderstanding. (2) "There is nothing beside Prakṛti which can prompt her to action ; Puruṣa is eternally unattached to anything." [1] (Chap. II, pāda 2, aph. 4.) Nimbārka comments on this thus : "Pradhāna cannot be the cause of the world, because it is not guided by the conscious Puruṣa. Why ? Pradhāna being independent, it has no other assistant than itself." [2] Here, too, it is supposed that Pradhāna is *independent* of Îśvara, according to the Sāṅkhya ; but that the supposition is mistaken has been satisfactorily proved before. It is curious that Vyāsa, as the author of the Brahma-Sûtram, declares that Pradhāna or Prakṛti is, according to the Sāṅkhya, *independent* of Îśvara, while, as the commentator of the Yoga-Sûtram, he writes that Prakṛti and Puruṣa are not *wholly distinct*, that Brahman resides in a concealed form in the chitta, *i.e.*, the mind, which is nothing but a compound of three evolutes of Prakṛti, and that the knowledge of the world attained by the Buddhi-sattva (the pure intellect) is *identical* with that of Puruṣa. (*Vide* commentaries on aph. 20 of the *Sādhana-pāda*, aph. 4 of the *Samādhi-pāda*, and aphs. 22 and 23 of the *Kaivalya-pāda*, cited in Chap. IV.)

Now, Vyāsa has evidently derived his view from the Upaniṣads ; therefore, it is necessary to examine carefully the texts referred to. In several Upaniṣads Prakṛti and her evolutes are mentioned in various connexions, but it is in the Śvetāśvatara Upaniṣad, in particular, that the relation between Îśvara and Prakṛti is more explicitly

[1] "व्यतिरेकानवस्थितेश्चानपेक्षत्वात् ।"

[2] "प्राज्ञेनाऽनधिष्ठितं प्रधानं न जगत्कारणं, कुतः ? तद्व्यतिरिक्तस्य सहकार्य्यन्तरस्यानवस्थितेरर्थतस्त्वं तदनपेक्षत्वात् ॥"

described. (See Chap. I, aphs. 10-12 ; and Chap. IV, aphs. 5, 6, 7 and 10.)[1]

Here the nature of the Infinite Soul, the finite Soul and Prakṛti, as well as their mutual relations are clearly stated. What we are especially concerned with here is the precise relation between the Infinite Soul (Brahman) and Prakṛti :

[1] "क्षरं प्रधानममृताक्षरं हरः, क्षरात्मानावीशते देव एकः। तस्याभिध्यानाद् योजनात् तत्त्वभावात् भूयश्चान्ते विश्वमायानिवृत्तिः॥" *i. e.*, "Pradhāna or Prakṛti is changeful, but Īśvara is unchangeful and immortal; that one (Īśvara), manifesting Himself, regulates the aforesaid changeful Pradhāna and all jīvas. The jīvas liberate themselves from the world-illusion by means of constant meditation upon Him and thinking Him as one with themselves." (Chap. I, aph. 10.) "ज्ञात्वा देवं सर्व्वपाशापहानिः, क्षीणैः क्लेशैर्जन्ममृत्युप्रहाणिः। तस्याभिध्यानात्तृतीयं देहभेदे, विश्वैश्वर्य्यं केवल आप्तकामः॥" *i.e.*, "If one knows Him, all his connexions with the world are severed; so that all the pains of that wise one arising out of non-discriminative knowledge (avidyā) are destroyed and he becomes released from repeated births and deaths. By meditation upon Him that wise Puruṣa, after the destruction of the body, attains that third essential form of Īśvara which is unmanifested in and above the world, and thereby becomes the possessor of all worldly grandeur, as well as becomes entirely self-contented and divested of the three guṇas." (*Ibid*, aph. 11.) "एतज्ज्ञेयं नित्यमेवात्मसंस्थं, नातःपरं वेदितव्यं हि किञ्चित्। भोक्ता भोग्यं प्रेरितारञ्च मत्वा, सर्व्वं प्रोक्तं त्रिविधं ब्रह्ममेतत्॥" *i.e.*, "This self-existent Brahman is the only thing worthy to be known, there being nothing else fit to be thought of : This Brahman is the enjoying jīvas, the enjoyable world, and Īśvara (lord), their guide and ruler. He has these three forms, and should be meditated upon in this way only." (*Ibid*, aph. 12.) "अजामेकां लोहितशुक्लकृष्णां, बह्वीः प्रजाः सृजमानां सरूपाः। अजो ह्येको जुषमाणोऽनुशेते, जहात्येनां भुक्तभोगामजोऽन्यः॥" *i.e.*, "Eternal one (*i.e.*, the Individual Soul), enjoying another (*i.e.*, Prakṛti), which is equally eternal, and is red, white and black, *i.e.*, possessing three guṇas, called Sattva, Rajas and Tamas, and procreatrix of various objects like herself, remains attached to her ; another eternal one (*i.e.*, Īśvara) exists without being attached to Prakṛti which supplies the materials of enjoyment to the Individual Puruṣa." (Chap. 4, aph. 5.) "द्वा सुपर्णा सयुजा सखाया, समानं वृक्षं परिषस्वजाते। तयोरन्यः पिप्पलं स्वाद्वत्त्यनश्नन्नन्यो अभिचाकशीति॥" *i.e.*, "Two friendly birds live together on one tree (*i.e.*, the body), one of which, called the Individual Soul, tastes the fruits of that tree, thinking them palatable, while the other (*i.e.*, Īśvara) does not taste them, but remains a mere spectator." (*Ibid*, aph. 6.) "समाने वृक्षे पुरुषो निमग्नोऽनीशया शोचति मुह्यमानः। जुष्टं यदा पश्यत्यन्यमीशमस्य, महिमानमिति वीतशोकः॥" *i.e.*, "On the same tree one bird called *jīva* lives and gets entangled with it, and being impotent to liberate itself, goes on lamenting : when, then, it comes to know the greatness of the other bird called Īśvara it gets released." (*Ibid* aph. 7.) "मायान्तु प्रकृतिं विद्यान्मायिनन्तु महेश्वरम्। तस्यावयवभूतैस्तु व्याप्तं सर्व्वमिदं जगत्॥" *i.e.*, "Prakṛti, which possesses the three guṇas, and is the material cause of the world, should be known to be a power of Brahman called Māyā, and Brahman should be known as the possessor or source of that power. The world is pervaded by the numerous different evolutes of that power called Māyā." (*Ibid*, aph. 10.)

This relation has been expressed by saying that Prakṛti is nothing but a *power* or *element* of Brahman, and therefore, is not anything independent of Him. The Sāṅkhya, as ordinarily interpreted, seems to declare Prakṛti's independence of Brahman. For this reason the Sāṅkhya is carefully distinguished from the Vedānta. Some go even so far as to assert that though the Sāṅkhya nomenclature occurs in many places of the Upaniṣads, it signifies different things, and has never been derived from the Sāṅkhya System. Some even suspect that the Sāṅkhya has rather borrowed its nomenclature from the Upaniṣads and used it for its own special purpose and in its own special sense. It is curious that the name of Kapila also is mentioned in the Śvetāśvatara Upaniṣad.[1] (*Vide* Chap. V, aph. 2.) It is true that it is not easy to settle by conclusive historical evidence whether the Upaniṣads derived the nomenclature from the Sāṅkhya, or the Sāṅkhya from the Upaniṣads. The real difficulty in this connexion evidently arises from the apparently opposed interpretations given to the relation between Puruṣa and Prakṛti. But I have conclusively proved before that the Sāṅkhya does not declare Prakṛti to be *entirely independent* of Puruṣa ; it has rather definitely affirmed that Prakṛti is an *integral element* of Puruṣa. Moreover, we find some significant verses in the Śāntiparva of the Mahābhārata which distinctly and emphatically declare that whatever knowledge we find in the Vedas has been *derived* from the Sāṅkhya.[2] (*Vide* Chap. 301.) Here it is explicitly maintained that the Sāṅkhya is the only source of all true and high knowledge, and that every other branch of knowledge, including even the Vedas, has derived its knowledge from the Sāṅkhya. This is further confirmed by verses embodying the

[1] "ऋषिं प्रसूतं कपिलं यस्तमग्रे ज्ञानैर्बिभर्त्ति जायमानञ्च पश्येत्।"

[2] "अमूर्त्तस्य कौन्तेय सांख्यं मूर्त्तिरिति श्रुतिः। अभिज्ञानानि तस्याहुर्मतं हि भरतर्षभ॥ ज्ञानं महद्यदिह महत्सु राजन् वेदेषु सांख्येषु तथैव योगे। यच्चापि दृष्टं विविधं पुराणे सांख्यागतं तन्निखिलं नरेन्द्र॥ यच्चेतिहासेषु महत्सु दृष्टं यच्चार्थशास्त्रे नृप शिष्टजुष्टे। ज्ञानञ्च लोके यदिहास्ति किञ्चित् साङ्ख्यागतं तच्च महन्महात्मन्॥"

sayings of the great sage Yājñavalkya.[1] (*Vide* Chap, 316, aph. 2; Chap. 301, aphs. 100 and 101.) The Bhagavadgîtā also bears the same testimony.[2] (*Vide* Chap. 5, verses 4 and 5.) These are undoubtedly good and clear testimonies which go to show that there is no real inconsistency between the Upaniṣads and the Sāṅkhya with regard to the relation between Puruṣa, whether Absolute or Individual, and Prakṛti. It is surprising that Vyāsa, who, as the writer of the Mahābhārata, was quite aware of these facts, had still written to say that the Prakṛti of the Upaniṣads is wholly different from that of the Sāṅkhya. He has, as I have pointed out before, also contradicted himself when explaining the relation between Prakṛti and Îśvara in his commentary on the Yoga-Sûtram.

We may conclude, then, by holding that the Sāṅkhya teaches that there is one Absolute Puruṣa—one Absolute Self-conscious Self or Îśvara, who includes Prakṛti as one of His constituent elements, and uses her as the means to differentiate or embody Himself into numberless objects, which constitute the world ; and that He being, thus, a Self-conscious 'System' or 'World,' and also the ultimate Source of all activity or effort, may be properly designated a *Person*; but being a perfect Unity, He should more appropriately be called *Super-Personal*.

[1] 'नास्ति सांख्यसमं ज्ञानं नास्ति योगसमं बलं । तावूभावेकचर्य्यौ तावूभावनिधनौ स्मृतौ ॥"
(अ: ३१६, श्लो: २)
"सांख्या राजन्महाप्राज्ञा गच्छन्ति परमां गतिं । ज्ञानेनानेन कौन्तेय तुल्यं ज्ञानं न विद्यते ॥
अत्र ते संशयो माभूज् ज्ञानं सांख्यं परं मतम् । अचरं ध्रुवमेवोक्तं पूर्णं ब्रह्मसनातनम् ॥"
(अ: ३०१, श्लो: १००, १०१)

[2] "सांख्ययोगौ पृथग्बाला: प्रवदन्ति न पण्डिता: । एकमप्यास्थित: सम्यगुभयोर्विन्दते फलम् ॥
यत् सांख्यै: प्राप्यते स्थानं तद् योगैरपि गम्यते । एकं सांख्यञ्च योगञ्च य: पश्यति स पश्यति ॥"

CHAPTER IV.

The Human Personality.

We now propose to consider the Sāṅkhya view of human personality. We should here also recall what the essential characteristics of personality are. To be a person, a human being must be a self-conscious 'system' or 'world,' viewed from the standpoint of both intellect and will. Does the Sāṅkhya call man person in this sense? The Sāṅkhya, no doubt, calls man puruṣa, but is puruṣa a bare or undifferentiated unity of a substance, or a complex and differentiated unity of a spirit? Or, to express it in a slightly different way, are the Puruṣa and Prakṛti really two *independent* entities, only *mechanically* united in man, or are they really two *inter-dependent* realities *organically* unified in him? If the former, man is not a person; if the latter, he is a person. Let us see in which of these two senses man is called a person by the Sāṅkhya.

The Sāṅkhya evidently speaks of Puruṣa in two senses: In verses 10 and 11 of the Sāṅkhya-Kārikā it speaks of the Absolute Puruṣa or Îśvara, and in verse 18 of the same book it speaks of Individual Puruṣas or jîvas. We have discussed this point before (*vide* Chaps. II and III) and come to the conclusion that although the Sāṅkhya defines Puruṣa, both Absolute and Individual, exactly in the same way, and in the same breath declares that Puruṣa is one and many at the same time, these apparently contradictory assertions can only be reconciled by holding that the multitudinous Puruṣas or jîvas are the individualisations or differentiations of the Absolute Puruṣa; that is to say, the Absoute Puruṣa manifests and realises Himself in and through the multiple forms of human

beings or Individual Puruṣas. But as the Absolute Puruṣa is present *whole and undivided* in each Individual Puruṣa as His mode or differentiation *from a particular point of view*, the latter must partake of the nature of the former, and therefore be perfect from that point of view. Or, in the words of the Sāṅkhya, the Individual Puruṣa is nothing but the Absolute Puruṣa as invested with the three *guṇas*. This is the reason why the Sāṅkhya gives only one definition of Puruṣa, which is applicable to all Puruṣas, infinite or finite, absolute or individual. But each individual man has another aspect: he is also *finite* or *particular*. This particular aspect of man is supplied by Prakṛti in the form of his physical body and its adjuncts. Thus, every man is the Absolute Puruṣa manifesting and realising Himself in and through his whole psychical and physical mechanism. Now, a question suggests itself: Is the unity of the Absolute Puruṣa and Prakṛti *in* man *mechanical* or *organic*? We have shown before that the Absolute Puruṣa includes Prakṛti in His contents, and His union with her is *eternal* and *irresolvable*. Such being the case, their union in man also must be eternal and irresolvable, as is admitted by the Sāṅkhya. See also Yoga-Sûtram (*Sādhana Pāda*, aph. 22), and Vyāsa's commentary on the following aphorism: "Puruṣa and the three *guṇas* both are eternal and for that reason their union is regarded as eternal. There is a saying about it: On account of the eternal union between the three guṇas and Puruṣa, there is also an eternal union between the manifested and Puruṣa."[1] Similarly, Vāchaspati says in his commentary on verse 21 of the Sāṅkhya-Kārikā that "on account of the eternity of the succession of union, in spite of being eternally united (with Prakṛti), it is proper to be united again for the sake of abstraction (from her)."[2] But a union which is

[1] "दृग्दर्शनशक्त्योर्नित्यत्वादनादिः संयोगो व्याख्यात इति। तथाचोक्तं 'धर्मिणामनादिसंयोगाद्धर्म-मात्राणामप्यनादिः संयोग' इति।"

[2] "अनादित्वाच्च संयोग-परम्पराया भोगाय संयुक्तोऽपि कैवल्याय पुनः संयुज्यते इति युक्तम्।"

eternal and irresolvable must be *organic* and *necessary*. Man is, therefore, a *specialised organic unity* of the Absolute Puruṣa and Prakṛti, and must be a *person*. But before taking it as final we should try to remove some difficulties which face our inference. I mean the difficulties raised by the Sāṅkhya doctrine of Bondage and Release of Puruṣa. It may be objected, if Puruṣa and Prakṛti be eternally and inseparably united in man, the bondage of the former must therefore be eternal and irresolvable; how is, then, the release of Puruṣa possible? The objection is serious, if it is true; but we shall see that it is based on a misconception of the nature of both Puruṣa and Prakṛti. We should, therefore, carefully examine the Doctrine of Bondage and Release as taught by the Sāṅkhya. But before proceeding to do so it is necessary to understand the Sāṅkhya Doctrine of Evolution.

(1) *The Doctrine of Evolution.*

After proving the multiplicity of the Individual Puruṣas in verse 18, the author of the Sāṅkhya-Kārikā next proceeds, in verse 21, to set forth the reasons for the evolution of the embodiment or investment with which they are associated. The verse runs thus: "For the sake of Puruṣa's perception of Prakṛti and for his release, a union of the two takes place, which resembles a union of the halt and the blind. By that union a creation is effected."[1] Gauḍapāda, one of the great commentators of the Sāṅkhya, interprets this verse in this way: "The union of Soul with Nature is for its (*i.e.*, Nature's) perception; that is, the Soul perceives Nature (in the state of) intellect and the other effects including the gross elements. For that object is the union of Nature with Soul; and the same union, which is also for the abstraction (of the latter), is like the association of the halt and blind. Just as a lame man and a blind man, deserted by their fellow-travellers,

[1] पुरुष य दर्शनार्थं केवल्यार्थं तथा प्रधानस्य। पङ्ग्वन्धवदुभयोरपि संयोगस्तत्कृतः सर्गः॥"

who in making their way with difficulty through a forest had been dispersed by robbers, happening to encounter each other and entering into conversation so as to inspire mutual confidence, agreed to divide between them the duties of walking and seeing; and accordingly, the lame man mounted the blind man's shoulder and was thus carried on his journey, whilst the blind man was enabled to pursue his route by the directions of his companion, so, in the same manner, the faculty of seeing is in the Soul, which is thus like the lame man, while the faculty of moving is in Nature, which resembles, therefore, the blind man. Further, just as the lame man and the blind man part, when their mutual object is accomplished, and they have reached their journey's end, so Nature, having effected the liberation of Soul, ceases to act; and Soul, having perceived Nature, obtains release. And consequently, their respective purposes being effected, the connexion between them is dissolved. Finally, *by that union, a creation is effected.* As the birth of a child proceeds from the union of a male and a female, so the productions of creation result from the connexion of Nature with Soul." [1]

Similar reasons are expressed in the following verses: "This evolution of Nature, from Intellect to the special elements, is performed for the deliverance of each individual Soul; and for the sake of one precisely as for another." [2] (Verse 56.) "As it is a function of milk, an unintelligent

[1] "अथैतयोः प्रधानपुरुषयोः किंहेतुः सङ्गात उच्यते—पुरुषस्य प्रधानेन सह संयोगो दर्शनार्थं, प्रकृतिं महदादिकार्यं भूतपर्य्यन्तं पुरुषः पश्यति, एतदर्थं प्रधानस्यापि पुरुषेण संयोगः कैवल्यार्थम्। स च संयोगः पङ्ग्वन्धवदुभयोरपि द्रष्टव्यः, यथा एकः पङ्गुरेकश्चान्ध एतौ द्वावपि गच्छन्तौ महता सामर्थ्येनाटव्यां सार्थस्य स्तेनकृतादुपप्लवात् स्वबन्धुपरित्यक्तौ देवादितश्चेतश्च चैरतुः, खगत्या च तौ संयोगमुपयातौ पुनस्तयोः स्ववचसोर्विश्वस्तत्वेन संयोगो गमनार्थं दर्शनार्थं च भवति, अन्धेन पङ्गुः स्कन्धमारोपितः, एवं शरीरारूढपङ्गुदर्शितेन मार्गेनान्धो याति पङ्गुश्चान्धस्कन्धारूढः। एवं पुरुषे दर्शनशक्तिरस्ति पङ्गुवन्न क्रिया, प्रधाने क्रियाशक्तिरस्त्यन्धवन्न दर्शनशक्तिः। यथावान्धयोः पङ्ग्वन्धयोः कृतार्थयोर्विभागो भविष्यतीप्सितस्थानप्राप्तयोः, एवं प्रधानमपि पुरुषस्य मोचं कृत्वा निवर्त्तते पुरुषोऽपि प्रधानं दृष्ट्वा कैवल्यं गच्छति, तयोः कृतार्थयोर्विभागो भविष्यति। किञ्चान्यत्, तत्कृतः सर्गः, तेन संयोगेन कृतस्तत्कृतः, सर्गः सृष्टिः, यथा स्त्रीपुरुषसंयोगात् सुतोत्पत्तिस्तथा प्रधानपुरुषसंयोगात् सर्गस्योत्पत्तिः॥"

[2] "इत्येष प्रकृतिकृतो महदादिविशेषभूतपर्य्यन्तः। प्रतिपुरुषविमोचार्थं स्वार्थ इव परार्थ आरम्भः॥"

(substance), to nourish the calf, so it is the office of the Pradhāna to liberate the Soul." [1] (Verse 57.) "As people engage in acts to relieve desires, so does the undiscrete (principle) to liberate the Soul." [2] (Verse 58.) With these should also be read aphorism 23 of Sādhana Pāda in the Yoga-Sûtram, which runs thus: "The union (between the Percipient or Puruṣa, and the Percept or Prakṛti together with her evolutes) takes place for the sake of knowing the essential nature of the power of the Percipient and the Percept." [3] Vyāsa, the great commentator of the Yoga Philosophy, comments on this in the following terms: "When the Percipient Puruṣa is united with his own Percepts for the sake of their perception, the knowledge or experience of their essential nature following from such union is called enjoyment (bhoga); and the knowledge of the essential nature of the Percipient's own self is called release." [4] In the Sāṅkhya-Pravachana-Sûtram, also, the object of creation is said to be the same. "Creation (results) from passion (*i.e.*, the desire to perceive Prakṛti and her evolutes), and release from Dispassion (*i.e.*, indifference) to them." [5] (Chap. II, 9.)

From the above account it is evident that the real object of creation is twofold: (*a*) the perception or experience of Prakṛti and her evolutes by Puruṣa, and (*b*) the release of Puruṣa from the bondage consequent upon such perception or experience. Now, an important question suggests itself, namely,—whose purpose is it that necessitates the creation? The Sāṅkhya-Kārikā says it is the object of *both* Puruṣa and Prakṛti, as in the case of the lame man and the blind man. Just as the lame man has the power of seeing, but no power

[1] "वत्सविवृद्धिनिमित्तं क्षीरस्य यथा प्रवृत्तिरज्ञस्य। पुरुषविमोचनिमित्तं तथा प्रवृत्तिः प्रधानस्य॥"

[2] "औत्सुक्यनिवृत्त्यर्थं यथा क्रियासु प्रवर्त्तते लोकः। पुरुषस्य विमोचार्थं प्रवर्त्तते तदवद्व्यक्तम्॥"

[3] "स्वस्वामिशक्त्योः स्वरूपोपलब्धिहेतुः संयोगः।"

[4] "पुरुषः स्वामी दृश्येन स्वेन दर्शनार्थं संयुक्तः, तस्मात् संयोगाद्दृश्यस्योपलब्धिर्या स भोगः, या तु द्रष्टुः स्वरूपोपलब्धिः सोऽपवर्गः॥"

[5] "रागविरागयोर्योगः सृष्टिः।"

of moving, and as the blind man has the power of moving, but no power of seeing, so Puruṣa has the power of perceiving, but no power of acting, whereas Prakṛti has the power of acting, but no power of perceiving; their union is, therefore, necessary for the purpose, in the former case, of pursuing a route safely, and in the latter case, of properly accomplishing the act of creation.

This analogy suggests one important point: the function of Puruṣa is *guidance* and that of Prakṛti is *activity as guided by Puruṣa*: and both are indispensably necessary for the purposes of creation or evolution. But guidance is also a kind of activity. When the lame man guides the blind man in pursuing their journey, he acts, and without such activity the proper and safe completion of their journey is impossible: similarly, when Puruṣa guides Prakṛti in her evolution, he acts, and without such an act evolution is impossible. That is to say, Puruṣa is as *active* as Prakṛti, though in a different form. But this important point has been overlooked by Gauḍapāda in his commentary, perhaps for the reason that it seems to him inconsistent with verse 57,[1] as quoted above. But really there is no inconsistency. In commenting upon this verse Gauḍapāda observes: "It is here objected that, Nature is irrational, and Soul is rational. How, then, can Nature, like a rational thing, understand that Soul is to be provided in the three worlds with the objects of sense, and at last with liberation? This is no doubt true; but it is also a fact that action and cessation of action are both observed in irrational things; whence it is said: 'As grass and water taken by the cow are assimilated into milk, and nourish the calf, and as (the secretion ceases) when the calf is grown, so Nature (acts spontaneously) for the liberation of Soul.' And this is the agency of

[1] "वत्सविवृद्धिनिमित्तं चीरस्य यथा प्रवृत्तिरज्ञस्य।
पुरुषविमोचनिमित्तं तथा प्रवृत्तिः प्रधानस्य॥"

an unintelligent thing."[1] Vāchaspati Miśra makes the following observations: "An unintelligent thing also is known to act for the purpose of realising a need, as for instance, the unintelligent milk acts for the nourishment of a calf. Similarly, Prakṛti, though unintelligent, acts for the release of Puruṣa."[2] He then proceeds to prove that such an act of the milk cannot be said to be due to its being guided by Îśvara; for Îśvara, being an intelligent being, can act only either for a selfish end, or for an altruistic one; but both are in fact impossible for Him. He cannot be supposed to act in order to remove His own want, since He has none, nor can He be supposed to act from kindness to the *jîvas*, for, then, He would have made them all happy; and, furthermore, no such kindness is possible before they are created. If it is supposed that He first made them unhappy, and then tried to relieve their unhappiness, it would have been better for Him not to have created them at all. Again, if it is said that He creates in order to relieve the pains which the *jîvas* suffer on account of their own actions, the reply will be, that as Îśvara Himself is the giver of the fruits of actions, it would have been better for Himself not to have created at all. For these reasons Îśvara cannot be said to guide the act of the milk; the milk *spontaneously* acts to nourish the calf. Similarly, Prakṛti acts *spontaneously* to release Puruṣa. A similar text[3] is found in the Sāṅkhya-Pravachana-Sûtram.

The main object of the above commentaries is evidently to prove that Prakṛti's activity of creation is entirely self-guided and spontaneous. Puruṣa has nothing to do with

[1] "अत्रोच्यतेऽचेतनं प्रधानं चेतनः पुरुष इति मया चिषु लोकेषु शब्दादिभिर्विषयैः पुरुषो योक्ष्योऽन्ये मोचः कर्तव्य इति कथं चेतनवत् प्रवृत्तिः? सत्यं, किन्त्वचेतनानामपि प्रवृत्तिर्दृष्टा निवृत्तिश्च यस्मादित्याह—यथा तृणोदकं गवा भक्षितम् चीरभावेन परिणम्य वत्सविवृद्धिं करोति, पुष्टे च वत्से निवर्त्तते, एवं पुरुषविमोचनिमित्तं प्रधानम् इति अज्ञस्य प्रवृत्तिरिति॥"

[2] "दृष्टमचेतनमपि प्रयोजने प्रवर्त्तमानं यथा वत्सविवृद्धये चीरमचेतनं प्रवर्त्तते एवं प्रकृतिरचेतनाऽपि पुरुषविमोचणाय प्रवर्त्तिष्यते।"

[3] "अचेतनत्वे चीरवच्चेष्टितं प्रधानस्य।"

it, and is an indifferent spectator only. But I fail to see how that conclusion follows. The milk acts, *i.e.*, flows into the mouth of the calf through a definite channel, to wit, the udders of the cow, not spontaneously, but by reason of being prompted and guided by the desire of the cow to feed the calf, when the latter sucks the udders. Thus, two incentives prompt the milk to act: (*a*) the desire of the cow to feed her calf, and (*b*) the desire of the calf to have the milk. In the absence of either, no action of the milk will take place. This shows that the activity of the milk is not really spontaneous, not really determined by the milk itself. Similarly, creation by Prakṛti is not spontaneous or determined entirely by herself, for, otherwise, the analogy will fail; and that this is the true meaning of the verse is corroborated by verse 58,[1] as quoted above. Gauḍapāda comments on this verse thus: "As people, being influenced by desire, engage in acts of various kinds for its gratification or fulfilment, and desist when the object is accomplished, so Pradhāna, active for the purpose of liberating Soul, desists, after having effected the twofold purpose of Soul; one, cognizance or enjoyment of the objects of sense; the other, cognizance of the difference between Soul and qualities (guṇas)."[2] And Vāchaspati makes the following observations: "*Autsukya* is *ichchhā, i.e.*, desire or wish; that desire or wish is gratified when it attains its object; the object is egoistic, because it is characterised as desired. Similarly, the Unmanifested (Prakṛti) engages in (creative) acts for the release of Puruṣa."[3] With these should also be read verse 59 in which it is stated that just as a dancing girl ceases dancing when she has finished her performance,

[1] "औत्सुक्यनिवृत्त्यर्थं यथा क्रियासु प्रवर्त्तते लोकः। पुरुषस्य विमोचार्थं प्रवर्त्तते तदव्यक्तम्॥"॥

[2] 'यथा लोके इष्टौत्सुक्ये सति तस्य निवृत्त्यर्थं क्रियासु प्रवर्त्तते, गमनागमनक्रियासु कृतकार्यो निवर्त्तते, तथा पुरुषस्य विमोचार्थं शब्दादिविषयोपभोगोपलब्धिलक्षणं गुणपुरुषान्तरोपलब्धिलक्षणं च द्विविधमपि पुरुषार्थं कृत्वा प्रधानं निवर्त्तते॥"

[3] "औत्सुक्यमिच्छा सा खल्विष्यमाण-प्राप्तौ निवर्त्तते, इत्थमाणश्च स्वार्थः, इष्टलक्षणत्वात् फलस्य। दार्ष्टान्तिके योजयति पुरुषस्य विमोचार्थं प्रवर्त्तते तदव्यक्तम्॥"

so Prakṛti ceases to further show herself to Puruṣa when she has finished her exhibition to him. In this analogy the dancing girl's cessation of dancing being deliberate, Prakṛti's cessation also must be deliberate, if the analogy has any meaning. This also proves that Prakṛti is conscious, because she is capable of acting *deliberately*.

It is explicitly admitted in verse 58 and in the commentaries upon it, as quoted above, that as people engage in actions under the influence of desires, so Prakṛti, too, undertakes the act of creation under the influence of a desire, namely, the desire for the release of Puruṣa. Now, an important question here suggests itself: How can Prakṛti have a desire? Only an intelligent being can have a desire, for a desire involves a consciousness of an end or object desired. But Prakṛti is said to be unconscious; how then can she have a consciousness of an end or object, namely, the release of Puruṣa? She is therefore either conscious, or the desire is not her own, but that of another being prompting and guiding her in creation. Whose desire, then, may it be? It must be the desire of Puruṣa. But we have already proved in the preceding chapter that Prakṛti is really conscious, inasmuch as she is pervaded by a Conscious Principle, to wit, Puruṣa.[1] Consequently, she may have a conscious desire, but nevertheless, she being only an element of Puruṣa, her desire is either the same as that of Puruṣa, or subordinate to it. Thus Prakṛti is ultimately guided in her creative activity by the desire of Puruṣa. But it has been said before that the object of creation is twofold, namely, *bhoga* or observation and enjoyment of the created objects by Puruṣa, and His liberation from the bondage that follows upon that *bhoga*. What then is the desire of Puruṣa that guides Prakṛti in the creation? It must be the desire for creation itself—the desire that He may observe and enjoy the creatures and then liberate Himself from the bondage

[1] For a fuller discussion of this point see next chapter.

resulting from that observation and enjoyment. Or, in other words, it is the desire of Puruṣa to bind Himself by creation and then to liberate Himself from the investments which He assumes for that purpose.

This conclusion may seem, at first sight, to be absurd, for it indicates that Puruṣa first weaves the web of His own bondage and then struggles to extricate Himself therefrom. Is not that a mark of indiscretion and unwisdom ? Moreover, it is difficult to discover any reason why an eternally perfect and free Being should have such a desire at all. As we have found, Vāchaspati raises some other objections to Puruṣa's having a desire for creation. It is true that every desire has reference to an end, egoistic or altruistic, which is unrealised at the time, and that such a desire is impossible for a perfect, free and omniscient Being. But the desire of such a Being need not have all the characteristics of *human* desire. A human desire is an event in time and refers to an object which is unattained at the time; but the Supreme Puruṣa's desire for creation is not an event in time, it is *eternal*, because creation itself is eternal, as the Sāṅkhya maintains. Again, the object of such an eternal desire cannot be an object *in time, i.e.*, an object which is unattained at the time of desiring it, but attainable in a future time; the object is, in fact, eternally co-present with the desire. But it may be objected that such a desire is inconceivable, for a desire, whose object is co-present with it, is a *satisfied* desire, and, as such, ceases to be a genuine desire. No doubt, this is true of human desires; but as for a desire which is itself eternal and whose object is also eternal, the objection is quite irrelevant. Of course, then, such a desire has no resemblance to a human desire and may, therefore, be designated by a different name; we may call it *perfect spontaneity* or perfect will. Divine will is perfect and as such does not admit of being expressed in terms of desire, purpose, or volition, as ordinarily understood; its essence is *perfect spontaneity* or *spontaneous*

activity. Thus, the Absolute Puruṣa may be said to have a desire in the only appropriate sense that it is His inherent and eternal nature to effect a creation and thereby to bind Himself, and then to struggle to regain His freedom. Creation, Bondage, Release—these are the three stages through which His eternal creative activity passes. We have discussed this point before and we shall discuss it more fully in the sequel. We have also found that in numerous other accounts of the Sāṅkhya Doctrine given in the Śāntiparva of the Mahābhārata, in the Bhagavadgîtā, in the Śrîmad-Bhāgavata, etc., it is distinctly stated that the Supreme Puruṣa or Îśvara is a perfect Will or Active Principle; that He is the direct Cause, Sustainer and Destroyer of the manifested world; and that Prakṛti is nothing but His tool or instrument.

We now come to a general conclusion. Creation is due to the union of Puruṣa and Prakṛti; but this union is not an event in time, that is, it does not take place at a particular point of time, but is *eternal*. The object of this union is, in so far as it is desired by Prakṛti, to bind Puruṣa by providing Him with numberless objects of knowledge and enjoyment, and then, to release Him by producing His complete satisfaction. In so far as it is desired by the Supreme Puruṣa, the object of this union is to have objects for His knowledge and enjoyment, which, as a knowing and willing Being, He cannot do without, and thereby to bind Himself with those objects as His investments or embodiments, or the definite sets of limited conditions or vehicles, each of which is *unique* in nature; and then to work out His release from that bondage by gradually attaining true and adequate knowledge both of Himself and of them. The result of such a union is Creation, or, more appropriately, Evolution.

After describing, in this way, the object of the union between Puruṣa and Prakṛti, and the cause of creation, the author of the Sāṅkhya proceeds to describe the details of creation. Before we proceed to consider these details we

should bear in mind one important point. Some regard the process of creation as *cosmic*, while others regard it as *individual* or *psychological*. The former maintain that by creation the Sāṅkhya means the creation or evolution of the investments or embodiments by which the Supreme Puruṣa or Îśvara binds Himself and thus assumes the forms of the Individual Puruṣas or *jîvas* as well as of all other objects, all of which together constitute the world; while the latter maintain that the process of evolution really means that process by which *each Individual Puruṣa* binds himself and struggles to release himself from bondage until he returns upon himself and regains his freedom. If we accept the first view we must say that the process is really cosmical, inasmuch as Îśvara Himself originates and passes through it; while, if we accept the second view, we must say that it is really psychological or individual, for it is the Individual Puruṣa who causes and undergoes it. Apparently, these two views are wide apart, but upon close examination they seem to be reconcilable. For, the Individual Puruṣa is none but the Supreme Puruṣa, as invested with the three *guṇas*, or working and realising Himself in and through the evolutes of Prakṛti, so that the process of evolution which the former undergoes is that which the latter creates and passes through.

Though this is true from one point of view, yet, from another point of view, there is an essential difference between the two kinds of processes. The Supreme Puruṣa in His essential and absolute nature is not identical with the Supreme Puruṣa as invested with the three *guṇas*; or, in other words, there is a fundamental difference between the Supreme Puruṣa and the Individual Puruṣa, just as there is a fundamental difference between the self and an idea, though the latter is nothing but the self as acting or expressing itself in a definite way. Such being the case, it cannot be said that the process of creation as determined by the Supreme Puruṣa is *identical* with that as determined by the Individual Puruṣa,

even though the latter is included in the former. For other reasons also those two kinds of processes are held to be distinct.

Those who maintain that there are multitudinous Puruṣas each of whom is absolute, think that each Puruṣa creates his own world of bondage, and the processes by which he weaves his own web must be thoroughly *individual* and therefore *psychological*. They adduce the following evidence in support of their conclusion: First, the Sāṅkhya proceeds to state the processes of evolution in detail immediately after declaring the multiplicity of the Puruṣas; this shows that the Sāṅkhya means to describe those processes by which each Puruṣa weaves the web of his own bondage, *i.e.*, he constructs the cosmos of his own experience and enjoyment. Therefore, the processes are wholly psychological and have, at least directly, no cosmic meaning. Secondly, the primary object of the Sāṅkhya is practical, *i.e.*, to find out the proper means by which each Individual Puruṣa, thus bound, may achieve his liberation. And this means is described to be the full enjoyment and complete knowledge of the cosmos, thus constructed, as well as the true knowledge of his own essential nature and of the real character of his relations with Prakṛti and her evolutes. Thirdly, if we consider the development of the categories beginning with the *Mahat* as described in the Sāṅkhya, commencing at the creation and ending with the release of the Individual Puruṣa, we find that this development is wholly individual or psychological. It is a development due to the struggle of the Individual Puruṣa to regain his own freedom and to attain his own release.

But these reasons are not sufficient to support their conclusion. For, in the first place, they are based upon the presupposition that Puruṣas are multitudinous and that there is no Supreme Puruṣa of whom they are mere modes or differentiations, and this view we have proved to be wholly erroneous. In the second place, though it is true that each Individual

Puruṣa constructs the cosmos of his own experience and enjoyment, yet, the categories—to wit, consciousness or intellect, self-consciousness, the mind, the senses, the subtle and the gross elements—are not his own creations but are, in a sense, "given" to him, for the construction of his own world of experience, and are the *data* with which he begins to construct that world. In the third place, to find out the proper means to his release, it is indispensable to know how he has come to be invested with these categories, and what is his real relation to them. This question is one that cannot be answered merely by tracing the psychological development of the categories or his investments, and by describing the psychological processes of the construction of his cosmos of experience. This is really a metaphysical or cosmological question, and can be answered only by describing the process of creation or evolution which Prakṛti passes through as the instrument of the Supreme Puruṣa, when she is united with Him. Thus creation or evolution has a cosmic meaning.

That this is the true view of creation has been conclusively proved before and may be further confirmed by citing other texts from other treatises containing summary accounts of the Sāṅkhya Philosophy. Take, for instance, the following: "As the worm that makes the cocoon binds itself completely on all sides by means of the threads that it weaves itself, so Puruṣa, though in reality above the *guṇas*, invests Himself on all sides with them."[1] (*Mahābhārata, Śāntiparva*, Chap. 303, 4.) This verse, coupled with other verses quoted before, shows that Puruṣa Himself is the real cause of the *guṇas* with which He binds Himself. Now, what are the *guṇas* in the present case? They are evidently the twenty-three categories or principles, beginning with the Mahat and ending with the five gross elements, which constitute the body. Mark carefully the essential point of the analogy;

[1] "कोषकारी यथात्मानं कोटः समवरुन्धति। सूत्रतन्तुगुणैर्नित्यं तथायमगुणो गुणैः॥"

it means to emphasise that just as the worm is the cause, both of the threads and the bondage, so Puruṣa is the cause, both of the *guṇas* (*i.e.*, the evolutes), and His bondage. From this it is evident that it is Puruṣa who evolves the categories beginning with the Mahat and the rest, and binds (*i.e.*, invests) Himself with them. Now, the question may be asked: Who is that Puruṣa who evolves those categories? Is He the Supreme Puruṣa or the Individual Puruṣa? If He be the Supreme Puruṣa the evolution will be cosmic, otherwise it will be psychological. But if we read this verse together with the other verses quoted before, it becomes evident that the evolution referred to is, in fact, caused by the Supreme Puruṣa. Consider also the following verses: "They (Prakṛti and Puruṣa) both being eternal and immortal are Îśvara (Lord); those who are endued with knowledge say that both are to be called principles or categories. On account of its attributes of creation and destruction, the Unmanifest is called indestructible. That Unmanifest becomes repeatedly modified for the purpose of creating the *guṇas*; and because the categories beginning with the Mahat are produced successively by that Unmanifest and also because the twenty-fifth resides in them as their guiding agent, it is called the Kṣetra (soil)."[1] (Chap. 307, vers. 12-14.) Here we meet with the word 'twenty-fifth.' Does this signify the *individualised* Puruṣa, or the Supreme Puruṣa? This is answered in the following verse: "When that Unmanifest, resting in His own essential form, throws off the guṇas, He is called *tat, i.e.*, that (Îśvara), and when He unites

[1] "अनादिनिधनावेतावुभावेवेश्वरौ मतौ।
तत्त्वसंज्ञावुभावेतौ प्रोच्येते ज्ञानचिन्तकैः॥
सर्गप्रलयधर्मत्वादव्यक्तं प्राहुरक्षरम्।
तदेतद् गुणसर्गाय विकुर्व्वाणं पुनः पुनः॥
गुणानां सङ्घदानासुत्पत्तिश्च परस्परम्।
अधिष्ठानात् चेवमाहुरेतत्तत् पञ्चविंशकम्॥"

Himself with them He is called the twenty-fifth."[1] (*Ibid*, 15.) From these it is manifest that the twenty-fifth is the *individualised* Puruṣa or jîva. Do we say then that the individualised Puruṣa creates the categories beginning with Mahat? This is evidently absurd, being inconsistent with numerous other verses cited above. If the individualised Puruṣa is the Supreme Puruṣa as invested with the guṇas, then, how can the former create the guṇas, *i.e.*, the categories beginning with Mahat, which constitute his individuality, or which are the essential conditions of his individuation? Call the Supreme Puruṣa S and the guṇas G and the individualised Puruṣa P, then it is clear that P = S + G, *i.e.*, both S and G are essential factors of P's being. If so, then, how can P create G which is an essential element of its being? That is evidently impossible, and the supposition that P can create G involves what is called in Logic the fallacy of *petitio principii*, or explanation in a circle; for, here P is supposed to explain the creation of G, and again, G is supposed to explain the creation of P. Therefore, we must hold that the real creator or evolvent of the guṇas *i.e.*, the categories, is the Supreme Puruṣa. The creation or evolution is therefore cosmical.

But we must guard ourselves against one misconception. Some use the term 'cosmical' in this connexion in its *wider* sense. They say that the categories, thus created or evolved, are universal, not particular, *i.e.*, not those which constitute the individuality of each Puruṣa or jîva. For instance, the Mahat is not the consciousness or intellect of a particular Puruṣa or man, but the Universal Consciousness or Intellect regarded as a cosmic power called by some 'Hiraṇyagarbha.' The late Prof. Max Müller made the following observations in this connexion.

[1] "यदा तु गुणजालं तदव्यक्तात्मनि सङ्क्षिपेत्।
तदा सङ्गुणवैकल्ये पञ्चविंशो विधीयते॥"

"Buddhi is generally taken in its subjective or psychological sense, but whatever native and European authorities may have to say, it is impossible that this should have been its original meaning in the mind of Kapila. If Buddhi meant only determination (Adhyavasāya), even in its widest sense, it would clearly presuppose the later phases, not only Ahaṁkāra, Manas, Indriyas, as subjective, but likewise something that is knowable and determinable, such as Mahābhûtas, or at least Tanmātras. Though this psychological acceptation is the common acceptation of Buddhi among native writers on Sāṅkhya, yet sense is more important than commentaries. The Buddhi or the Mahat must here be a phase in the cosmic growth of the universe, like Prakriti in the beginning, and the senses and the other organs of the soul; and however violent our proceeding may seem, we can hardly help taking this Great Principle, the Mahat, in a cosmic sense. Now the first step after Avyakta, the undeveloped, dull, and as yet senseless Prakriti, can only be Prakriti as lighted up, as rendered capable of perception, and no longer as dull matter. If taken in a psychological sense, it supplies, no doubt, in a later stage, the possibility of individual perception also, or of the determination of this and that. But originally it must have been meant as Prakriti illuminated and intellectualised, and rendered capable of becoming at a later time the germ of Ahaṁkāra (distinction of subject and object), Manas, mind, and Indriyas, apprehensive senses. Only after Prakriti has become lighted up or perceptive, only after mere material contact has become consciousness, can we imagine the distinction, whether general or individual, between subject and object (Ahaṁkāra), and their new relation as perceiver and perceived, as 'I' on one side and 'this' and 'that' on the other.

"This may seem a very bold interpretation, and a complete forsaking of native guidance, but unless a more reasonable and intelligible account can be given of Buddhi, there seems no escape from it.

"What native interpreters have made of Buddhi may be seen in all their commentaries; for instance, Vāchaspati-Miśra's commentary on Kārikā 23: 'Every man uses first his external senses, then he considers (with the Manas), then he refers the various objects to his Ego (Ahaṁkāra), and lastly, he decides with his Buddhi what to do.' This may be quite right in a later phase of the development of Prakriti, it cannot possibly be right as representing the first evolution of Prakriti from its chaotic state towards light and the possibility of perception. It could not be the antecedent of Ahaṁkāra, Manas, and even the Tanmātras, if it were no more than the act of fixing this or that in thought. I am glad to find that Mr. S. C. Banerji on p. 146 of his work arrives at much the same conclusion.

"It is quite clear that in all these explanations Buddhi is taken as intellect, and as personal intellect, and that the idea of a cosmic stage of intellectuality has been entirely forgotten. Thus only can we account for the statement that this Buddhi, if dominated by Sattva (Guṇa of purity), is said to assume the form (Rûpa) of virtue, knowledge, dispassionateness, and superhuman powers, while, if dominated by Tamas (Guṇa of darkness), it takes the four opposite forms of vice, etc. How could this be possible before the distinction between subject and object has been realised by Ahaṁkāra, and before Buddhi has assumed the character of sense-perception? We have in fact to read the Sāṅkhya Philosophy in two texts, one, as it were, in the old uncial writing that shows forth here and there, giving the cosmic process, the other in the minuscule letters of a much later age, interpreted in a psychological or epistemological sense.

"Here we must distinguish again between Ahaṁkāra, as cosmic power, and Ahaṁkāra as a condition presupposed in any mental act of an individual thinker. Ahaṁkāra was so familiar in the sense of Egoism that, like Buddhi, it was taken in its ordinary rather than in its technical Sāṅkhya sense. I quite

admit that this is a somewhat bold proceeding, but how to get without it at a proper understanding of the ancient Sāṅkhya, the rival of the Vedānta, I cannot see. We must remember that Ahaṁkāra, whatever it may mean in later times, is in the Sāṅkhya something developed out of primordial matter, after that matter has passed through Buddhi. Buddhi cannot really act without a distinction of the universe into subject and object, without the introduction of the Ego or I, which again is impossible without a Non-Ego, or something objective. After that only do we watch the development of what is objective in general into what is objectively this or that (the Tanmātras). But while the creation of what is subjective and objective is the only possible meaning of the cosmic Ahaṁkāra, its psychological interpretation is far more easy. Thus we are told that there are three or four modifications of the Ahaṁkāra.....This division, though rather confused, shows at all events that the Ahaṁkāra is here treated as simply a moral agent, dominated by the *Guṇas*, but no longer as a cosmic *potentia*." (Six Systems of Hindu Philosophy, pp. 246-50.) Again, "The undeveloped potential matter (Prakriti) is first illuminated and intellectualised by the development of a kind of cosmic Buddhi or intelligence. This in its turn generates *Ahaṁkāra* which involves the consciousness of subject and object, and so on through the elements of the subtle body with its internal organs which passes from life to life in the *saṁsāra*, until finally the process ends the coarser materials forming the world of our experience. Thus in any given individual the whole of the psychic life is regarded as the result of a material evolution, and is independent of the Puruṣa." (*Encyclopedia*, art. 'Sāṅkhya Philosophy.')

This point can be settled if we examine verses 10 and 11 of the Kārikā, which are as follow: "The Manifested is caused, non-eternal, limited, changeful, multiform, dependent, attributive, conjunct, and subordinate; the Unmanifested is the reverse. The Manifested has trine constituents,

and is indiscriminative, objective, generic (*i.e.*, enjoyable by all Souls), irrational and productive; so also is Prakṛti: Soul is the reverse in these respects as in those."[1] From these it is plain that the categories beginning with the Mahat and ending with the five gross elements, which are the Manifested, are particular rather than universal,—that is to say, *unique*, in the case of each individual Puruṣa or Jîva. The embodiment or investment by means of which the Supreme Puruṣa is individualised or differentiated is particular and unique in the case of each individual Puruṣa, and the categories or principles which constitute that embodiment or investment must, therefore, also be particular and unique. For instance, the Mahat of one individual Puruṣa differs from that of another. It i true that the consciousness or intellect of one man possesses some features which are *common* to that of all other men, and that this is the reason why all consciousnesses or intellects are called by the same name. Nevertheless, each man's consciousness or intellect is unique and particular. Or, in other words, they are the specialised modes, moments or differentiations of One Universal Consciousness or Intellect, possessed by the Supreme Puruṣa or Îśvara, and not possessed by another being called *Hiraṇyagarbha*. Even though we suppose that such a being was created at first, still he is also a specialised mode of the Supreme Puruṣa. But, in reality, *Hiraṇyagarbha* means, not an individualised being, but that which is prolific of, or capable of producing, innumerable things (**प्रकाशबहुलः**). And this description is strictly true of consciousness or intellect, because it is that principle which reveals to a man all things that constitute the cosmos of his experience.

What is true of consciousness or intellect is also true of all other categories such as self-consciousness, the

[1] "हेतुमदनित्यमव्यापि सक्रियमनेकमाश्रितं लिङ्गम्। सावयवं परतन्त्रम् व्यक्तं विपरीतमव्यक्तम्॥"॥१०॥
"त्रिगुणमविवेकि विषयः सामान्यमचेतनं प्रसवधर्मि। व्यक्तं तथा प्रधानं तद्विपरीतस्तथा च पुमान्॥११॥

eleven senses and the subtle and the gross elements. Some doubt may arise about the fact that the subtle and the gross elements also are particular and unique in the case of each individual Puruṣa. For instance, are not earth, water, fire, and ether all universal or cosmic elements? And if so, how can they be unique to each individual Puruṣa? The Sāṅkhya will perhaps reply that though, as abstractions, they are universal and common to all Puruṣas, yet, as concrete realities, they are unique objects to each Puruṣa: the earth which one Puruṣa perceives and enjoys is not exactly the earth which another Puruṣa perceives and enjoys, and similarly in the case of the other elements. Each of them is universal in the sense that it possesses some features which are perceived and enjoyed by *all* Puruṣas, although it has other features which are unique for each Puruṣa. Those who try to explain evolution as cosmic in the wider sense forget the impossibility of there being a Universal Intellect which is not, or is apart from, any particular intellect; or a Universal Self-consciousness which is not, or is apart from, any particular self-consciousness; etc., etc. Even if we can conceive all these, as Manifested, they all must be caused, limited, changeable, and therefore, as the Kārikā says, not universal at all. It may be contended that all the particular intellects must be the particular modes, moments or differentiations of an individualised Universal Intellect, and analogously with all other categories; but such a contention is not tenable, inasmuch as even the supposed individualised Universal Intellect, etc., must be, as the Kārikā asserts, the Manifested, and, for that reason, particular, limited and changeable. Again, from the verses quoted above from the Mahābhārata, etc., it is evident that the evolutes beginning with the Mahat and ending with the gross elements are nothing but the investments by means of which the Supreme Puruṣa or Îśvara binds Himself and thereby differentiates or individualises Himself into numberless Puruṣas or jîvas: thus those evolutes

are all particular and unique in the case of each individual Puruṣa, because he himself is particular and unique.

Max Müller's main contention in support of his view that the Mahat or Intellect is the first step in the cosmic growth of the universe, is that, Prakṛti being originally dull and senseless, the first step of her evolution must naturally be her illumination or intellectualisation in the form of consciousness or intellect. Therefore, Mahat being nothing but "Prakṛti illuminated and intellectualised," must be the first step in the cosmic growth of Prakṛti, and, as such, universal. But the argument seems to me erroneous. In the first place, Prakṛti, before her creation or evolution, is an abstraction, for, the Sāṅkhya positively tells us that creation is eternal, while, according to the Sāṅkhya doctrine of *satkārya*, consciousness or intellect exists in some form in Prakṛti previously to its creation or evolution. Thus Prakṛti is not absolutely dull and senseless, but contains the element of consciousness or intellect, even when apparently undeveloped, and hence she does not require to be further illuminated and intellectualised. (This point we shall fully discuss in the following chapter.) Therefore Mahat is not "Prakṛti illuminated and intellectualised," but a particular and unique investment which the Supreme Puruṣa creates or evolves through Prakṛti in order to bind Himself, and thereby differentiate Himself into a jîva or individual Puruṣa. In the second place, we have already proved by citing numerous texts that the Mahat is an evolute particular and unique in the case of each individual Puruṣa. Müller further tells us that we should read the Sāṅkhya in two texts. In the old text, the Sāṅkhya appears, here and there, to give indication of the cosmic process of evolution, while in the recent text, the process of evolution is interpreted psychologically or epistemologically. This may be true, because as we have shown before, the process of evolution has two stages: the first cosmical, and the second psychological. But

this does not imply that the whole or part of the process of evolution is cosmical in the wider sense, or in the sense in which he supposes it to be so.

Again, the same writer tells us that Ahaṁkāra is also a "cosmic power," because it is an evolute of Prakṛti after she "has passed through Buddhi." Now, if Buddhi is particular and unique, as we have already proved it to be, then Ahaṁkāra also is particular and unique; it has, no doubt, a cosmical side, but that only in the narrower sense, *i.e.*, in the sense that it is a particular and unique investment like Buddhi. We may, therefore, conclude that evolution or creation as expounded by the Sāṅkhya is cosmical in its first stage, and individual or psychological in its second stage, *i. e.*, in the stage of its further development until release is attained. That this is the true view will be further proved when we proceed with the detailed description of the process itself. But it should be remembered here that when we say that evolution is individual or psychological we do not mean to deny that it has a cosmic meaning —it is a part of the cosmic evolution. What we mean emphatically to assert is that the Sāṅkhya does not describe the process of cosmic evolution in its wider sense, *i. e.*, of the universe, but rather that process by which the Supreme Puruṣa invests Himself as an individualised Puruṣa or jîva, and then struggles to get rid of the investment and thereby to regain His freedom. If we take this view of the process of evolution, which is, as we have proved before, the true view, we shall find that the whole process is partly cosmical and partly individual or psychological.

We may now proceed to examine the detailed account of the process of evolution. Here we find that the whole process by which the external embodiment or investment of each individual Puruṣa is constructed, passes through five main stages, to wit, the evolution of *Mahat* or *Buddhi* (*i. e.*, Consciousness or Intellect), that of *Ahaṁkāra* (*i. e.*, Self-consciousness

or Self-apperception), that of the *ekādaśa Indriyas* (*i. e.*, the mind and the ten senses of knowledge and activity), that of *Pañcha Tanmātras* (*i.e.*, the five finer elements), and that of *Pañcha Mahābhûtas* (*i.e.*, the five gross elements). In all, these twenty-three principles, which are called *tattvas* or categories, are the evolutes that constitute the whole psychical and physical apparatus called the embodiment or investment with which each individual Puruṣa is bound up. Thus we read in the Sāṅkhya-Kārikā: "From Nature issues the Great Om; thence egotism, and from this the sixteen-fold set; from five among the sixteen proceed five elements."[1] (Verse 22.) We read also in the Sāṅkhya-Pravachana-Sûtram: "The creation of the five gross elements is in the order of Mahat and the rest."[2] (Chap. II, aph. 10.)

From the above it is manifest that the first product of the union of Puruṣa and Prakṛti is Consciousness or Intelligence. The word 'Mahat' is most probably derived from the word 'maghash' which means that which reveals; and consciousness or intelligence is that which reveals everything to Puruṣa. Therefore 'consciousness' is the proper English equivalent of Mahat. Another name for *Mahat* is *Buddhi* (as in the Sāṅkhya-Pravachana-Sûtram, Chap. II, aph. 13), which evidently means intelligence. But consciousness is wider than intelligence and includes it. In the Sāṅkhya System they are used as synonymous terms. But consciousness, in its most rudimentary state, has no explicit reference to 'I' or Self, as the centre; as it develops, every state of it is referred to a centre as the subject of that state. Such a vague, undifferentiated, rudimentary consciousness is found, for instance, in the newly-born babe just after birth, and,

[1] "प्रकृतेर्महांस्ततोऽहङ्कारस्तस्माद्गणश्च षोड़शकः।
तस्मादपि षोड़शकात् पञ्चभ्यः पञ्च भूतानि॥"

[2] "महदादिक्रमेण पञ्चभूतानाम्।"

along with its development, it begins to be well-defined and differentiated into numerous definite and distinct states, each of which is referred to a definite centre called the 'subject', 'I' or 'self,' thereby becoming a heterogeneous or differentiated unity called *Ahaṁkāra*. The English equivalent of this term is self-consciousness or self-apperception. *Ahaṁkāra* is therefore nothing but a more developed form of Mahat or Buddhi. But consciousness does not refer to a subject only; it refers also to an object. When I am conscious of the pen I am writing with, my consciousness attains fullness and distinctness only when it refers, not only to the subject called 'I,' but also to the object called 'this pen.' Hence the full development of consciousness requires a double reference. But the object is distinct from, and outside (in a sense) of, the subject or 'I,' so that the subject must possess powers or capacities to be conscious of the object. I can be conscious of the pen which is distinct from, and in a sense outside myself, only if I possess power to be conscious of it. These powers and capacities are called *Indriyas*. So that *Indriya* is an equivalent of the English term 'sense.' European psychology recognises six such senses; but the Sāṅkhya recognises eleven senses, five of which are called Cognitive senses (ज्ञानेन्द्रिय), five Active senses (कर्म्मेन्द्रिय), and the remaining one, *Manaḥ* or the internal sense. The last one has a double function. It partakes of the nature of both the cognitive and the active senses; that is, it co-operates with both of them. Its main function is to determine and grasp the true and distinctive character of the objects of the senses. ("उभयात्मकमत्र मनः सङ्कल्पकमिन्द्रियञ्च साधर्म्म्यात्.") To understand the real meaning of *Manaḥ*, we must also understand the real meaning of *Saṁkalpa*. Professor Colebrooke and Professor Wilson both render this term into 'pondering,' but this is evidently erroneous. Vāchaspati explains it in this way: "The *Saṁkalpa* consists in carefully considering an object of sense and determining 'this is simple,' 'that is not so'; or in discriminating it by its conditions of

predicate and predicable."[1] Thus, *Saṁkalpa* is the process of selective attention by which the object of simple perception is considered, so as to form a definite idea of it. Thus *Manaḥ* has a special function which is a *sine quâ non* of the functioning of the other senses; we cannot be conscious of a sensation or an action, or of their objects unless and until they are determined and grasped in their true and definite character by *Manaḥ*. *Manaḥ* must co-operate with the other senses in order that perception of an object, event, or action may follow. But *Manaḥ* should be carefully distinguished from *Mind*. It is strange that Professor Colebrooke and Professor Wilson should have confused them with each other. The word 'mind,' as used in European psychology, is far more comprehensive than *Manaḥ* as used in the Sāṅkhya. Mind is synonymous with self or soul, whereas *Manaḥ* is the internal sense which has a limited and special function, and while it is true that the function of mind *includes* that of *Manaḥ*, they cannot be identified. But *Manaḥ*, being evolved directly from self-consciousness (Ahaṁkāra) and indirectly from consciousness, contains them both. For this reason Consciousness or Intelligence (Mahat), Self-consciousness (Ahaṁkāra), and the Internal sense (Manaḥ), together constitute what is called *Antaḥ-karaṇa* or *Chitta*, so that the latter is the true medium through which all that is supplied by the other senses, is presented to Puruṣa, Self, or Soul, for his experience and enjoyment. Now, the question is, what evolves these powers or capacities called senses? It is evidently Self-consciousness that directly evolves them in order that it may be supplied with materials for its contemplation and specification.

But this is not all. The senses supply self-consciousness with materials only when they are acted on by objects outside of and distinct from them. What, then, are these objects?

[1] "आलोचितमिन्द्रियेण वस्त्विदमिति सम्मुग्धमिदमेवं नैवमिति सम्यक् कल्पयति विशेषणविशेष्याभावेन विवेचयतीति।"

What are those things about which the senses supply the information? Who makes or evolves them? These are questions which we have now to consider. The Sāṅkhya says, they are, in the first instance, the *Pañcha Tanmātras*. But there is unfortunately a good deal of confusion about the precise meaning of *Tanmātra*. The phrase 'pañcha tanmātrāṇi' is generally rendered into 'five subtile elements,' the term 'Tanmātrāṇi' thus indicating what are subtile. According to this interpretation the *Pañcha Tanmātrāṇi* are those objects which are subtile and the ultimate constituent elements of the gross or coarse elements, such as earth, water, fire, air, and ether. Some, on the contrary, explain *Tanmātram* to be nothing but what is called, in psychology, mere sensation, that is, sensation which has not, as yet, been localised and objectified. So, in the case of a newly-born child, for instance, the sensations received are not distinctly referred to objects in space, but are apprehended as mere states of consciousness, or, in the words of modern psychology, they do not give rise to perceptions, but are merely felt. Even in adult life such sensation is not altogether absent. In many instances we are aware of having sensations without understanding, at the same time, the real and exact nature of the object exciting them in our mind. (In this connexion the chapter on "Sensation" in Professor Stout's *Manual of Psychology* may be read with advantage.) According to this interpretation, *Tanmātras* are nothing but mere sensations that represent the most vague and rudimentary stage of perception.

These two interpretations are evidently opposed to each other; but it is difficult to decide between them. It is true that there are mere sensations, or sensations which are only vaguely referred to external objects, or by which no distinct perception of objects is possible; and it may also be conceded that they serve the purpose of the objects of consciousness at the beginning of our life. But this seems contrary to the general tenor of the Sāṅkhya System, particularly to one of the most

important doctrines, namely, the doctrine of the subtle body, according to which our physical organism which is dissolved at death is only an outer coating or investment. There is also an inner coating or investment with which Puruṣa or Soul is directly and immediately connected ; it is called 'the subtle body' and is constituted by *Antaḥ-karaṇa* or *Chitta*, the ten *Indriyas* (senses), and the *Pañcha Tanmātras* (*i.e.*, the five subtile elements). This subtle body remains in tact even after the dissolution of the outer physical coating, or 'body,' at death. Thus the *Pañcha Tanmātras* are not, and cannot be, mere sensations, for, such a sensation, which does not lead to a distinct perception, must arise only through the stimulation of the organs of sense. But all sense-organs are dissolved, with the body, at death, so that after the dissolution of the body no sensation can arise; thus the dissolution of the body involves also the impossibility of evolution of any *Tanmātra* understood as a mere sensation. But the Sāṅkhya positively and emphatically says that the *Pañcha Tanmātras* survive the dissolution of the gross body. And that is possible only if by *Tanmātra* is meant, not mere sensation, but something else which is more or less a permanent element of the investment with which Puruṣa becomes connected at creation. (*Cf.* verse 40 of the *Kārikā.*)[1]

The question remains, then, What are the *Tanmātras*? The Sāṅkhya says they are the final or ultimate elements out of which all composite material bodies are made up. The five gross elements, namely, earth, water, fire, air, and ether, are composed of them. The next question is, What evolves them? And the answer is that 'they are evolved by *Ahaṁkāra*, or Self-consciousness, in order that they may be the objects of experience or enjoyment (**भोगः**) for Puruṣa.' Now there is one difficulty here which we must solve. These five elements, being subtle, cannot be perceived by the senses, and therefore

[1] "पूर्व्वोत्पन्नमसक्तं नियतं महदादिसूक्ष्मपर्य्यन्तम्। संसरति निरुपभोगं भावैरधिवासितं लिङ्गम्॥"

they cannot be objects of perception or experience. What then is the use of their evolution, and how do we know that they exist at all? The reply will perhaps be that, although they cannot be directly perceived by the senses, their existence is the necessary condition of the perception of the gross or compound things (**स्थूलभूतानि**) which are the ordinary objects of sense-perception; for, all gross or compound things, by their very constitution, are composed of subtile parts or elements, and unless those parts or elements had affected the senses separately, there would arise no sensations and therefore no perception. It is true that we are not ordinarily conscious of the affections which they separately produce in consciousness, and that what we are distinctly conscious of is their collective result, which we ordinarily call a sensation ; but this only proves that the separate affections possess so low a degree of intensity that they do not rise to the level of distinct and vivid consciousness ; that is to say, they remain more or less subconscious. But, yet, to explain the conscious we must resort to the subconscious ; to explain a distinct and vivid sensation produced by a compound thing we must maintain that it is the collective result produced by the combination of many subconscious affections excited by subtle parts or elements of the thing. This is a great psychological truth, and is called, in Western Psychology, 'the theory of subconscious mental modification.' It may still be asked, however, if the subtile elements are evolved by *Ahaṁkāra* and finally by *Mahat* (Consciousness or Intellect), why do they remain subconscious? The reply is, that consciousness admits of degrees, and what is called subconsciousness is also a kind of consciousness possessing a very low degree of intensity. And it is also a fact that what is subconscious may be raised to the level of consciousness by special processes of concentration, and that what is conscious may in turn fall below the level of distinct consciousness, and thus become subconscious. So that consciousness and subconsciousness are matters

of degree, as our everyday experience teaches. In this connexion it should be remembered, (*a*) that the senses can be developed to a considerable extent, and (*b*) that the incapacity to perceive the subtile elements is due to the gross and obtuse character of the organs of sense. It is found that the defects of the organs of sense may, to a considerable extent, be removed by intensifying their stimulation by means of suitable instruments such as the microscope, telescope, etc., and that they then become far better means of perceiving objects too fine, or too remote, to be perceived under their ordinary conditions. It is said in the Yoga-Sûtram that the yogins may develop powers by virtue of which they may perceive subtle elements or things which cannot be perceived through the ordinary organs of sense. (See *Vibhûti Pāda*, aph. 25.[1])

The next and last results of evolution are the five gross elements, namely, earth, water, fire, air, and ether. But two other steps should be added to complete the process of evolution. The objects of the senses are not merely those five gross elements, for, there are innumerable other objects which we find around us, made up of those elements—our physical organism or body being one of them. Again, all objects, subtile and gross alike, constitute a single system—a world, called the cosmos of experience, which supplies all the materials for the enjoyment of Puruṣa. In this way the Supreme Puruṣa constructs, or rather creates, through the instrumentality of Prakṛti, investments for His individualisation, and a world or cosmos of experience for His observation and enjoyment. There is an infinite number of such investments or embodiments, each of which is unique. Thus, though there is One Perfect Absolute Puruṣa, His differentiations, modes, or moments, are unlimited in number, and, consequently, He appears to be multitudinous, by reason of His connexions

[1] "प्रवृत्त्यालोकन्यासात् सूक्ष्मव्यवहित-विप्रकृष्टज्ञानम्।

with those multitudinous investments or embodiments. The One Puruṣa appears to be *many* Puruṣas.—Such is the Doctrine of Creation or Evolution as expounded by the Sāṅkhya System of Philosophy.

From the above description of the process of evolution it is quite manifest that the Sāṅkhya view with regard to the nature of the manifested world is thoroughly *spiritualistic* or *idealistic*. Some, *e. g.*, Professor Flint in his *Anti-theistic Theories* maintain that the Sāṅkhya System entertains a *materialistic* view of the world. The reasons offered for such a view seem to be these : The consciousness and the self-consciousness (Mahat and Ahaṁkāra) from which the manifested world is said to be evolved are themselves evolved from Prakṛti ; but Prakṛti is regarded by the Sāṅkhya as the opposite of Puruṣa, *i.e.*, as *unintelligent* or *unconscious*, and is therefore *materialistic* ; the consciousness and the self-consciousness must consequently be also materialistic, they being the products of Prakṛti, and for the reason that according to the Sāṅkhya the product or effect pre-exists in the cause and derives all its characteristics from it. Again, all the objects of the world, gross and subtle, are also evolved from consciousness and self-consciousness, and ultimately from Prakṛti, and must, therefore, be materialistic in nature. Thus, both the ultimate evolvent (*i. e.*, Prakṛti) and the last evolutes (*i. e.*, the objects of the world) being materialistic, why will the intermediate evolutes, to wit, the consciousness, the self-consciousness and the eleven senses be different ? They also must be materialistic. But it is difficult to see how this conclusion follows. We have already proved that Prakṛti is unconscious in a relative sense only ; for, she being pervaded by, and pervading, the conscious Puruṣa cannot be absolutely unconscious. Moreover, the Sāṅkhya does not say that the consciousness and the self-consciousness are derived from Prakṛti alone; when Prakṛti is united with Puruṣa, then and then only is she able to evolve Consciousness or

Intellect. Thus, Puruṣa is as essential a condition of the evolution of Consciousness, as Prakṛti is. Again, as we have already proved, Prakṛti being a constituent element of Puruṣa, she cannot but be conscious, and whatever is evolved from such a Prakṛti must necessarily be conscious. Hence, even the five subtle and the five gross elements with all the results of their various combinations are, in a sense, *conscious*. Of course, we do not usually call them conscious, because they are generally subconscious, *i.e.*, possess a very low degree of consciousness. (We shall dilate upon this point in the sequel.) Therefore, Prakṛti as understood by the Sāṅkhya is quite different from matter as understood by the materialists, or even by the modern scientists; and the manifested world, as understood by the former, is similarly quite different from that as understood by the latter. Prakṛti with all her manifestations is through and through spiritual, whereas matter with all its manifestations is through and through non-spiritual, or opposite of the spritual. While the Sāṅkhya explains and understands matter spiritually, materialism or naturalism explains and understands spirit materialistically. These two views of the world are therefore as opposite as the two poles of the earth.

Some, on the other hand, maintain that the Sāṅkhya propounds the theory of Rigorous Dualism. But we have already proved conclusively that that is erroneous. Puruṣa and Prakṛti are not two absolutely opposed and independent principles, they are wholly inter-dependent and inter-related like the subject and the object, the self and the not-self: their union is eternal, neither of them can exist apart from the other. The Sāṅkhya therefore teaches Relative Dualism or Absolute Idealism.

(2) *The Doctrine of Bondage*:

From the outline given above of the process of evolution of the external investment or embodiment by which the Absolute Puruṣa binds Himself and thereby individualises or

differentiates Himself as a *Jîva Puruṣa* (man), it is easy to understand what is meant by Bondage. Bondage, according to the Sāṅkhya, is the feeling of the three kinds of pain, intrinsic (आध्यात्मिक), extrinsic (आधिभौतिक), and supernatural (आधिदैविक), arising out of the Puruṣa's experience (भोगः) of the evolutes or manifestations of Prakṛti. What is the cause of such experience? The cause is the union of Puruṣa with Prakṛti for the purpose of evolution (सगः). But we have seen that the union between Puruṣa and Prakṛti is eternal and therefore irresolvable. Is then Puruṣa eternally bound? The word 'bondage' has two senses, a wider and a narrower one. In the former sense, it indicates an eternal and general connexion between Puruṣa and Prakṛti; even during the Pralaya or dissolution when all manifested things become absorbed into Prakṛti, their primal cause, such a connexion remains intact. In this sense of bondage, Puruṣa may be said to be eternally bound, for He never exists separately from Prakṛti, but eternally pervades her. In the latter sense, it indicates a specific kind of bondage, namely, the feeling of the three kinds of pain arising out of the specific connexion which the Absolute Puruṣa enters into with Prakṛti in order to evolve specific investments or embodiments for the purpose of His specific experience. In this latter sense, the word 'bondage' is usually used in the Sāṅkhya System.

The real and immediate cause of this specific bondage is said to be *Aviveka*, or non-discriminative knowledge, under the influence of which the individualised Puruṣa forgets Himself, as it were, and completely identifies Himself with the objects of His experience and enjoyment, to wit, the manifestations of Prakṛti, from the Mahat to the five gross elements and other objects composed of them. When, in this way, Puruṣa becomes completely encompassed by them, He then, under delusion, begins to think that the wants, appetites, passions and desires which really arise from the changeful conditions of the physical organism; the changeful states of cognition,

feeling and volition which really arise from the actions and reactions between the body and the environment ; or, in a word, the whole empirical self (*antaḥ-karaṇa* or *chitta*)—are His own, and belong, as parts and parcels, to Himself. He proceeds further and identifies Himself with His worldly possessions, house, wife, children, relatives, etc. He begins to say, 'I am enjoying happiness, I am enduring pain.' Thus He loses sight of Himself as something different and becomes completely submerged in Prakṛti. This complete self-forgetfulness and the consequent identification of Himself with Prakṛti and her manifestations, which is usually found to be the case with all worldly people, is considered by the Sāṅkhya to be the real perennial source of all His misery and trouble. So we find that the real cause of bondage is not the union but the delusion (**अविवेक:**), and that the cause is psychological, not metaphysical at all. Being psychological, the delusion may be dispelled by the development of better psychical conditions through the adoption of proper and adequate means. The Sāṅkhya admits the possibility of such a development through suitable moral and religious training and practices, and holds that the delusion comes to an end after going through a course of such training and practices extending over an indefinitely long period of time. And along with its end comes also the end of the bondage, *i.e.*, the complete relief from the three kinds of pain. It is curious that Prakṛti performs a double function in this connexion. On the one hand, by variously manifesting herself, she supplies the materials for the enjoyment of Puruṣa and thereby supplies the means to His bondage; on the other hand, by thus satisfying Him to the full, she completes His enjoyment and brings the terms of His bondage to a close. (Vide *Sāṅkhya-Kārikā*, vers. 56, 58 and 59.) A very elaborate account of such a delusion and its consequences has been given in the *Śāntiparvan* of the *Mahābhārata* (*vide* Chap. 302, vers. 41-49, and Chap. 303).

Now an important question suggests itself: To whom do the delusion and its effect, the bondage, really belong? The Sāṅkhya appears, at first sight, to say that they cannot belong to Puruṣa, because He is eternally enlightened and free: (*vide* the *Sāṅkhya-Kārikā*, ver. 19, and the *Sāṅkhya-Pravachana-Sūtram*, Chap. 3, aphs. 71 and 72, Chap. 5, aph. 13, and Chap. 6, aph. 10). They therefore must belong to Prakṛti. How then is Puruṣa deluded and bound? The Sāṅkhya seems to teach that the delusion and bondage are reflected on Puruṣa by Prakṛti by virtue of her proximity (**सान्निध्य**) to Him, just as the red tinge is reflected on a crystal vase by a china rose by virtue of its proximity. (*Vide Sāṅkhya-Pravachana-Sūtram*, Chap. 6, aphs. 27 and 28.) Though this analogy, by itself, is inappropriate, like those generally given in the Sāṅkhya, it suggests one important truth. The analogy appears at first sight to emphasise the point that Puruṣa remains essentially unaffected by the reflexion cast upon Him by Prakṛti, just like a crystal vase which remains as it is, though it appears red on account of the reflexion cast upon it by a china rose. But really it emphasises the opposite truth. The crystal vase appears red so long as the reflexion exists. This shows that it has the capacity for being so reflected on, otherwise it could not be so reflected on. Thus Puruṣa really does not remain indifferent to the reflexion by which the delusion and bondage are cast upon Him by Prakṛti, but becomes affected by the reflexion and remains so as long as it continues. Consequently, the delusion and bondage of Puruṣa is real. Is not this inconsistent with the eternally free and enlightened character of Puruṣa? To answer this question properly we should consider carefully the Sāṅkhya Doctrine of *Avidyā* or *Aviveka*, *i.e.*, non-discriminative knowledge.

Avidyā or *Aviveka* may be said to be what is opposite to *Vidyā* or *Viveka*, *i.e.*, the knowledge of the distinction between Puruṣa and Prakṛti. Therefore, it is the knowledge of the identity between them: When Puruṣa thinks Himself identical

with Prakṛti and her evolutes, He may be said to have *Avidyā* or *Aviveka*. In other words, *Vidyā* or *Viveka* is discriminative knowledge, while *Avidyā* or *Aviveka* is non-discriminative knowledge, about Puruṣa and Prakṛti. The same definition is given in the Yoga-Sûtram: "*Avidyā* is the thinking of the non-eternal to be eternal, of the unclean or impure to be clean or pure, of the painful to be pleasant, and of the non-spiritual to be spiritual."[1] Vyāsa adds the following in his commentary on the above: "Just as the opposite of friend does not mean the absence of friend, or only friend in name, but an enemy; and the opposite of grazing field, not the absence of grazing field, or only grazing field in name, but another wide land; so *Avidyā* is not indicative of proof, or of absence of proof, but is a kind of knowledge opposed to *Vidyā*."[2] In other words, *Avidyā* is non-discriminative knowledge—the knowledge of the identity between Puruṣa and Prakṛti. Thus, *Avidyā* is as real as *Vidyā*. They are both positive, but about different things: *Vidyā* is the knowledge of the distinction, and *Avidyā* is the knowledge of the identity, between Puruṣa and Prakṛti. But Puruṣa is eternal, pure, full of bliss, spiritual, and the manifestations of Prakṛti are non-eternal, impure, painful, and non-spiritual. Therefore, *Avidyā* is the knowledge of identity between what is eternal, pure, blissful, and spiritual, and what is non-eternal, impure, painful, and non-spiritual.

Now, not all knowledge has the same value; some ought to be retained and some shunned. *Vidyā* is true knowledge, because it is the knowledge of the distinction between Puruṣa and Prakṛti, which is true; while *Avidyā* is false or erroneous knowledge, because it is the knowledge of the identity between Puruṣa and Prakṛti, which is false or erroneous. This

[1] "अनित्याशुचिदुःखानात्मसु नित्यशुचिसुखात्मख्यातिरविद्या।"

[2] 'यथा नामित्रो मित्राभावो न मित्रमात्रं किन्तु तद्विरुद्धः सपत्नः, तथाऽगोपदः न गोपदाभावो न गोपदमात्रम्, किन्तु देश एव ताभ्यामन्यत् वस्त्वन्तरम्, एवमविद्या न प्रमाणं न प्रमाणाभावः किन्तु विद्याविपरीतं ज्ञानान्तरमविद्येति।"

appears to be the reason why the Sāṅkhya says that *Avidyā* should be shunned and *Vidyā* should be attained, if we desire Release.

Now the question naturally arises: Why do we say that the knowledge of identity between Puruṣa and Prakṛti is erroneous? Puruṣa and Prakṛti are no doubt distinct, but they are, as we have shown before, also related. Puruṣa and Prakṛti are both all-pervading, *i.e.*, they mutually include each other, they are related as subject and object—as whole and part; their union is eternal and irresolvable; they are interdependent, and so on. (*Vide* preceding chapter.) Puruṣa and Prakṛti are therefore both distinct and identical at the same time; that is to say, they are relatively distinct and identical, not absolutely so. But, the reason why the Sāṅkhya calls the knowledge of the identity between Puruṣa and Prakṛti erroneous is evident. Puruṣa and Prakṛti are not absolutely identical or entirely the same thing, and if we regard them so, as all the worldly people do, our knowledge must be erroneous; and so long as we continue to do so, we may be said to be under the influence of the delusion caused by *Avidyā*. Therefore, *Avidyā* is false and delusive, not because it is the knowledge of the identity between Puruṣa and Prakṛti, but because such identity is conceived by all individualised Puruṣas (*i.e.*, jîvas) to be absolute until they attain *Vidyā* and the consequent release.

From the above it is evident that the real cause of *Avidyā* is the differentiations of the Absolute Puruṣa into individualised Puruṣas effected through His specific unions with Prakṛti which result in the so-called twenty-three categories, beginning with *Mahat* and ending with the *Pañcha Mahābhûtas*, including all other objects composed of them. But the differentiating activity of the Absolute Puruṣa is eternal, as we have shown before; therefore the consequent *Avidyā* is also eternal. Now, another important question suggests itself: If *Avidyā* is eternal, how can it be destroyed? The Sāṅkhya says it can be destroyed by *Vidyā* or discriminative

knowledge. (*Vide Sāṅkhya-Pravachana-Sútram*, Chap. 3, aph. 23, "ज्ञानान्मुक्तिः," and also *Sāṅkhya-Kārikā*, ver. 44, "ज्ञानेन चापवर्गः.") But *destruction of Avidyā* by the attainment of *Vidyā* is an event in time. How then can an event in time such as the destruction of *Avidyā* affect the latter which, being eternal, is above time, or more appropriately, embraces the whole of time? That is to say, *Avidyā*, which is eternal, cannot be destroyed or put to an end. How can we reconcile this with the positive assertion of the Sāṅkhya that *Vidyā* is capable of dispelling *Avidyā*, just as light is capable of dispelling darkness? (*Vide Sāṅkhya-Pravachana-Sútram*, Chap. I, aph. 56, "नियतकारणात् तदुच्छित्तिर्ध्वान्तवत्.") In this way: *Avidyā*, which consists in the confusion of the relative identity with the absolute identity between Puruṣa and Prakṛti (including her evolutes), may be put to an end only by attaining the understanding of the true nature of the confusion. And such an understanding is nothing but the knowledge that the identity is relative, not absolute; that is to say, it implies also distinction between Puruṣa and Prakṛti. Thus, in fact, *Avidyā* is not entirely destroyed but only transformed or modified, or assumes a form quite different from that which it had before; for, the knowledge of identity is not and cannot be wholly destroyed, it being partially or relatively true. Therefore, when the Sāṅkhya says that *Vidyā* is capable of dispelling *Avidyā*, what it really means to say is that the consciousness of the distinction between Puruṣa and Prakṛti transforms or modifies, not altogether destroys, the erroneous consciousness of the absolute identity between them. And the transformation or modification of *Avidyā* is not inconsistent with its eternal nature. For, according to the Sāṅkhya doctrine of causality, nothing is created out of nothing, or comes to nothing, but everything undergoes a process of evolution, *i.e.*, a process of transformation or modification, which process also is eternal. Similarly, *Avidyā* undergoes a process of transformation or modification without changing its nature altogether,

and appears to be a quite new thing when it is completely transformed at the time of release: this its complete transformation or modification is designated in the Sāṅkhya as its complete dispelling or disappearance, because under its influence Puruṣa is no longer deluded. This point will be made more clear when we consider the Doctrine of Release.

We are now in a position to answer properly the question which we raised and left unanswered before, namely, the question, How is the reality of *Avidyā* and *Bandha* (*i.e.*, non-discriminative knowledge and bondage) consistent with the eternally free and enlightened character of Puruṣa? The answer is: These two opposite assertions represent the two opposite standpoints from which we view His nature. We have proved before that according to the Sāṅkhya every individualised Puruṣa is a perfect differentiation of the Absolute Puruṣa from a particular or unique point of view. In as far as the Absolute Puruṣa exists, whole and undivided, in Him we may be said to be eternally free and enlightened; but in as far as, again, the Absolute Puruṣa expresses and realises, *i.e.*, embodies or invests Himself in and through His unique and finite physical organism and its adjuncts, He appears deluded and bound or confined. Hence a double conception is necessary to understand the real nature of an individualised Puruṣa; and the delusion and bondage are real, not illusory, inasmuch as they are the indispensable conditions by means of which the Absolute Puruṣa in man gradually realises Himself and returns upon Himself as a liberated Being.

Why the Absolute Puruṣa imposes upon Himself such limitations is a question which is unanswerable, because unmeaning. The attempt to answer such a question by using words like *Avidyā* or *Aviveka*, or some other similar words, is bound to be futile. The difficulties are not obviated by saying that *Avidyā* really belongs to Prakṛti and is transferred to Puruṣa by virtue of her proximity to Him, for, if He were

really wholly immune from *Avidyā*, nothing could make Him appear to be affected by it. The simile of a China-rose casting its tinge upon a crystal vase put near it does not in the least prove, as we have shown before, that the Puruṣa remains entirely unaffected by the casting of *Avidyā* upon Him by Prakṛti, on account of her proximity to Him. Besides, the word 'proximity,' being too vague and inadequate to express the relation between Puruṣa and Prakṛti, who are eternally united and mutually pervading, rather increases the difficulty by proving that Puruṣa possesses the capacity for appearing to be affected by *Avidyā*, as the crystal vase possesses the capacity of being red when placed near a China-rose. Furthermore, Puruṣa and Prakṛti being mutually pervading, whatever belongs to Prakṛti must be pervaded by Puruṣa; that is, must be included in the nature of Puruṣa. Therefore *Avidyā*, which belongs to Prakṛti, must also belong to Puruṣa. Thus, we find that Puruṣa being all-pervading there is nothing in Prakṛti which entirely falls outside the nature of Puruṣa. Again, *Avidyā* which is a kind of positive knowledge, cannot be possessed by Prakṛti who is subconscious; consequently, *Avidyā* must, somehow or other, belong to Puruṣa. These are the reasons why we say that the question is the ultimate of all ultimate questions—it is about the very mystery of creation. We therefore conclude that the Absolute Puruṣa, working and realising in men, includes within Himself their psychical and physical organisations as indispensable means to His realisation, or returning upon Himself.

(3) *The Doctrine of Release.*

That Prakṛti in man is not something wholly foreign and antagonistic to the Absolute Puruṣa in him may be shown to be true, if we consider the Sāṅkhya Doctrine of

Release. What then is Release? It is the complete liberation from the three kinds of pain. How is such liberation attained? It is attained through *Vidyā* or *Vivekā*, *i.e.*, by the possession of true knowlege of Puruṣa, Prakṛti and other categories. But that saving knowledge is not attained in one life; Puruṣa has to migrate from life to life for an indefinitely long period before He can attain it. What is the nature of the knowledge which saves him from the bondage? It is the knowledge of the distinction between Him and Prakṛti including her manifestations. In the state of bondage, Puruṣa, as we have found, is completely self-forgetful and entirely ignorant of such distinction from Prakṛti; but through moral and spiritual cultures gone through for a period extending over numerous successive lives He gradually rises to the level of that consciousness of Self and of its distinction from Prakṛti and her manifestations, which is the only means by which He returns upon Himself, contemplates His true essential nature, regains everlasting peace and contentment, and does not migrate any longer. This state is called by the Sāṅkhya one of liberation or release. But it should be carefully remembered here that the state of release is not a state of complete separation of Puruṣa from Prakṛti; that is, as we have shown, impossible. This conclusion will be further confirmed if we carefully examine the behaviour of Prakṛti and Puruṣa towards each other in the state of release as it has been described in the Sāṅkhya by means of various kinds of similes.

Consider, for instance, the following: (A) "As a dancer, having exhibited herself on the stage, desists from the dance, so does Prakṛti cease, when she has manifested herself to Puruṣa."[1] (*Sāṅkhya-Kārikā*, verse 59; also the *Sāṅkhya-Pravachana-Sūtram*, Chap. 3, aph. 69.) Here it is stated that when

[1] "रङ्गस्य दर्शयित्वा निवर्त्तते नर्त्तकी यथा नृत्यात्।
पुरुषस्य तथात्मानं प्रकाश्य निवर्त्तते प्रकृतिः॥"

Puruṣa has experienced or enjoyed all the manifestations of Prakṛti to His satiety, she ceases to act, that is, to manifest herself any more to Him and thereby to bind Him further. And consequently He attains liberation, because He has nothing more to experience and enjoy, and therefore to be bound up with. This does not imply that Prakṛti completely separates herself from Puruṣa, or *vice versa*, because, both being all-pervading, and for several other reasons described before, a complete separation is impossible. They still remain united, but their behaviour towards each other is wholly different from that which was found during the state of bondage. What that behaviour definitely is, is not expressly stated in the Sāṅkhya.

(B) "My opinion is, that nothing exists more bashful than Prakṛti, who knowing that 'I have been seen' does not appear again before Puruṣa."[1] (*Ibid*, verse 61, also *Sāṅkhya-Pravachana-Sútram*, Chap. 3, aph. 70.) This does not mean to say that Prakṛti cuts herself completely asunder from Puruṣa, after she has been completely experienced and enjoyed by Him, but it simply means that she appears before Him no longer as a binding agency—she no longer manifests herself in such a way as to delude and bind Him, as she used to do in the state of His bondage. This meaning is confirmed by the following verse.

(C) "So by a study of the principles is the final, incontrovertible and only one knowledge attained that I am not, nought is mine, and the ego exists not."[2] (*Ibid*, verse 64.) Here in a short compass the form of the saving knowledge is described. There are three parts of the sentence, and we should carefully examine them. (1) I am not (**नाऽस्मि**): What does

[1] "प्रकृतेः सुकुमारतरं न किञ्चिदस्तीति मे मतिर्भवति।
या दृष्टाऽस्मीति पुनर्न दर्शनमुपैति पुरुषस्य॥"

[2] "एवं तत्त्वाभ्यासान्नास्मि न मे नाहमित्यपरिशेषम्।
अविपर्ययाद्विशुद्धं केवलमुत्पद्यते ज्ञानम्॥"

this exactly mean? It does not mean, of course, that I (*i.e.*, Puruṣa) am non-existent, for that is absurd. What it really means is that I am not now what I thought myself to be under the delusion during the state of bondage. During that state I forgot myself and completely identified myself with Prakṛti and her evolutes; now, in the state of release, I have attained the knowledge of my distinction (relative) from them,—I am the Self, they are the Not-self, although they are also the parts of my content. (2) Nought is mine (**न मे**): This does not mean that I have no content—that I am a bare undifferentiated unity, for that is self-contradictory. It really means that my present contents are entirely different in kind from those which I thought myself to have during the state of bondage; or the very same contents which I have had during the state of bondage have now been so transformed and modified that they appear to me in a wholly different guise, and my attitude towards them has become also entirely different, so that I may now say that I have no such content as I had in the state of bondage. (3) The ego exists not (**नाहम्**): This does not mean that I am now extinct or dead. What it really means is this: I am no longer a selfish egoist, my particular individuality has been completely transformed into the universal personality. My deluded and confined Self—the Self under bondage—is now dead, and what now lives is the delivered and free Self. My false Self has died and my true Self now lives. So that what is denied here is not the true Self-hood, but the "short, brutish, selfish individuality." Some, as M. Cousin for instance, suppose that this verse declares "an absolute nihilism, the last fruit of scepticism." This is evidently wrong, because it is against the entire tenor of the Sāṅkhya Philosophy.

Other commentators explain the above in different ways. Gauḍapāda offers the following explanation: "Neither I am: I am not. Not mine: not my body; that is, I am one (thing), body is another. Nor do I exist: that is, exempt from

egotism."[1] In this commentary 'nāsmi' is explained as 'I am not.' What does that precisely mean? If it means 'I am extinct or dead,' the meaning is absurd, for Puruṣa being perfect and eternal, cannot become extinct or dead. What else, then, does it mean? The commentator is silent about that. *Na me* is made to mean 'my body is not mine' or 'I am different from my body.' In one sense this is true, but it is not the whole truth. The whole truth about it is, that in the state of bondage I thought my body and its adjuncts to be perfectly same with my Self, but now in the state of release I have come to know that they are not really so; they are also distinct from myself, although, still, they form part of my contents. It should be remembered here that Puruṣa being all-pervading, the body and its adjuncts cannot fall outside Him, but are included in His contents even in the state of release. The real difference between the state of bondage and the state of release is the difference of attitudes towards the body and its adjuncts in the two states. For these reasons Gauḍapāda's interpretation seems to me to be unsatisfactory.

Vāchaspati offers the following explanation: "*I am not* precludes action only. Indeed, 'as,' the root, together with 'bhû' and 'kṛ,' are said to signify action in general. 'Nāsmi' therefore signifies, not 'I am not,' but 'I do not.' Thus, all acts whatever, whether external or internal, ascertainment, consciousness, reflexion, perception and all others, are denied as acts of soul: consequently, there being no active functions in soul, it follows that neither do I (as an individual agent) exist. *Aham* here denotes 'agent'; as, I know, I sacrifice, I give, I enjoy, or so on, implying uniformly the notion of an agent—nor is aught mine. An agent implies mastership; if there be no agent there can be no abstract mastership (or possession). Or 'nāsmi' means 'na asmi,' 'I am male' or Puruṣa unproductive of progeny, of acts.

[1] "नास्मि नाहमेव भवामि, न मे मम शरीरं तत्, यतोऽहमन्यः शरीरमन्यत्, नाहमिति अपरिशेषम् अहङ्काररहितम्।"

'Nāham' indicates 'absence of agency,' for what is unproductive cannot be also an agent: 'Na me' means I am not a master, because I am not an agent."[1] The above interpretation seems to be strained. We have already proved conclusively that Puruṣa cannot be absolutely inactive, devoid of all agency; He is rather the ultimate source of all activity which is supposed to belong to Prakṛti.

Vijñāna Bhikṣu offers the following explanation: "*Neither I am* denies the agency of the soul, nor (is aught mine), denies its attachment (to any objects); nor do I exist, denies its appropriation (of faculties)."[2] The Sāṅkhya-Pravachana-Sûtram offers the same explanation: "Through constant cultivation of the categories in the form of the abandonment (of abhimāna or conceit), expressed as (that the Self is) not (Prakṛti), (that it is) not (Mahat, etc.), (there takes place) the perfect development of Viveka or Discrimination."[3] (Chap. 3, aph. 75.) The Sāṅkhya-Chandrikā offers a similar explanation: "*I am not* means I am not agent; therefore I am distinct from the principle of intelligence. *Not mine is pain*: Exemption from being the seat of pain and the rest thence determined. *Nor do I exist*: By this difference from egotism is expressed."[4] The gist of all these explanations is that in the state of release Puruṣa becomes conscious of His absolute inactivity or indifference, of His absolute separatedness from Prakṛti and her manifestations, etc. But we

[1] नास्मीत्यात्मनि क्रियामात्रं निषेधति, यथाहुः 'क्रुध्वस्तयः क्रिया-सामान्य-वचना' इति। तथा चाध्यवसायाभिमानसङ्कल्पालोचनानि चान्तराणि, बाह्याश्च सर्व्वे व्यापाराः, आत्मनि प्रतिषिद्धानि बोद्धव्यानि। यतश्चात्मनि व्यापारावेशो नास्यतो नाहम्, अहमिति कर्त्तृपदम्, 'अहं जानामि, अहं जुहोमि, अहं ददे, अहं भुञ्जे' इति सर्व्वत्र कर्त्तुः परामर्शात्। ... ... अतएव न मे, कर्त्ता हि स्वामितां लभते, तदभावात्तु कुतः स्वाभाविकी स्वामितेत्यर्थः। अथवा 'नास्मि' इति पुरुषोऽस्मि, न प्रसवधर्म्मा, अप्रसवधर्म्मत्वाच्चाकर्त्तृत्वमाह नाहमिति। अकर्त्तृत्वाच्च न स्वामितेत्याह 'न मे' इति॥"

[2] "नास्मीत्यात्मनः कर्त्तृत्वनिषेधः। न मे इति सङ्गनिषेधः। नाहमिति तादात्म्यनिषेधः॥"

[3] "तत्त्वाभ्यासान्नेति नेतीति त्यागादिविवेकसिद्धिः।"

[4] "नास्मीत्यस्य न कर्त्तास्मीत्यर्थस्तेन बुद्धिभिन्नोऽहमिति प्राप्तं न मे दुःखमिति शेषस्तेन दुःखाद्यारोपाभावो लभ्यो नाहमित्यनेनाहंकारभेदयहः॥"

have already proved by citing several texts from the Sāṅkhya that such expressions are only partially true, and false and misleading if taken unconditionally. We may therefore conclude that the interpretations we have given to the expressions *Nāsmi*, *Na me* and *Nāham* are the correct and consistent ones.

(D) "With this (knowledge) Puruṣa, unmoved and self-collected, as a spectator, contemplates Prakṛti, who has ceased from production (and) consequently reverted from the seven forms (to her original state)." [1] (*Ibid*, verse 65.) Here it is clearly stated that Puruṣa still contemplates Prakṛti, but as something completely transformed, *i.e.*, as no longer binding and deluding Him. Prakṛti does not cease to exist for nor separates herself completely from, Him; but she is not contemplated now in just the same way as before. Puruṣa is still the all-pervading subject and Prakṛti the all-pervading object; and the theoretical relation between them is just the same now as it was before, but their *practical* relation has become different and transformed. In the state of bondage Prakṛti used to delude and bind Puruṣa by her various manifestations. Now in the state of release, she has ceased to do so, but still she is an inseparable element of Puruṣa. This point is made very explicit in the following verse.

(E) "The one disregards because 'I have seen'; the other desists because 'I have been seen'; (and) notwithstanding their conjunction there is no occasion for (further) evolution." [2] (*Ibid*, verse 66.) Here it is explicitly asserted that the conjunction between Puruṣa and Prakṛti is still intact; but what has been changed is the psychical delusion under which Puruṣa thought that the evolutes of Prakṛti were His own productions and identical with Himself.

[1] "तेन निवृत्तप्रसवामर्थवशात् सप्तरूपविनिवृत्ताम्। प्रकृतिं पश्यति पुरुषः प्रेक्षकवदवस्थितः स्वस्थः॥"
[2] "दृष्टा मयेत्युपेक्षक एको दृष्टाऽहमित्युपरमत्यन्या। सति संयोगेऽपि तयोः प्रयोजनं नास्ति सर्गस्य॥"

(F) "The attainment of adequate knowledge renders virtue and the rest inoperative; (Puruṣa, however) like a wheel revolving from the effect of (previously-received) impulse, remains (for a while) invested with a frame." [1] (*Ibid*, verse 67.) Here it is definitely stated that a liberated Puruṣa may remain associated with a body for a time. This fact is affirmed in the Sāṅkhya-Pravachana-Sûtram. (*Vide* Chap. I, aph. 157 [2]). Here it is also stated that there is no real antagonism between a liberated Puruṣa and His physical organism which is also a manifestation of Prakṛti; the two may co-exist and be associated with each other. This shows that no separation takes place between Puruṣa and Prakṛti at the time of release. The verse affirms another important truth: When a deluded and confined Puruṣa is released, *i.e.*, attains true knowledge about Himself and Prakṛti, He rises above the spheres of duty and virtue, and His actions cannot be qualified by such words as good or virtuous. These epithets are applicable to human actions only, so long as human beings are conscious of the conflict between reason and inclinations—the self and the not-self—Puruṣa and Prakṛti in them, from which conflict arises the sense of duty. But in a liberated or a perfectly rational Soul such a conflict has disappeared and has consequently banished the possibility of any action which may be called good or virtuous. This fact conclusively shows that the life of a liberated Puruṣa is a completely transformed one which has no resemblance with that of a deluded and unreleased Puruṣa. This does not mean that there has been separation between Him and Prakṛti, but rather that the nature of their relation has been completely changed; and though Prakṛti still exhibits herself to the released Puruṣa as before, her exhibitions are observed by Puruṣa in a quite different light and way; He is no longer

[1] "सम्यग्ज्ञानाधिगमाद्धर्मादीनामकारणप्राप्तौ। तिष्ठति संस्कारवशाच्चक्रभ्रमिवत् धृतशरीरः॥"
[2] "वामदेवादिर्मुक्तो नाद्वैतम्।"

affected and deluded as before. The lives of those *jívanmuktas* are instances in point. But the following verse appears to raise some difficulties.

(G) "When owing to gratification of ends, (its) separation from the body takes place and Prakṛti ceases to act, (Puruṣa) obtains both absolute and final release from the three kinds of pain."[1] (*Ibid*, Verse 68.) Here the word 'Kaivalya' seems to raise some difficulties. With some commentators the word means isolation (पृथग्भाव:), while with others, Vāchaspati, for instance, it means liberation from the three kinds of pain (दु.खत्रयविगम:). I agree with the latter commentators, because their interpretation is consistent with the fact that separation or isolation between Puruṣa and Prakṛti is out of the question. And that this is the true meaning is further confirmed if we consider what *puruṣārtha*, or the ultimate object of an individual Puruṣa is. The Sāṅkhya-Pravachana-Sûtram says: "Now, permanent prevention of the three-fold pain is the supreme purpose of Life."[2] (Chap. I, aph. 1.) The same thing is said in the Yoga-Sûtram also: "Pain not-yet-come (*i.e.*, the future) is the avoidable."[3] (*Sādhana-Pāda*, aph. 16.) Again, "The removal (of pain) is caused by the disappearance of conjunction (between Puruṣa and Intellect) which is caused by the disappearance of the non-discriminative knowledge (Avidyā); and that is the absolute freedom (from pain) of the knower (Puruṣa.)"[4] (*Ibid*, aph. 25.) Vyāsa comments on this in this way: "On account of the disappearance of that non-discriminative knowledge, the disappearance of the union (specific) between Puruṣa and the Intellect takes place; this means the absolute disappearance of the Bondage (of Puruṣa). This is called the removal of pain, and that is also the absolute

[1] "प्राप्ते शरीरभेदे चरितार्थत्वात् प्रधानविनिवृत्तौ।
ऐकान्तिकमात्यन्तिकमुभयं कैवल्यमाप्नोति॥"

[2] "अथ त्रिविधदु:खात्यन्तनिवृत्तिरत्यन्तपुरुषार्थ:।"

[3] "हेयं दु:खमनागतम्।"

[4] "तदभावात् संयोगाभावो हानं, तद्दृशे: कैवल्यम्॥"

freedom of the Seer (Puruṣa) and His intrinsic splendour. This means that He does not unite with the guṇas again; *hānam* is the cessation of pain on account of the disappearance of the cause of pain. It is said that, then Puruṣa is established in His own essential form."[1] Consider also the following with this: "The absolute freedom (from pain) takes place when the guṇas become latent, *i.e.*, do not act any more for fulfilling the object of Puruṣa, or when the Conscious Principle is established in its own essential form."[2] (*Kaivalya-Pāda*, aph. 34.) Vyāsa comments on this in this way: "The absolute freedom (from pain) is attained when the guṇas as causes and effects become latent, on account of their completing the enjoyment and thereby achieving the release of Puruṣa, and of their thus having no need of acting for the fulfilment of His object. Again, the establishment of Puruṣa in His essential form takes place when His conscious power becomes absolutely free on account of the cessation of its relation with the pure Intellect. The absolute freedom (from pain) arises when the conscious power always exists in that state."[3]

From the above it is plain that *kaivalya* means absolute freedom from pain; it is also called the establishment of the conscious power of Puruṣa in its own essential form on account of the cessation of the union or relation between Him and the Intellect. These two definitions do not at first seem to be identical. But closer examination shows that though they are not strictly identical there is no inconsistency between them; for the former is the necessary consequence of the latter. So that it is immaterial whether

[1] 'तस्यादर्शनस्याभावात् बुद्धिपुरुषसंयोगाभाव: आत्यन्तिको बन्धनोपरम इत्यर्थ:; एतद् हानं, तद्दृशे: कैवल्यम्, पुरुषस्वामिशक्तीभाव:, पुनरसंयोगो गुणैरित्यर्थ:। दु:खकारणनिवृत्तौ दु:खोपरमो हानं, तदा स्वरूपप्रतिष्ठ: पुरुष इत्युक्तम्॥"

[2] "पुरुषार्थशून्यानां गुणानां प्रतिप्रसव: कैवल्यम् स्वरूपप्रतिष्ठा वा चितिशक्तिरिति।"

[3] "कृतभोगापवर्गाणां पुरुषार्थशून्यानां य: प्रतिप्रसव: कार्यकारणात्मनां गुणानां तत् कैवल्यं, स्वरूपप्रतिष्ठा पुनर्बुद्धिसत्त्वाऽनभिसम्बन्धात् पुरुषस्य चितिशक्तिरेव केवला, तस्या: सदा तथैवाऽवस्थानं कैवल्यमिति।"

kaivalya is defined as the establishment of Puruṣa in His own essential nature, or as His absolute liberation from pain.

But one thing requires explanation. The establishment of Puruṣa in His own essential form is said to be caused by the disappearance of the union or of the relation between Him and the Intellect. We have proved before that such a union or relation cannot cease absolutely. As we have shown, the Sāṅkhya-Kārikā explicitly says that even after the liberation of the individual Puruṣa such a union or relation remains intact, but only the attitude of Puruṣa and Prakṛti towards each other changes and assumes a quite different form. This view is confirmed by the first part of aphorism 34, which is as follows : "*Kaivalya* is the latency which the *guṇas* attain when they cease to fulfil the object of Puruṣa."[1] But what is the object of Puruṣa ? What is the *puruṣārtha* ? The immediate object is the Puruṣa's experience or enjoyment of the *guṇas* and their manifestations, the consequence of which is His bondage ; the ultimate object is His absolute liberation, by attaining discriminative knowledge, from pain following upon that experience and bondage. It is evident that the *guṇas* cease to fulfil the first object only, when Puruṣa attains emancipation. That is, Puruṣa ceases altogether to experience the *guṇas* and their manifestations. What is the true meaning of this ? Does Puruṣa cease wholly to experience the *guṇas* ? If so, how does Puruṣa, as liberated during His mundane life (jîvanmukta), experience them ? That is, how can His emancipation co-exist with His experience of the *guṇas* ? In his commentary on aphorism 30 of the *Kaivalya-Pāda* of the *Yoga-Sûtram* Vyāsa holds that the wise yogin becomes free (from pain) even while alive (on this earth).[2] The true meaning of the aphorism, therefore, should be that the *guṇas*

[1] "पुरुषार्थशून्यानां गुणानां प्रतिप्रसवः कैवल्यम्।"
[2] "जीवन्नेव विद्वान् विमुक्तो भवति।"

cease to bind Him or give Him pain even though they still supply the materials for His experience or enjoyment. Or, otherwise expressed, He ceases to be painfully affected by the experience of the materials, by maintaining an attitude of indifference or aloofness towards them. And even if by *kaivalya* is meant the permanent rest of Puruṣa in His own essential form, it does not imply that He exists alone, *i. e.*, absolutely separated from the *guṇas*, but that He has now regained the knowledge of His distinction from them, which He wholly lost in the state of bondage. And in this sense He may be said to rest in His own essential form—a form which is not painfully affected by the experience of them, which is wholly immune from pain arising from such experience. This interpretation is confirmed by the fact that even a liberated Puruṣa has a body, though quite different in nature and constitution from that which He has in the state of bondage.

Consider also the following aphorisms : "Although destroyed in relation to him whose objects have been achieved, it is not destroyed, being common objects to others."[1] (*Sādhana-pāda*, aph. 22.) Read also Vyāsa's commentary along with this : "Although it (*chitta* or mind) is destroyed to the Puruṣa who is Kuśala or has attained wisdom, it is not destroyed in relation to the Puruṣas who have not attained wisdom, as it has not done its duty to them, yet, it still exists as the object of their observation, for its very existence as such object is necessitated by the need of the percipient Puruṣa. For these reasons Puruṣa and His objects are both eternal, and consequently their union is so too. As has been said : On account of the eternal conjunction between Puruṣa and the three *guṇas*, there is eternal conjuction between Him and their manifestations (*i.e.*, the categories beginning with

[1] "कृतार्थं प्रति नष्टमप्यनष्टं तदन्यसाधारणत्वात्।"

Mahat and ending with the five gross elements)." [1] Here it is very clearly stated that absolute separation does not and cannot take place between Puruṣa and Prakṛti and her evolutes at the time of his emancipation ; what really takes place is this : That Prakṛti ceases to painfully affect the liberated Puruṣa with her manifestations as she used to do in his state of bondage ; that she no longer binds him, as he has attained the knowledge of his distinction from her, and therefore has altogether ceased to delude him.

In the *Śāntiparva* of the *Mahābhārata* the state of *kaivalya* is described in this way : "The twenty-fifth (*i. e.*, the individual Puruṣa), when becomes free, no longer sees the twenty-fourth category (Prakṛti), and when he considers himself different from her he becomes enlightened, (*i. e.*, knows the Supreme Puruṣa). When the Unmanifest Puruṣa understands that pure, stainless, supersensible Intelligence (*i.e.*, the Supreme Puruṣa), he becomes possessed of his own essential nature. In that way he gets enlightened and is called the Twenty-sixth (*i. e.*, the Supreme Puruṣa) and he, then, abandons that Unmanifest Prakṛti who is the cause of creation and destruction. Knowing Prakṛti to be unconscious and possessed of *guṇas*, the Individual Puruṣa, who is himself destitute of any *guṇas*, becomes absolutely free by virtue of his beholding the Unmanifest Supreme Puruṣa. And being emancipated by his becoming united with the absolutely free Supreme Puruṣa he returns to his own true essential form." [2] (Chap. 308, vers. 9-13.)

[1] "कुशलं पुरुषं प्रति नाशं प्राप्तमप्यकुशलान् पुरुषान् प्रतिनक्तार्थमिति तेषां दृशेः कर्म्मविषयतामापन्नं सभत एव परदृपेक्षात्मरूपमिति। अतश्च दृग्दर्शनशक्त्योर्नित्यत्वादनादिः संयोगो व्याख्यात इति तथा चोक्तं धर्म्मिणामनादिसंयोगाद्धर्म्माणामप्यनादिः संयोग' इति।"

[2] "केवलं पञ्चविंशञ्च चतुर्व्विंशं न पश्यति।
बुध्यमानो यदात्मानमन्योऽहमिति मन्यते॥
तदाप्रकृतिमानेष भवत्यव्यक्तलोचनः।
बुध्यते च परां बुद्धिं विशुद्धामसलां यदा॥

According to the above description the state of *kaivalya* or liberation implies these : (*a*) Perception of, and unity with, the Supreme Puruṣa or Brahman; (*b*) cessation of further perception of Prakṛti and her evolutes; (*c*) the consequent abandonment of them ; and (*d*) final return of the individual Puruṣa upon his essential form. Now, the points (*b*) and (*c*) require an explanation. What is the true meaning of the *cessation* of perception and the consequent *abandonment* of Prakṛti and her evolutes by the individual Puruṣa? By returning upon his true essential nature and being one with Brahman he becomes perfect and all-pervasive. How can then such a being cease to see and abandon Prakṛti and her evolutes which are still included in his nature ? Is not that impossible ? Therefore, the true meaning of those terms must be that (1) he ceases to see them in the way in which he used to see them in his state of bondage : in the state of bondage he saw them as if they were indistinct from, or identical with, him : now, in the state of release, he sees them as distinct from him and therefore incapable of affecting him painfully by supplying the materials of his enjoyment. Not that they have ceased to exist for him, but that they have ceased to affect him painfully. Therefore, even though he now sees them, yet he sees them in an entirely different light and way. (2) He abandons them not wholly, because such an abandonment is inconsistent with his all-pervasive nature, but in the sense that he no longer considers them as the source of his bondage and afflictions. He now takes an attitude of complete indifference or aloofness towards them in so far as his enjoyment of them is concerned.

षड्विंशो राजशार्दूल तथा बुद्धत्वमाव्रजेत्।
ततस्त्यजति सोऽव्यक्तं सर्गप्रलयधर्म्मि वै॥
निर्गुणः प्रकृतिं वेद्य गुणयुक्तामचेतनाम्।
ततः केवलधर्म्मासौ भवत्यव्यक्तदर्शनात्॥
केवलेन समागम्य विमुक्तोऽात्मानमाप्नुयात्।
..... ॥"

The above explanation is confirmed by the following verse of the *Śrîmad-Bhāgavata* : " Prakṛti, the materials of enjoyment supplied by whom have been enjoyed, who has been abandoned and whose faults are being constantly seen, is unable to do any harm to Puruṣa who has established himself in his own greatness." [1] (Skandha, 3, Chap. 27, ver. 22.) From this it is evident that Puruṣa does not altogether cease to see Prakṛti ; but He still sees her in a different light, *i.e.*, as faulty or incapable of giving Him any peace or contentment. He abandons her, not in the sense of separating Himself from her wholly, but in the sense that the materials supplied by her for His enjoyment have been fully enjoyed, and nothing remains to be enjoyed any more, and therefore, she is now wholly needless for that purpose. In the second part of the above verse it is explicitly stated that when Puruṣa attains liberation and becomes established in His own greatness, Prakṛti is not separated from Him, but simply ceases to do Him any harm, *i.e.*, to give Him any pain as she used to do in the state of His bondage. It is then clear that the true meaning of *kaivalya* is not separation or isolation of Puruṣa from Prakṛti, but the complete relief from the three kinds of pain.

From the above discussion it is evident that even in the state of release no *separation* between Puruṣa and Prakṛti takes place. The state of release differs from the state of bondage only in this,—that in the latter state Puruṣa is under the delusion that the body with all its adjuncts and with all that are directly or indirectly connected with them are His own evolutes, whereas they are all really the manifestations of Prakṛti ; that they are identical or same with Himself ; that they are parts and parcels of His own life, and the sources of His miseries ; and that, in this way, He becomes entangled in the meshes woven by Prakṛti, and this entanglement is the

[1] "भुक्तभोगा परित्यक्ता दृष्टदोषाच नित्यशः ।
नेश्वरस्याशुभं धत्ते स्वे महिम्नि स्थितस्य च ॥"

real cause of all His earthly troubles and affliction ; while, in the former state, He gets out of such entanglement on account of His attaining true discriminative knowledge. Thereby He regains His freedom and absolute release from the three kinds of pain which beset Him so much in the state of bondage. But His union with Prakṛti remains equally intact in both the states.

But it may be asked, why, then, does Prakṛti cease to torment Him in the state of release, if her union with Puruṣa is still intact ? The main reason for such cessation is that the attitude of Puruṣa towards Prakṛti in the state of bondage is completely changed and transformed in the state of release ; in the former state He used to take one view with regard to His relation with Prakṛti ; now, in the state of release, He takes an essentially different view. In the former state, He completely identified Himself with Prakṛti, forgetting His distinction from her ; now, in the latter state, He comes to know His distinction, though not altogether forgetting His identity with Prakṛti. Or, in other words, He comes to know that He is both distinct from and identical with Prakṛti ; that His distinction and identity are both relative, not absolute. The consequence of this essential change and complete transformation of His attitude towards Prakṛti and her manifestations is that He is no longer troubled by the three kinds of pain arising out of the incessant vicissitudes of Prakṛti and her manifestations, and has attained that everlasting peace and contentment which are the essential characteristics of a perfect and free being. Prakṛti and her manifestations have been so transformed in relation to Him that they are no longer the sources of His pain, but of His peace and contentment, which really result from complete indifference, both to worldly joy and sorrow. So says *Bhagavadgîtā* : " The union of the Individual Puruṣa with the Supreme Puruṣa is said to consist in equanimity with regard both to worldly pleasure and to pain." [1]

[1] "सुखे दुःखे समी भूत्वा समत्वं योग उच्यते ।"

After this long and elaborate discussion we are in a position to determine whether the individualised Puruṣa (*i.e.*, man) is a person or not. We have, let us hope, satisfactorily proved that being specialised differentiation or individualisation of the Absolute Puruṣa, he is not a bare identity, or undifferentiated or homogeneous unity which is absolutely shut up within itself, does not go to its other and therefore has no element of difference contained within itself, but is a 'system' or 'world'—a differentiated or heterogeneous unity, which goes to its other and contains within itself the ground and condition of both identity and difference, unity and variety. Thus he is a self-conscious being,—the systematic unity of Self and Not-self, of Puruṣa and Prakṛti: he is the Self eternally united with Prakṛti, the Not-self; his concrete, real nature is the organic synthesis of Puruṣa and Prakṛti. Again, he is not a mere self-conscious being; he is also the ultimate source of all activity and effort. His nature, therefore, satisfies the two essential conditions that constitute personality, *viz.*, self-consciousness and will. He is consequently a *person*.

CHAPTER V.

Other Forms of Personality.

(A Personalistic Conception of Nature.)

Does the Sāṅkhya recognise other forms of personality than the human and the divine? This is the next important question which we propose to consider here. The Sāṅkhya view regarding this point may be deduced from its view with respect to the nature of the Absolute Puruṣa as well as that of evolution. According to the Sāṅkhya, as we have found, the Absolute Puruṣa is an all-pervasive Subject and therefore includes Prakṛti as an element of His nature. Consequently, whatever is in the latter is pervaded by, or included in, the former. Or, in other words, everything in Prakṛti is, thus, a subject-object. It is a subject inasmuch as the Absolute Puruṣa is in it; but the Absolute Puruṣa is in it, whole and undivided, for He cannot be conceived to be divided into parts, each of which exists in each of the objects that constitute Prakṛti, just as our mind cannot be conceived to be divisible into parts which separately exist in our ideas, thoughts, feelings and volitions. In other words, just as the whole mind exists in each of its states from the point of view of that state, so the whole Absolute Puruṣa exists in each object that He pervades or includes. Thus, everything in Prakṛti partakes of the nature of the Absolute Puruṣa and is perfect; but it is perfect from a particular or limited standpoint; for it is also an object, a particular or limited thing. So that everything in Prakṛti is, from its own point of view, a perfect subject-object. This fact becomes more clear if we consider the nature of the evolution of the world. It

is a well-known Sāṅkhya doctrine that everything—every evolute—is a result of the conjunction of Puruṣa and Prakṛti: consequently, in everything both Puruṣa and Prakṛti are present; that is, thus, everything is a self and a not-self—a subject and an object—a Puruṣa and Prakṛti—at the same time. But the subjective side of it is represented by the Absolute Puruṣa in as far as He is in it; so that it is a perfect subject-object from its own point of view. Thus, being such, it is a person. This is perhaps the grandest and the loftiest of all the teachings that we can learn from the Sāṅkhya. The Sāṅkhya maintains that the world is a system of spirits and thus preaches Pan-psychism. In this respect, at least, it is in perfect agreement with the Vedānta as interpreted by Rāmānuja and Nimbārka.

But we should consider one difficulty here. The Sāṅkhya calls Prakṛti and her manifestations unconscious or unintelligent. (*Vide Sāṅkhya-Kārikā*, verse 11.) How can, then, the manifested world be a world of spirits or conscious beings? We must, therefore, carefully examine the sense in which the Sāṅkhya calls Prakṛti and her manifestations unconscious. In this connexion we should read another verse: "Therefore, through union therewith, the insensible products seem intelligent; (and Puruṣa, though) indifferent appears like an agent, though the activity is of the cosmic factors."[1] (*Ibid*, verse 20.) Gauḍapāda explains it in this way: "Here Puruṣa (alone) is sentient, (and it is) owing to union therewith that intellect and the other evolutes, invested with an appearance of intelligence, seem sentient. As, in the world a jar through the conjunction of cold feels cold, through that of warmth feels warm, so intellect and the other modes, through conjunction with Puruṣa, appear as intelligent."[2] Along with these should also be read the

[1] "तस्मात् तत्संयोगादचेतनं चेतनावदिव लिङ्गम् गुणकर्तृत्वेऽपि तथा कर्तेव भवत्युदासीनः ॥"

[2] "इह पुरुषश्चेतनाख्यः तेन चेतनावभासं युक्तं महदादिलिङ्गं चेतनावदिव भवति यथा लोके घटः शीतसंयुक्तः शीतः उष्णसंयुक्त उष्ण एवं महदादिलिङ्गं तस्य संयोगात् पुरुषसंयोगाच्चेतनावदिव भवति ··· ··· ।"

following aphorisms: "The evolving power of Prakṛti is due to her proximity to Îśvara, as in the case of a load-stone."[1] (*Sāṅkhya-Pravachana-Sûtram*, Chap. I, aph. 96.) "The evolving power of Antaḥ-karaṇa is due to its being lighted up by Îśvara as in the case of the iron."[2] (*Ibid*, aph. 99.) "The agency of Puruṣa is due to the influence of Prakṛti, and the consciousness of Prakṛti is due to her proximity to Puruṣa."[3] (*Ibid*, aph. 164.)

In the above statement we find two apparently contradictory assertions: on the one hand, it is asserted that Prakṛti and her evolutes are unconscious or insentient; on the other, it is asserted that they acquire consciousness or sentience through their conjunction with, or proximity to, Puruṣa. Are these two assertions reconcilable? We believe they are. Prakṛti and her evolutes are called unconscious when thought of as distinct and abstracted from Puruṣa; and they are called conscious, when thought of as identical and conjoined with Him. Some say that they appear or seem to be conscious, while they really remain unconscious. But this explanation seems to me preposterous. A thing, which is essentially or by its nature, unconscious, cannot even appear to be conscious, for the appearance of a thing as some other thing indicates a capacity of that thing for appearing so—a fact which is inconsistent with its essential nature. Therefore, when it is said that Prakṛti and her evolutes appear conscious through their conjunction with Puruṣa, they must have the capacity for appearing as such: this means that they are not essentially or absolutely unconscious, but appear to be so when thought distinct and abstracted from Puruṣa.

Gauḍapāda gives practically the same explanation. He holds: "As a jar through the conjunction of cold feels

[1] "तत्सन्निधानादधिष्ठातृत्वं, मणिवत् ।"

[2] "अन्तःकरणस्य तदुज्ज्वलितत्वाल्लोहवदधिष्ठातृत्वम् ।"

[3] "उपरागात् कर्तृत्वं चित्सान्निध्याच्चित्सान्निध्यात् ।"

cold, through that of warmth feels warm, so Intellect and the other modes, through conjunction with Puruṣa, appear as intelligent." Though he uses the phrase "appear to be conscious," yet his analogy clearly indicates that Prakṛti and her evolutes become conscious through their union with Puruṣa, just as a jar becomes, not merely appears, cold or warm, when in contact with a cold or a warm object. Here the essential point of the analogy should be carefully noticed. The fact that a jar becomes cold or warm when in contact with a cold or a warm object shows that it has a capacity for becoming so, *i.e.*, it is its essential nature to be affected by coldness or warmth of an object, otherwise it would remain quite unaffected by them both. Similarly, if Prakṛti and her evolutes were really and essentially incapable of being conscious, if they were absolutely indifferent to consciousness, if they were merely unconscious, the union between them and Puruṣa could not, in the least, make them even appear to be conscious. No particular instance can be adduced that would prove that a thing which does not really and essentially possess an attribute, can even appear to possess it by virtue of its union with, or proximity to, another thing which possesses that attribute. In the *Sāṅkhya-Pravachana-Sûtram* some illustrations, as I have quoted before, are given which, at first sight, seem to prove that a thing may come to possess an attribute which it really does not possess by virtue of its proximity to another thing which possesses that attribute : *e.g.*, an iron may possess the power of burning or heating, or of attracting, by virtue of its proximity to fire, or to a loadstone, which power it does not really and essentially possess. But the instance proves rather the opposite truth. It proves that iron has the capacity for, or the attribute of, so doing, which reveals itself when it is placed near, or in contact with, fire or a loadstone, otherwise it could not show such a power even when placed near, or in contact with, a stone or any other thing. But the fact that it does not do so, clearly shows that

it does not accidentally come to possess that power, but possesses it really and essentially under the condition that it can operate only when placed near or in contact with fire or a loadstone. It is a well-known fact that all things reveal their powers or attributes under definite conditions : fire burns only when in contact with a combustible thing ; a loadstone attracts only when put sufficiently near a piece of iron ; a man can see an object only when it is in a position to excite his visual organ. Similarly, an iron can burn, heat or attract, only when placed near or in contact with fire or a loadstone. Take another example. A rope appears to be a snake in the dark ; and it may be said that this is an appropriate instance to show that a thing may appear to possess a power which it really and essentially does not ; but it is not so. The rope which appears to be a snake in the dark, has a capacity or power to appear as such, and such a capacity or power is not merely accidental, but inherent in its nature ; for, otherwise, it could appear to be a quite different thing, such as a log, or a tree, or a block of stone, etc. The fact that it appears to be a snake indicates that there are some important points of resemblance between itself and a snake which do not fail to be perceived in the dark, while its points of difference from the snake fail to do so. This is the real reason why it is mistaken for a snake. It may be said that its confusion with a snake is due to the misinterpretation of the sensations excited by it in the mind of an observer, not to its possessing a capacity for appearing as such ; but our reply will be that such a misinterpretation is possible because the rope is capable of producing those sensations which only a snake can produce. Thus its capability or power is inherent in its nature, not a merely accidental or adventitious acquisition. Therefore, the fact that Prakṛti and her evolutes appear conscious or sentient by virtue of their conjunction with, or proximity to, Puruṣa clearly proves that they possess the capacity or power of being so ; that is to say, they are

conscious. This conclusion is further confirmed by the fact that if Puruṣa and Prakṛti were absolutely opposite to each other—if there were no tendency inherent in their nature to be conjoined with each other, they could not be conjoined at all—they would remain as apart from each other as the two poles of the earth. But the Sāṅkhya tells us that they are eternally conjoined—that their conjunction is the cause of the evolution of the world. These two facts,—namely, (*a*) that Prakṛti and her evolutes appear conscious by reason of their conjunction with Puruṣa, and (*b*) that such conjunction being eternal, they eternally appear conscious—conclusively prove that consciousness is an essential attribute of them, inasmuch as they never part with it, they possess it eternally.

But yet another difficulty remains to be explained. If Prakṛti and her evolutes are really conscious, why does the Sāṅkhya, then, call them unconscious? I have offered one reason above : they are called unconscious, when thought of as distinct and abstracted from Puruṣa. For they are conscious in as far as they are conjoined with Him ; but in as far as they are thought of as distinct and abstracted from Him, they must be unconscious ; for if, still, they are conscious, no meaning is left in the fact that they are conscious in as far as they are conjoined with Puruṣa. Or, in other words, they are conscious because they are differentiations, modes, or moments of Puruṣa— because Puruṣa exists, works, realises Himself in and through them—because Puruṣa is their very being or life-principle. And if that Puruṣa, that life-principle, is abstracted from them, or they are abstracted from Him, nothing remains of them that may be called conscious; they become unconscious.

There is another reason for calling them unconscious. It is necessary to understand the meaning of unconsciousness if we want to understand the meaning in which Prakṛti and her evolutes are called unconscious. Unconsciousness may be used to mean the total absence of consciousness; or it may be used

to mean a very low degree of consciousness—consciousness whose intensity or degree falls below the threshold or the level of distinct and vivid consciousness. In the former sense unconsciousness is absolutely opposite to consciousness, whereas in the latter sense, it is a kind of consciousness and is called, in modern psychology, subconsciousness. But can we conceive of an absolutely unconscious thing? How do we know that a thing is absolutely unconscious? We can know a thing to be absolutely unconscious only by relating it to our thought or consciousness. But how can we relate a thing which is absolutely unconscious to a thing which is conscious? How can we relate what is absolutely unconscious with our thought or consciousness? Is it not impossible? Two things, which are absolutely opposite, cannot be related, for relation implies affinity of nature, some characteristics in which they agree ; and two things, which have nothing in common, must fall absolutely asunder and cannot be related. Thus there cannot be anything absolutely unconscious ; and even if there were such a thing we could not know it, could not think about it, could not make any assertion whatever about it, *i.e.*, could not say whether it existed or not. We must therefore reject the first meaning of unconsciousness (as it has been rejected by modern psychology), and accept the second meaning. When, therefore, the Sāṅkhya calls Prakṛti and her evolutes unconscious, what it means to say is, that they are sub-conscious ; that is, their consciousness has a low degree of intensity—intensity which is not sufficiently high to make consciousness distinct and vivid.

Now subconsciousness also admits of degrees : thus one thing may be more or less subconscious than another, that is, may possess lower or greater degree of subconsciousness than another. Thus, the five subtle and the five gross elements, for instance, are more subconscious, *i.e.*, possess lower degrees of consciousness than the eleven senses, which, again, are more subconscious than Self-consciousness (Ahaṁkāra),

and so on. Even the objects composed of the five gross elements do not possess subconsciousness in equal degrees. This fact may be made more clear if we consider our own subconscious ideas. Those of our ideas which are, at any particular time, subconscious, *i.e.*, below the level of distinct and vivid consciousness, or in other words, of which we are not, at present, distinctly and vividly conscious, do not possess subconsciousness in the same sense and in the same degree. Some of them are just below the level, so that they can be raised to the level of distinct and vivid consciousness by a very slight effort of will, or by a very slight suggestion from outside, while some others require greater effort of will, or more powerful external suggestion; some others, still, require far greater effort or far more powerful suggestion; some, again, cannot be revived even after continuous effort or suggestion; while some others seem to be lost for ever. These different classes of ideas may be regarded as possessing subconsciousness in different degrees and may be called more or less subconscious. The evolutes of Prakṛti may be called more or less subconscious in this sense. But the liminal intensity or threshold of consciousness may be lowered by proper practices to such an extent that what is subconscious in normal circumstances may be made conscious, or that what remains imperceivable in normal circumstances may be made perceivable; and in this way the liminal intensity may be so lowered that only very few ideas remain subconscious. In the *Yoga-Sûtram* it is said that yogins may attain powers by virtue of which they may perceive or be conscious of things which remain unperceived by ordinary men, or be conscious of ideas which remain subconscious to the latter. (*Vide Vibhûti-Pāda*, aph. 33.) And we conceive of a conscious Being in whom such a liminal intensity or threshold is so extremely low that it has altogether disappeared, so that in Him there is no idea or state which is subconscious, to Him there is nothing which is not consciously present. Such a

Being is the Absolute Puruṣa. The lives of all other beings are divided into two spheres—the subconscious and the conscious—with different extents and boundaries.

From the above it is manifest that the limits of both consciousness and subconsciousness are fluctuating, and that a being may be called both subconscious and conscious from different points of view. Thus, a being may be called subconscious, *i.e.*, possessing lower degree of consciousness, in comparison with a being possessing higher kind of consciousness; and the same being may be called conscious in comparison with a being possessing still lower degree of consciousness, or more subconsciousness. In this sense, a lower animal may be called subconscious in comparison with a man and conscious in comparison with a plant. Similarly, Prakṛti and her evolutes are called by the Sāṅkhya unconscious (*i.e.*, subconscious) in comparison with Puruṣa who possesses the highest degree of consciousness, and are also said to appear conscious, not, of course, in comparison with anything else, because there is nothing else than Puruṣa to be compared with, but because their subconsciousness is a kind of consciousness. Or, in other words, though they are unconscious in comparison with Puruṣa, yet, they may, to all intents and purposes, be regarded as conscious; that is, they are conscious from their own points of view. Just as we are conscious from our own points of view, but subconscious from the point of view of the Absolute, so the physical things are conscious from their own points of view but are subconscious from our points of view. The reasons for such a double point of view from which we view the nature of Prakṛti and her evolutes, are that the latter do not reveal their consciousness in the same way as we do. The manifestations of their consciousness being quite different from, or in numerous instances diametrically opposite to, those of ours, we label them with the name of unconscious; but really, they are conscious in their own ways and from their own points of view, as we

are in our own ways and from our own points of view. We may therefore conclude that there is no inconsistency in affirming that Prakṛti and her evolutes are both conscious and unconscious (*i.e.*, subconscious), if we understand the proper meaning of the assertion.

In the *Yoga-Sûtram* it is admitted that the world is included in the content of Puruṣa as the object of His knowledge or consciousness, that in respect of this kind of knowledge there is no difference between Him and the Chitta or the mind, and that this coincidence of knowledge is called experience (**भोग**:) of Puruṣa. Let us consider fully the aphorisms in which these admissions are made: "Though Buddhi-Sattva (*i.e.*, purified consciousness) and Puruṣa are widely different, yet, their knowledge **प्रत्यय**: of the world is perfectly coincident, and this coincidence of knowledge is called experience (**भोग**:) of Puruṣa; but this experience of Puruṣa is a part of Buddhi-Sattva and is therefore an object of Puruṣa's experience (**भोग**:): the self-consciousness or self-knowledge of Puruṣa (**पौरुषेय. प्रत्यय**:) is different from his consciousness or knowledge of the world, the former representing the very essence (**स्वरूप**:) of him, while the latter is a part of Buddhi-Sattva: But, yet, Puruṣa is the observer of that self-knowledge."[1] (Vibhūti-Pāda, aphor. 35.) (In this connexion, see also Vyāsa's commentary on it.) Here it is stated that Puruṣa possesses two kinds of knowledge (**प्रत्यय**:), one of which is the knowledge of the manifested world that comes to Him through Buddhi-Sattva or purified consciousness, and the other is the knowledge of His own essential form (**स्वरूप**:); but He is the observer of both—of the manifested world and His own essential form. One thing should be carefully noted here: The aphorism does not assert that Puruṣa and Buddhi-Sattva are absolutely different, but that they are widely and exceedingly different (**अत्यन्तासङ्कीर्ण**:). If it meant to affirm their absolute difference, it could not say

[1] "सत्त्वपुरुषयोरत्यन्तासङ्कीर्णयोः प्रत्ययाविशेषो भोगः, परार्थत्वात्, स्वार्थसंयमात् पुरुषज्ञानं।"

that their *pratyaya*, *i.e.*, experience or knowledge of the manifested world is identical (**अविशेष**:); for two absolutely different things cannot coincide in any respect: two things which know a third thing exactly in the same way and in the same sense, indicate that they have affinity of nature or similar constitution at least in some respects, although in some other respects they may differ. Puruṣa and Buddhi-Sattva both know the manifested world exactly in the same way and in the same sense; and for this reason their knowledge is identical. Therefore, Puruṣa and Buddhi-Sattva (an evolute of Prakṛti) cannot be absolutely different; they must have an affinity of nature, *i.e.*, in some respects at least they must agree. And in what respects may they be supposed to agree? It is, at least, in respect of consciousness that they must agree, that is to say, both of them are conscious; and in respect of the knowledge of the manifested world they are conscious exactly in the same way and in the same sense; if they were not so, the knowledge of the one could not be identical with that of the other. But Vyāsa in his commentary says: "Puruṣa is unattached, different (from Buddhi-Sattva) and purely conscious or intelligent, and has, therefore, characteristics widely opposite to those possessed by the changeful Buddhi-Sattva."[1] From these it is evident that according to Vyāsa the aphorism means to say that Buddhi-Sattva is unconscious. It is difficult to see how does he derive such a meaning. The word 'atyantāsaṃkîrṇa' may mean 'widely or very different,' and this meaning is consistent with the assertion that the knowledge of the manifested world on the part of Buddhi-Sattva and Puruṣa is entirely coincident or identical. If Buddhi-Sattva and Puruṣa were really opposite to each other in all respects, if they possessed wholly opposite characteristics, there could not be, as I have shown before, any coincidence or identity between their

[1] "तस्माच्च सत्त्वात् परिणामिनोऽत्यन्तविधर्म्मा ग्रह्योऽन्यस्थितिमात्ररूपः पुरुषः।"

knowledges of the manifested world—Puruṣa could not even think that the knowledge, which was originally attained by Buddhi-Sattva, was His own knowledge. Besides it is difficult to see how an unconscious thing like the Buddhi-Sattva could attain any knowledge at all, inasmuch as knowledge, as is well known, must be a conscious state; and still more difficult it is to see how such a knowledge, even if possible, can be that which the conscious Puruṣa can consider as His own. It is curious that Vyāsa calls the knowledge attained by Buddhi-Sattva unconscious, and the self-knowledge of Puruṣa (पौरुषेयः प्रत्ययः) conscious.[1] Now a question suggests itself: If the knowledge attained by Buddhi-Sattva about the manifested world be really unconscious, how can it coincide or be identical with the knowledge possessed by Puruṣa about the same world, having regard to the fact that Puruṣa's knowledge must always be conscious? Or, in other words, how can an unconscious knowledge, even if possible, coincide with a conscious knowledge? The answer must be that it cannot. The difficulty can however be obviated by the supposition that Buddhi-Sattva is not really unconscious, but subconscious in the sense of possessing far lower degree of consciousness than that possessed by Puruṣa. Puruṣa's consciousness or self-consciousness always possesses the highest degree of intensity, leaving no margin for subconsciousness, that is, He is fully and distinctly conscious of all things, whereas the consciousness of Buddhi-Sattva possesses different degrees of intensity under different circumstances and conditions; therefore Buddhi-Sattva may be called partly conscious and partly unconscious, *i.e.*, subconscious.

The above conclusion is confirmed by aph. 20 of the *Sādhana-Pāda*, which runs thus: "Puruṣa is only subject; though he is unattached to anything, yet, he observes the

[1] " यस्तु तस्मादिशिष्टचितिमात्ररूपोऽन्यः पौरुषेयः प्रत्ययः। "

functions or modifications of Buddhi as if they were his own."[1] Carefully notice the commentary of Vyāsa on this: "The subject only; 'this means that he is nothing other than the power of becoming conscious; that is to say, he is not touched by the qualities.' This Puruṣa has cognitions similar to those of Buddhi; he is neither wholly similar nor very dissimilar to Buddhi. He is not wholly similar; why? Buddhi is changeful inasmuch as its objects are (sometimes) known and (sometimes) unknown; (for instance), its objects, such as the cow and the jar, etc., being (sometimes) known and (sometimes) unknown, show its changefulness. But Puruṣa is the constant knower of his objects; and this fact shows his unchangefulness. How? For, it never happens that Buddhi, which is the object of his consciousness, becomes sometimes known to him and sometimes not; he is always cognisant of it, and this shows his never-failing power of observation and thereby his unchangefulness. Furthermore, Buddhi exists to fulfil another's object on account of its synthetic activity; but Puruṣa exists for his own sake. Again, Buddhi is capable of taking the forms of all objects, and is thus constituted of three guṇas and therefore unconscious; whereas Puruṣa is only the observer of the three guṇas. For these reasons he is not similar. Let him be so: but, yet, he is not very dissimilar: Why? Even though he is pure or unattached, yet he sees the functions or modifications of Buddhi as if they were his own, and thereby appears to be, as it were, the very self of Buddhi, although in reality he is not so. So it has been said elsewhere: 'The enjoying power (Puruṣa) is certainly unchangeful and does not run after objects. But he appears to run after the functionings of Buddhi, as if he himself were connected with the changeful external objects; and thus the reflexion of his consciousness falling upon Buddhi, he appears to imitate

[1] " द्रष्टा दृशिमात्रः शुद्धोऽपि प्रत्ययानुपश्यः। "

those functionings.' For these reasons the conscious Puruṣa appears to be indistinct from, or similar to, Buddhi." [1]

Read with this also the aph. 4 of the *Samādhi-Pāda*, which runs thus : " Identification (of Puruṣa) with the modifications or functions (of Buddhi) elsewhere," [2] and also Vyāsa's comments on it which run thus: " How then ? On account of his seeing the objects presented to Chitta, identification (of his manifestations) with the modifications (of Chitta) takes place elsewhere, *i.e.*, in the state of the latter's outward activity. In the state of the Chitta's outward activity, whatever may be the modifications of it, the same are the modifications of Puruṣa, as if he existed in that state. And similar is the aphorism : 'Though the knowledges of Puruṣa and Chitta are really distinct, yet they appear to be identical.' Chitta is like a magnet and benefits Puruṣa by its proximity to him alone, and becomes his own self as it were by reason of its being his object of experience. Therefore in respect of his consciousness of the Chitta's functions or modifications his eternal relation with Chitta as that of the subject to the object is the cause." [3]

The aphorism 22 of the *Kaivalya-Pāda* is more significant. It runs thus: " Though the Conscious Principle (Puruṣa) is not

1 " दृशिमात्र इति दृक्शक्तिरेव विशेषणाऽपरामृष्टेत्यर्थः ; स पुरुषो बुद्धेः प्रतिसंवेदी ; स बुद्धेः न सरूपो नात्यन्तं विरूप इति। न तावत् स्वरूपः ; कस्मात् ? ज्ञाताज्ञातविषयत्वात् परिणामिनी हि बुद्धिः, तस्याश्च विषयो गवादिर्घटादिर्वा ज्ञातश्चाज्ञातश्चेति परिणामित्वं दर्शयति। सदा ज्ञातविषयत्वन्तु पुरुषस्य अपरिणामित्वं परिदीपयति ; कस्मात् ? नहि बुद्धिश्च नाम पुरुषविषयश्च स्यात् गृहीताऽगृहीता च ; इति सिद्धं पुरुषस्य सदा ज्ञातविषयत्वम् ; ततश्चापरिणामित्वमिति। किञ्च परार्था बुद्धिः, संहत्यकारित्वात् ; स्वार्थः पुरुष इति। तथा सर्वार्थाध्यवसायकत्वात् त्रिगुणा बुद्धिः, त्रिगुणत्वादचेतनेति। गुणानां तूपद्रष्टा पुरुष इति ; अतो न सरूपः। अस्तु तर्हि विरूप इति ; नात्यन्तं विरूपः ; कस्मात् ? शुद्धोऽप्यसौ प्रत्ययानुपश्यो, यतः प्रत्ययं बौद्धमनुपश्यति, तमनुपश्यन्न तदात्माऽपि तदात्मक इव प्रत्यवभासते। तथाचोक्तम्, " अपरिणामिनी हि भोक्तृशक्तिरप्रतिसंक्रमा च, परिणामिन्यर्थे प्रतिसंक्रान्तेव तद्वृत्तिमनुपतति ; तस्याश्च प्राप्तचैतन्योपयहरूपाया बुद्धिहत्तेरनुकारमात्रतया बुद्धिहत्त्यविशिष्टा हि ज्ञानहत्तिरित्याख्यायते।"

2 " हत्तिसारूप्यमितरत्र।"

3 " कथं तर्हि ? दर्शितविषयत्वात् हत्तिसारूप्यमितरत्र। व्युत्थाने यास्चित्तहत्तयस्तदविशिष्टहत्तिः पुरुषः। तथा च सूत्रम्। एकमेव दर्शनं ख्यातिरेव दर्शनमिति। चित्तमयस्कान्तमणिकल्पं संनिधिमात्रोपकारि दृश्यत्वेन स्वं भवति पुरुषस्य स्वामिनः। तस्माच्चित्तहत्तिबोधे पुरुषस्यानादिः सम्बन्धो हेतुः।"

connected with any guṇas or qualities and is therefore unchangeable, he assumes the form of Chitta's functions or modifications ; and in this way he comes to feel them as if they were his own." [1] Vyāsa comments on it thus: "The experiencing Principle (Puruṣa) is certainly unchangeable and has no motion in the form of entering into any guṇa or quality ; yet it appears to follow the functions or modifications of the changeful Buddhi as if it had entered into the latter ; and then it seems to be indistinct from the same upon which the reflexion of its consciousness has fallen, on account of its imitating those functions or modifications. And so it has been said : Nor nether worlds, nor mountain caves, nor darkness, nor seas, nor ravines are the hollows in which is placed the Eternal Brahman. The wise point out Buddhi, which is indistinct from Him, to be that hollow (गुहा)." [2]

Read also the next aphorism along with this. " The Chitta (mind) being thus coloured by the nature of both the knower (subject) and the knowable (objects), becomes capable of revealing all things." [3] Vyāsa comments on it thus: "The Chitta or mind is of course coloured by the objects thought of, and is also itself the object of Puruṣa's observation ; for these reasons it becomes connected with him as if its functions or modifications were those of his own self. The Chitta or mind, having thus assumed the forms of the observer and the observed, appears to be both the subject and the object ; and in this way assuming the forms of both the conscious and the unconscious, it appears as if it were of the nature of the subject,

1 " चितेरप्रतिसंक्रमायास्तदाकारापत्तौ स्वबुद्धिसंवेदनम्।"

2 " अपरिणामिनी हि भोक्तृशक्तिरप्रतिसंक्रमा च परिणामिन्यर्थे प्रतिसंक्रान्तेव तद्वृत्तिमनुपतति, तस्याश्च प्राप्तचैतन्योपयहस्वरूपाया बुद्धिहत्तेरनुकारिमात्रतया बुद्धिहत्त्यविशिष्टा हि ज्ञानहत्तिराख्यायते। तथा चोक्तं 'न पातालं न च विवरं गिरीणां नैवाश्मकारं कुचयो नोदधीनाम्। गुहा यस्यां निहितं ब्रह्म शाश्वतं बुद्धिहत्तिमविशिष्टां कवयो वेदयन्ते' इति॥"

3 " द्रष्ट-दृश्योपरक्तं चित्तं सर्वार्थम्।"

although it is of the nature of the object; it appears to be conscious, although it is unconscious. Just as a crystal vase appears red when the reflexion of a China-rose falls upon it, so the Chitta or mind, too, appears conscious and capable of revealing all things, when it receives the reflexion of consciousness. The Chitta or mind being thus able to assume the form of the conscious Puruṣa, some people are deceived into saying that it itself is the conscious agent."[1]

Similar other aphorisms may be cited, but those quoted above are sufficient to prove our contention that Prakṛti (of which Buddhi and Chitta are only evolutes) is not absolutely unconscious. In aphorism 20 of the *Sādhana-Pāda* it is expressly stated that Puruṣa sees the functions or modifications of Buddhi (*i.e.*, Intellect) as if they were His own. And Vyāsa in his commentary upon this remarks that Puruṣa is not very dissimilar to the Buddhi; for, He appears to be the very self of the Buddhi on account of His experiencing its functions or modifications as if they were His own. Now, it is here asserted that the ground of the similarity between Puruṣa and the Buddhi is the capability of the former for experiencing the functions or modifications of the latter as if they were His own, and for appearing, thereby, to be the very self of it. We have already proved that when one thing appears to be another, it possesses the capacity or power for appearing as such, that is, it is the nature of the thing to appear as such. If it were not the nature of Puruṣa to appear to be the very self of Buddhi, if He did not contain the capacity or power to appear as such, He could not do so; but the fact that He really does so, proves that He really possesses such a capacity or power. He is, no doubt, also distinct from Buddhi; but that does not debar Him from identifying Himself with it in certain respects. There

[1] "मनो हि मन्तव्येनार्थेनोपरक्तम्, तत् स्वयञ्च विषयत्वात्, विषयिणा पुरुषेणात्मीयया हत्त्याऽभिसम्बद्धम्; तदेतच्चित्तमेव द्रष्टृ-दृश्योपरक्तं विषय-विषयिनिर्भासं चेतनाचेतनस्वरूपापन्नं विषयात्मकमप्यविषयात्मकमिवाचेतनं चेतनमिव स्फटिकमणिकल्पं सर्व्वार्थमित्युच्यते। तदनेन चित्तसारूप्येण भ्रान्ताः केचित्तदेव चेतनमित्याहुः॥"

are no things in the world which are absolutely similar or dissimilar: all things are partially similar and partially dissimilar: we call things similar or dissimilar when the points of their dissimilarity or of their similarity are few and unimportant (at least for a certain purpose). Similarly, Puruṣa and Buddhi are dissimilar in certain respects and similar in certain other respects. Of course one of the points of their dissimilarity is stated to be that Puruṣa is conscious and Buddhi is unconscious. And the reason stated for such dissimilarity is that the latter, possessing the three *guṇas*, must be unconscious, whereas Puruṣa, who is merely the seer of them, is untouched by them, and is, therefore, conscious. But I am unable to follow the argument: it is true that Buddhi possesses the three *guṇas*, but that is no reason for its being unconscious, if by unconsciousness is meant the total absence of consciousness. We have already proved that there is nothing in Prakṛti which is not pervaded and enlivened by the Conscious Puruṣa, and therefore, not conscious. In fact, here unconsciousness must mean subconsciousness, which is the popular or ordinary sense of the term, as I have said before. And it is no reason to argue that Puruṣa is conscious, because He is unconnected with the *guṇas*, being a mere seer of them. Being all-pervading, He is present in them, though distinct from them. Again, He is the seer and they are the objects seen, and this relation of subject and object being *eternal*, neither of them can exist apart from the other—the very life of the one is inseparably bound up with that of the other. And what I contend here is confirmed by aphorism 4 of the *Samādhi-Pāda*, read with Vyāsa's comments on it. Here it is very clearly stated that an identification takes place between the manifestations of Puruṣa and the modifications of Buddhi in the state of the latter's external activity. Again, Buddhi is likened to a magnet. The essential point of the analogy, if there is any, is that as a magnet impregnates a piece of iron with its attractive power, so Buddhi impregnates

Puruṣa with its own power of modifications and functions so thoroughly that the latter comes to think them as if they were His own. How are all these possible, if Puruṣa and Buddhi were really absolutely distinct from each other? The truth is, they are not really absolutely distinct, but partly also identical. For Puruṣa, being all-pervading, includes Buddhi as an element of His nature, though at the same time, also distinct from it, as the whole is distinct from its constituent elements. The same conclusion follows from aphorism 22 of the *Kaivalya-Pāda*. In his commentary Vyāsa quotes a significant passage which most distinctly asserts that Buddhi is the real cave where the Eternal Brahman (Puruṣa) is hidden. If the Eternal Brahman or Puruṣa is really hidden in Buddhi, how can they be absolutely distinct? Can one thing be hidden (*i.e.*, present in a concealed form) in another, if they are absolutely distinct or opposite in nature? The truth is, Puruṣa includes Buddhi within His nature and is eternally present there, although His presence remains concealed from the view of ordinary people.

The same thing is asserted in aphorism 23 of the *Kaivalya-Pāda* in a still more emphatic way. Here it is clearly affirmed that Buddhi assumes the forms of both the subject and the object—both the conscious and the unconscious. It becomes conscious by reason of its receiving the reflexion of the conscious Principle (Puruṣa), just as a crystal vase becomes red when it receives the reflexion of a China-rose. The analogy clearly shows that like a crystal vase, Buddhi is not wholly indifferent to such reflexion; that is to say, it is its inherent nature to receive the reflexion—it possesses the capacity or power for the reception of the reflexion. This shows that it is not absolutely unconscious; if it were really so, it could not even appear to be or assume the form of the conscious. It is true that Buddhi is not itself the Conscious Puruṣa, as some people erroneously suppose, but, still, it is

the conscious instrument or vehicle in and through which Puruṣa works and manifests Himself.

According to the Sāṅkhya, then, everything that is real and a real constituent of the world is a unique centre in and through which the Absolute Self-conscious Spirit realises itself in a unique manner and returns upon itself as a fully-realised Being. In this sense, everything partakes of the nature of the Absolute, and is, therefore, a perfect subject-object from its own point of view. But everything is not perfect from the beginning; it is actually imperfect, but potentially perfect, that is, capable of attaining perfection by gradual evolution. Consequently, everything, except the Absolute, is a subject-object possessing different degrees of the unity of self-consciousness. Thus we get three forms of personality: the Absolute is Super-person; the human beings are persons, and the other forms of being may be called, *en bloc*, sub-human persons, understanding by the last persons who possess more imperfect forms of self-consciousness. The Sāṅkhya therefore preaches pan-psychism or a personalistic conception of nature, the world being a system of spirits.

INDEX

(This index has been prepared by Mr. N. Mukherjee, M.A., B.L., Bar-at-Law, to whom I owe an expression of very grateful thanks.)

A

Abhāva (absence), 13.
Abhimāna (self-consciousness), 21.
Absolute, active principle (perfect will), 85.
Absolute, concrete, 54.
Absolute Idealism, The Sāṅkhya teaches, 106. See *Rigorous Dualism*.
Absolute Puruṣa. See *Īśvara* and *Individual puruṣa*.
,, ,, Activity of, whether spontaneous, 84. See *Activity, Spontaneous*.
,, ,, Bondage, Creation, Release of, 85.
,, ,, Bondage of, whether eternal and irresolvable, 77. See *Bondage*.
,, ,, Distinguished from Brahman, not essentially as united with Prakṛti and her evolutes. See *Prakṛti*.
,, ,, Function of, in relation to Prakṛti's creative activity, 80, 83.
,, ,, Included in Sāṅkhya definition of Puruṣa, 76.
,, ,, mainfests and realises Himself in multiple forms, 34, 75.
,, ,, Nature of Prakṛti's union with, 76.
,, ,, Release of. See *Release*.
,, ,, Sāṅkhya view of, whether a bare unity of a substance or a differentiated unity of a spirit, *i.e.*, whether personal, or impersonal (see *Personality*), xv.
Absolute Self, 32, 53.
Actions, fruits of, whether produced by *Karma* or given by Īśvara, discussed. 8, *et seq.* (See *Karma* and *Īśvara*.)
Active senses, five, 99. (See *Senses*.)
Activity, cause of, 8.
,, Creative, (a supposed property of Prakṛti), 119, and eternal, 85, 111, (See *Prakṛti*).
,, of Īśvara for creation and fruition of actions, discussed, 9. See *Actions* and *Īśvara*.
Activity, Spontaneous (a property of Īśvara), 84. See *Spontaneous Activity* and *Īśvara*,
,, Ultimate source of, xv, 74, 119, 130.
,, Whether predicable of Īśvara, discussed, 11. (See *Causality* and *Īśvara*.)
Adhyavasāya (determination), 91.
Ādi Puruṣa, who is, 20.
Agnosticism in Sāṅkhya. (See *Atheism*.)
Ahaṃkāra, cosmic, (generated by Cosmic Buddhi), 93. (See *Buddhi*.)
,, Developed form of Mahat or Buddhi, 99.
,, Differentiated unity of states of consciousness referred to a definite centre called 'I' or Self, 99.
,, Distinction of subject and object, and their relations as perceiver and perceived, 91-93, 97, 100.
,, Evolvent of the capacities or powers called 'senses,' as of the Tanmātras, 100, 102.
,, Moral agent (dominated by the guṇas), 93.
,, Psychical, a moral agent. (See *ante*.)
,, Regarded as materialistic by some, 105.
Ākāśa and water-pots, simile of. (See *Metaphors* and *Similes* in Sāṅkhya.)
Akshamatvam, 4.
Analogy (Metaphors and Similes in Sāṅkhya) of the birth of a child by union of male and female, 78. See *Puruṣa* (*Absolute*) and *Prakṛti*.
,, of Cave and Buddhi, 148. See *Buddhi* and *Puruṣa*.
,, of Chitta and Magnet, 133, 147. See *Buddhi* and *Puruṣa*.
,, of Cow and jar, 143. See *Buddhi-Sattva*.
,, of Crystal vase and China-rose, 25, 146, 148. See *Antaḥkaraṇa* and *Chitta*.
,, of Crystal vase and red rose, See *Prakṛti*, *Puruṣa* (Absolute) and *Vidyā*. See also Analogy of sun and water to the same effect.

Analogy, of Dancer and Spectators, 82, 115.
,, of Diver diving and rising again, 19. See *Prakṛti*, *Puruṣa* and *Pralaya*.
,, of Ether and Receptacles, 27.
,, of Fire and Iron, 59. See *Antaḥkaraṇa*, *Puruṣa* (*Absolute*) and *Causation*.
,, of Genus and Species, 38. See comment on this simile on p. 38.
,, of Jar, 132. See *Prakṛti* and *Absolute Puruṣa*.
,, of Jīvanmuktas and their physical bodies, 121,125. (See *Jīvanmuktas*, *Individual puruṣa* and *Release*.)
,, of King and Soldiers. See same simile on p. 62.
,, of Lame and Blind, 59. See comment on this on p. 59.
,, of Light and Darkness, 112. See *Vidyā*, *Avidyā* and *Bondage*.
,, of Loadstone and Iron, 6, 58. See comment on this, p. 58, and *Causation*.
,, of Milk and Calf, 80. See *Prakṛti* and *Liberation*.
,, of Rope and Snake, 135. See *Sub-consciousness* and *Absolute Puruṣa*.
,, of Self and its Ideas, 86. See *Absolute Puruṣa* and *Individual puruṣa*.
,, of Silk-worm and Cocoon, 43, 88. See *Cosmos* and *Bondage*.
,, of Sun and its Rays, 65f. See *Pralaya* and *Creation*.
,, of Sun and Water, 69. See *Ākāśa and Receptacles*, simile of, *ante*.
Anekatvam, 28.
Aniruddha Bhaṭṭa, 7, 8, 11, 13, 15. 17, 20, 21.
Antaḥkaraṇa, constituents of, 100. See *Chitta*.
,, Material of subtle body, 102. See *Subtle body*.
,, Medium of Puruṣa's experience of materials supplied by all other senses, 100.
Aphorisms, Bhagavad-Gītā (verses), 47, 48, 68.
,, Bhāgavata-Purāṇam (verses), 49-51, 69-70, 128.
,, Brahma-Sūtram, 70-71.
,, Mahābhārata (verses), 4, 42-45, 65-67f., 73, 85, 88, 89, 108.
,, Pātañjala-Darśanam (verses), 39 40-41.
,, Sāṅkhya-Chandrikā (verses), 119.
,, Sāṅkhya-Kārikā, 3, 26, 32, 33, 52-53, 59, 60, 75-79, 92, 93, 98, 102, 108, 112, 115, 124.
,, Sāṅkhya-Pravachana-Sūtram, 1-7, 8-13, 15, 19-22, 27, 40, 56, 59, 79, 98, 109, 112, 115, 119, 121, 122.
,, Sāṅkhya-Sūtram, 53.
Aphorisms, Śvetāśvatara Upanishad (verses), 71, 73.
,, Yoga-Sūtram, 61-65, 71, 76, 79, 104, 110, 122, 123.
,, Yājñavalkya Smṛti (verses). 74
Āptavachana, 2. See *Śruti*.
,, Proof of existence of Īśvara by, 3. See Īśvara.
Āśaya, 62.
Āsuri, 64.
Atheism (in Sāṅkhya), 1.
Attachment :
,, Absolute Puruṣa (being transcendent over Prakṛti), devoid of, 54. See *Asaṅga*.
Atyantāsaṅkīrṇa, 140.
Attributes, contradictory, whether predicable of the (Absolute) Puruṣa, discussed, 30, 55.
Avidyā, 107 109. See *Ignorance*.
,, False but positive knowledge, causing Puruṣa (Absolute) to think of the relative identity of Prakṛti and Himself to be absolute, 111.
,, kind of delusion reflected by Prakṛti on Puruṣa, 110.
,, Property of Prakṛti, 110, but being a kind of knowledge appertains to Puruṣa, 114,
,, Reverse of Vidyā. See *Vidyā*.
Avyakta, 91.

B

Bandha, 113.
Bannerji, S. C. 92.
Bhagavad-Gītā. See *Aphorisms*.
Bhāgavata-Purāṇa. See *Aphorisms*.
Bhārata, 47, 48.
Bhrataṛṣabha, 68.
Bhoga, 79, 83.
Birds, parable of, 72 f. See Analogies (Metaphors and similes in Sāṅkhya).
Birth (characteristic of that side of man represented by Prakṛti), 33.
Body of Puruṣa (man), 88, 98. See *Mahat*, *Mahābhūtas* and *Categories*.
Bondage, conjunction of Puruṣa, with Prakṛti, cause of, 56.
,, Construction of a cosmos of (by Puruṣa for Himself) 87. See *Cosmos*.
,, defined, 107. See *Pain*.
,, Delusion consequent on, real, not illusory, 113.
,, Nature of, psychological, not metaphysical, 108
,, of Puruṣa, how caused, 57.
,, of Puruṣa (Absolute) and Jīva, not same, but different, 58. See *Jīva*.
,, of Puruṣa (Absolute), whether eternal and irresolvable. 77.
,, Release of Puruṣa from, object of creation, 78, 83. See *Creation*.

Bondage, Return of Puruṣas, merged into Prakṛti at pralaya, at next creation, 20. See *Pralaya* and *Creation*.
,, Sāṅkhya doctrine of, 57, 77. See *Doctrine of Bondage*.
,, Temporary release of (unliberated) puruṣas during pralaya from, 20. See *Pralaya* and *Release*.
Born-slave, Prakṛti described as, 59.
Brahmā, 61, 63.
Brahma-Bindu-Upanishad, 36.
Brahma-Mīmāṃsā, 23.
Brahman, 22, 23, 42 f., 45, 49, 55.
,, Condition of being the form of, 22.
,, identical with Absolute Puruṣa, 42, 46, 49.
,, identified in the Mahābhārata with the truths of Sāṅkhya Philosophy, 42 See *Mahābhārata*.
,, Individual puruṣa, when invested with ignorance, 45. See *Ignorance*.
,, Māyā, a power of, 72 f. See *Māyā*.
,, Status of, when attained by individual puruṣa, 68.
,, Three forms of, 72f.
Brahmarūpatā, 22, 23.
,, State of being in, during sleep, trance and absolute absorption (into Brahman), 23. See *Brahman*.
Brahma-Sutra. See *Aphorisms*.
Brahma-svarūpa. See *Brahmarūpatā*.
Buddhi. See *Buddhi-Sattva*.
,, a phase in the cosmic growth of the universe, 91.
,, inability of, to act without distinction of the universe into subject and object, 93.
,, narrower than Mahat, 98. See *Mahat*.
Buddhi-Sattva :
,, conscious vehicle in and through which Absolute Puruṣa works and manifests Himself, 148.
,, integral part of All-pervasive Puruṣa (Absolute), differing only from latter as whole from its constituent parts, 148.
,, purified (pure) consciousness, 71, 140. See *Consciousness*.
,, not absolute consciousness but sub-conciousness, 142. See Sub-consciousness.
,, not different in nature from (Absolute) Puruṣa, 148.
Borrowings of nomenclature as between Sāṅkhya and Upanishad, 73.

C

Capacity of covering and projection, attributes of Prakṛti, 50. See *Prakṛti*.
Category, evolute of Prakṛti, 44.
,, guṇa, another name for, 88, 90. See *Guṇas*.
Category, Individual puruṣa, whether a, discussed, 44.
,, no category above the twenty-fifth admitted in Sāṅkhya, 32.
,, Supreme Puruṣa, the evolvent of, 90. See *Supreme Puruṣa*.
,, Supreme Soul's transcendency and supremacy over, 44, 67 f. See *Supreme Soul*.
,, twenty-four, called the abode of Brahman as qualified by guṇas, 50. See *Brahman* and *Guṇas*.
,, Unmanifest twenty-fourth, called Prakṛti, 42.
,, Twenty-fifth, called Puruṣa in Sāṅkhya, but whether Absolute or Individual Puruṣa, discussed, 46, 89-90. See *Kāla* (also called the twenty-fifth category), 51.
,, whether cosmical or psychical, 90.
Causality of Brahman not amenable to proof or disproof by sense-perception, 11-12. See *Brahman* and *Proof*.
,, of Brahman (not His existence), denied in Śruti, 15. See *Brahman (or Īśvara)* and *Śruti*.
,, non-existence of, on Īśvara's part, no proof of His non-existence, 17.
,, of Prakṛti, due to influence of Puruṣa (Absolute) by virtue of her proximity to Him, 59.
,, Sāṅkhya doctrine of, 29.
,, whether possible without Rāga, 10. See *Rāga*.
Cause, Effect subsists in, 29. See *Doctrine of Satkārya*.
Chitta, a compound of three evolutes of Prakṛti, 71.
,, a modification of Buddhi-Sattva. See *Buddhi Sattva*.
Cognitive senses, 99. See *Senses*.
Colebrooke, Prof., 31, 99.
Conjunction of Prakṛti and Puruṣa, cause of creation or evolution of the world, 136. See *Creation, evolution* and *world*.
,, of Prakṛti, cause of Puruṣa's bondage, 56.
,, of Prakṛti and Puruṣa, eternal, 57, 125, 136, and ultimate fact, 57.
,, Removal of pain (bondage) by removal of, between Puruṣa and Intellect, 122.
Consciousness, attribute (eternal), of Prakṛti and her evolutes, 94-95, 136. See *Mahat*.
,, not absolute, but admitting of degrees and sub-consciousness, 136-37. See *Sub-consciousness*.
,, of Puruṣa (Absolute), full and absolute, admitting of no degrees, 142.
,, of Puruṣa (Absolute), as distinguished from Buddhi-sattva, 142.
,, two senses or significations of, 136-37.

Cosmic elements, what are, 95.
Cosmos, 87, 88, 94. See *World*.
,, of bondage, Puruṣa's own construction, 87. See *Bondage*.
Cousin, M., 117.
Creation (same as Evolution). See *Evolution*.
,, defined in Sāṅkhya, 85.
,, Details of, 85.
,, Five stages of the process of, 97.
,, joint work of Prakṛti and Puruṣa, 78
,, Object, twofold, of, 79.
,, spontaneous, theory of, 81.
,, Supreme Puruṣa's eternal and inherent nature to engage in acts of, 85.
,, whether cosmical or psychological or both, discussed, 86-88, 95.
Crystal vase and China-(red) rose, simile of. See *Metaphors and Similes in Sāṅkhya*.

D

Devahūti, 49.
Delusion. See *Bondage*.
Desire, cause of all activity, 8. See *Activity*.
,, human and divine, distinguished, 84.
,, either altruistic or egoistic unrealised at the time, 84.
,, whether predicable of Absolute Puruṣa, discussed, 84.
Destruction of the world, not annihilation but absorption into Prakṛti at pralaya, 43. See *Pralaya* and *World*.
Details of creation, 85 *et seq*.
Doctrine of Bondage, 106.
,, of causality, 29, 112.
,, of cause and effect, 105.
,, of creation, 105.
,, of delusions, 108.
,, of dualism in Sāṅkhya, whether rigorous or relative, 106.
,, of genus and species, 37-38.
,, of migration from life to life, 115.
,, of pan-psychism, 132.
,, of release, 114.
,, of satkārya, 96.
,, of sub-consciousness, 103.
,, of subtle body, 102.
Double conception as to nature of individual Puruṣa, 113.
Dualism in Sāṅkhya, 106. See *Doctrine of Dualism*.
,, Relative, 106. Rigorous, 106.
Duty, meaning of, 64.
,, whether attributable to Absolute Puruṣa, 64.

E

Effect, pre-existent in cause, 29. See *Cause* and *Doctrine of Cause and Effect*.
Ekādaśa Indriyas, 98, 99. See *Senses*.
Enlightenment, 126. See *Viveka* or *Vidyā*.
Everything in the World, a single Whole constituted by many parts (one-in-many = unity-in-variety), 30.
,, in the world (except the Absolute Puruṣa), a subject-object possessing different degrees of the unity of self-consciousness, xiv.
Evidence, as to psychological view of creation in Sāṅkhya. 87. See *Creation*.
,, as to existence of Iśvara (God), 16.
,, internal, 19 *et seq*.
,, as to theistic character of Sāṅkhya Philosophy. See *Atheism in Sāṅkhya*.
,, not capable of proof or disproof by sense-perception, 16.
,, not positively denied in Sāṅkhya, 16.
Evolutes, 44. See *Categories*.
Evolution (same as creation). See *Creation*.
,, Deliverance of Puruṣa from bondage the object of, 78. See *Bondage*.
, Spiritualistic as opposed to materialistic (in Sāṅkhya), 105.
Existence of God by sense-perception, not provable, 16.

F

Finite puruṣa, See *Individual puruṣa*.
Finite Self (same as finite puruṣa), 32, 41. See *Individual puruṣa*.
Five gross elements. See *Gross elements*.
Fruits of actions, whether attributable to Absolute Puruṣa or to Karma, 8, 10. See *Karma*.
Flint, Prof., 105.

G

Gauḍapāda, 26 29, 80, 117, 132. 133.
Generic, meaning of, 94.
Genus and species :
,, ,, ,, Different meanings of, in logic and metaphysics, 38.
,, ,, ,, Theory of, 38. See *Doctrine of Genus and Species*.
Godhead, 1.
Great Principles (Mahat), 91.
Great Soul (Supreme Soul = Absolute Puruṣa), 43.
Gross Elements (five), 33, 94, 104, 106, 107. See *Pañcha Mahābhūtas*.
,, (with subtle elements), constituting a system or world (cosmos) for the enjoyment and experience of Puruṣa, 104. See *Subtle Elements*.

Gross, elements (five), Element of consciousness whether possessed by, 106.
Guṇas, 16, 33, 42, 53, 65f., 66f., 67f., 69, 72f., 76, 88, 90, 93, 123, 124, 147. See *Prakṛti*.
,, Absolute separation of Supreme Puruṣa from, whether possible, discussed, 124, 125.
,, Ahaṁkāra (self-consciousness), whether dominated by, 93.
,, categories of Sāṅkhya philosophy, 88.
,, Cause of physical embodiments in and through which Prakṛti, conjointly with Puruṣa, works, 33.
,, Colours of, 72f.
,, Creator of, whether Absolute or individual Puruṣa, discussed. 90.
,, Enjoyment and experience of, the immediate object of Puruṣa, 124.
,, God (immanent in Prakṛti) whether possessed of, 147.
,, ,, (transcendent over Prakṛti), above and beyond the reach of, 43, 66f., 67.
,, ,, divested of, whether Absolute or individual puruṣa, 44, 49, 50.
,, whether eternal, 76.

H

Hānam, 123.
Hegel, 38.
Hiraṇyagarbha, 90, 94. See *Mahat*.
Human personality, essential characteristics of, 75.
,, ,, Sāṅkhya view of, 75. See *Personality* and *individual Puruṣa*.

I

'I,' centre of reference, 98.
Idealism, Absolute, in Sāṅkhya. See *Absolute Idealism*.
Ignorance, 43, 62, 66f. See *Avidyā*.
Incarnations of Iśvara, 5. See *Īśvara*.
Individual Puruṣa, Supreme Puruṣa invested with the guṇas, 90.
,, ,, same as Infinite Puruṣa—Infinite Self—Twenty-fifth Category—Jīva—Man. See *Categories*, *Guṇas* and *Jīva*.
Indriyas, 99.
Inference, 13.
Iśvara (same as Absolute Puruṣa—Brahman—God—Great Soul—Infinite Self—Parama Puruṣa—Supreme Puruṣa—Supreme Soul—Tat—Viṣṇu). See each of these terms.
Īśvara, activity of (even from altruistic motives, if possible), discussed, 8-9.
,, above the twenty-five categories, 46. See *Categories* and *Jīva*.
,, an ever-enlightened witness exalted above and devoid of the guṇas, 15.
,, declared in Śruti as voluntary creator of the world, 6.
,, Differentiations of, 45f., 67f.
,, defined in Bhagavadgītā, 51. See *Aphorisms*, *Bhagavadgītā* (verses) and *Kāla*.
,, devoid of rāga, 10.
,, distributor of fruits of actions whether directly or by aid of karma, discussed, 8. See *Fruits of Actions* and *Karma*.
,, Efficient (indirect) cause of the world, 17, 48.
,, existence of, in Nyāya Darśana, 21. See *Nyāya Darśana*.
,, existence of, in Pātañjala Darśana, 41. See *Pātañjala Darśana*.
,, existence of, in Śruti, 3. See *Śruti*.
,, ,, ,, in Upanishads, 51.
,, ,, ,, by sense-perception as defined in Sāṅkhya, 3, 5, 16.
,, existence of, not positively denied in Sāṅkhya, 16.
,, identical with individual puruṣa, 45.
,, incarnations of, 5.
,, No mention of, in Sāṅkhya, 4, 32.
,, No proof of causality or, agency of, 13, 14.
,, Perception of, 5, 6. See *Yogins*.
,, unattached to Prakṛti and her evolutes, 14.
,, Very forms of, assumed by individual puruṣas in trance, deep sleep, absolute absorption, or release, 22, 23.
,, whether personal or impersonal in Sāṅkhya, discussed, 52.

J

Janaka, 4, 45.
Jīva. See *Puruṣa*.
,, defined, 50.
,, Equipoise of guṇas agitated by prenatal acts of, resulting in creation, 69. See *Guṇas*.
,, finite and confined puruṣa, 6, 24, 32.
,, Multitudes of, differentiations of Absolute Puruṣa, 32, 34, 39.
,, regarded in Sāṅkhya as an evolute of Prakṛti. See *Prakṛti*.
Jīvanmukta, 124.

K

Kaivalya, meaning of, 123.
,, defined, 124. See *Pain*.
,, Implications of, 127.
,, True meaning of, 128.

Kāla, 50, 51, 69. See *Īśvara*.
Kalpa-pralaya, 63.
Kapila, 18, 27, 40, 49, 64, 73, 91.
,, mentioned in Svetāśvatara Upanishad, 73.
,, regarded as an incarnation of Nārāyaṇa, 17.
Kāraṇābhāvāt, 29. See *Doctrines of—Cause and Effect—Satkārya*.
Karma, 8.
,, direct cause of the world, 8.
,, whether auxiliary to Īśvara for creative purposes, 8.
Kleśa, 62. See *Avidyā*.
Knowledge, discriminative. See *Vidyā*.
,, true and false, 110.
Kshetra, 66f.
Kshetrajña, 66f.

L

Liberation. See *Release*.
Liberated soul, meaning of, 40. See *Jīvanmukta*.
,, ,, implies bondage previous to liberation, 40.
,, ,, non-return to state of bondage at next creation following pralaya, 41. See *Creation* and *Pralaya*.
Loadstone (and Iron), simile of. See *Metaphors and Similes in Sāṅkhya*.

M

Mahābhārata. See *Aphorisms*, *Mahābhārata*.
Mahābhūtas (gross elements), 91, 95, 104, 111.
,, compound things and objects of sense-perception, 102, 104.
Mahādeva (commentator), 11, 17. 24. See *Vedāntin Mahādeva*.
Mahā-pralaya, 63.
Mahat, 24. 91. See *Buddhi*.
,, Cosmic power, called Hiraṇyagarbha, 91. See *Hiraṇyagarbha*.
,, first step in the cosmic growth, 96.
,, not the consciousness of a particular puruṣa, 91.
,, particular and unique investment by which Absolute Puruṣa creates through Prakṛti, 96.
Maheśvara, 5.
Man. See *Jīva*.
,, a person possessing intellect and will, 75. See *Human Personality*.
,, a specialised organic unity of Absolute Puruṣa and Prakṛti, 33, 77.
,, called Puruṣa in Sāṅkhya, 75.
,, regarded as having two sides, 33.
Manaḥ, evolved directly from Ahaṁkāra and indirectly from Mahat, 100.
,, internal sense, the medium of all other senses, 100.
Manifest (the), attributes and characteristics of, 93.
Manana, meaning of, 17.
Manyness, ground and condition of Prakṛti's oneness, 23, 29.
Material cause of the world, 72f.
Māyā, a power of Brahman, 72f.
,, evolutes of, pervading the world, 72f.
Max Müller, 90, 96.
Metaphors and Similes in Sāṅkhya. See *Analogies*.
Metaphysical (or cosmological) questions involved in Sāṅkhya, 88.
Metaphysics of Sāṅkhya, whether borrowed from Upanishads, 73.
Migration. See *Doctrine of Migration*.
,, of Puruṣa from life to life, 115. See *Knowledge* and *Liberation*.
Mind, a compound of three evolutes of Prakṛti, 71.
,, equivalent of manas, but wider in its meaning, 100. See *Manas* and *Manaḥ*.
Multiplicity, power of, an attribute of Prakṛti, 37.
,, of puruṣas, the guṇas, not the cause of, 33. See *Guṇas*.
,, of souls (puruṣas), Sāṅkhya theory of, 37.
,, of souls, proof of, 27.

N

Nāham, meaning of, 119.
Nārāyaṇa, Kapila regarded as incarnation of, 17. See *Kapila*.
Nāsmi, meaning of, 118.
Nature, 66f. See *Prakṛti*.
Nyâya Darśana, 21.
Neo-Hegelianism, 38.
Nimbārka, 55, 70, 71, 132.
Nirguṇa, 68. See *Guṇa*.
Nirīśvara-Sāṅkhya, a misnomer, 40.
,, ,, as distinguished from Seśvara Sāṅkhya, 40.
Nomenclature of Sāṅkhya, whether borrowed from Upanishad or not, 73.
Non-theistic theory of Sāṅkhya, discussed, 1. See *Atheism*.

O

Object, compound matter on which the senses operate, 100.
,, of creation, twofold, 79, 104.
,, Prakṛti as, in relation to Absolute Puruṣa as subject, 54. See *Subject-object*. 33.

P

Pain, three kinds of, 115, 122.
,, absolute freedom from, 123. See *Bondage*.
Pañcha Mahābhūtas. See *Mahābhūtas*.
Pañcha-Śikha-Sūtram, 18.
Pan-psychism. See *Rigorous Dualism*.
Pañcha Tanmātras, defined, 101. See *Tanmātras*.
Parable of two birds, 72f.
Parama Puruṣa. See *Absolute Puruṣa*.
Paratantra, meaning of, 20.
Pāravaśya, meaning of, 20.
Passion, cause of creation, 79. See *Rāga*.
Pātañjala Darśana. See *Aphorisms, Pātañjala Darśana*.
Perfect subject-object, described, xiv.
Perfection, attainability of, by gradual evolution, 149.
Person, Absolute Puruṣa, whether a, xiii.
,, defined, xiii.
Personality, different forms and senses of, (in Sāṅkhya), xiii.
,, essential characteristics of, xiii, 61, 75.
Pluralistic system, Sāṇkhya appears to be a, 61.
Pradhāna, 11, 70, 71. See *Prakṛti*.
Prakṛti, (same as Pradhāna):
,, Activity of, prompted by desire to release Puuṣa, 81-83. See *Activity*.
,, cause of creation (when conjoined with Absolute Puruṣa), 78.
,, cause of physical and psychical mechanism of man, 76.
,, co-eternal part of Īśvara and always sub-conscious. See *Īśvara* and *Sub-consciousness*.
,, Colours of the guṇas or qualities of, 72f. See *Guṇas*.
,, Creative activity of, immediate object, 124.
,, Creative activity of, two-fold object, 79.
,, Creative activity of, ultimate object, 124.
,, different from matter, 106.
,, Views on, in Sāṅkhya and Upanishad, 70.
,, element or power of Brahman, 73. See *Brahman*.
,, Evolutes of, both cosmical and psychological, 86.
,, for enjoyment and deliverance of Puruṣa, 77.
,, Function of, in relation to Puruṣa, 80.
,, Guṇas or qualities of, 72f. See *Guṇas*.
,, integral part of Absolute Puruṣa, 78.
,, intellectualised and illuminated Mahat, 93. See *Mahat*.
,, material cause of the world, 72f.
Prakriti.
,, Puruṣa and, eternally and wholly interdependent and inter-related, 106. See *Rigorous Dualism*.
,, Puruṣa and, not two independent realities mechanically united in man, 75.
,, Union between Puruṣa and, eternal, 76.
Pralaya, 20, 66f., 67f., 126.
Pratyaksha, as proof, meaning of, 3. See *Sense-perception*.
Proofs, three kinds of, in Sāṅkhya, 2, 11.
Puruṣa. See *Absolute Puruṣa* and *Individual Puruṣa*.
,, Ādi, 20.
,, attributes of, 30, 60.
,, bondage of. See *Bondage*.
,, classification of, into finite and infinite, 32, 75, 76.
,, ,, ,, into released and unreleased, 20, 32.
,, defined, 75.
,, Multiple forms of, in Sāṅkhya, 33, 75.
,, Release of. See *Release*.
,, Sāṅkhya view of, xv.
Puruṣārtha, 122.

Q

Qualities of Prakṛti. See *Guṇas* and *Prakṛti*.
Question, cosmological, involved in Sāṅkhya, 88.

R

Rāga, activity or causality without, if possible, 10.
Rajas. See *Guṇas*.
Rāmānuja, 55.
Relative plurality, 61.
Release, doctrine of, 57, 114.
,, for individual puruṣa, different from that of Absolute Puruṣa, 58.
,, Real meaning of, as regards jīvanmuktas and yogins during their mundane existence, 127,
,, whether absolute separation of Absolute Puruṣa and Prakṛti, 57.
Rigorous Dualism, 106.

S

Sa, whether refers to Īśvara, 20.
Sa hi, whether refers to Puruṣa or Prakṛti, 24.
Sambandha, meaning of, 13.
Saṃkalpa, 99, 100.
Sāṅkhya-Chandrikā, 27.

Sāṅkhya doctrines. See *Doctrines*.
Sāṅkhya-Kārikā. See *Aphorisms, Sāṅkhya-Kārikā*.
Sāṅkhya Philosophy. See Sāṅkhya System.
Sāṅkhya-Pravachana. See *Aphorisms, Sāṅkhya-Pravachana*.
Sāṅkhya-Sûtram, 35.
Sānkhya System, different senses and forms of personality recognised in, xiv.
,, ,, non-theistic theory of, whether warranted, xiv.
,, ,, pan-psychism, whether recognised in, xvi. See *Pan-psychism*.
Sarva-kartā, 20.
Sarvavit, 20.
Sattā, meaning of, 11.
Self-consciousness, See *Ahaṃkāra* and *Buddhi*.
Sense-perception. See *Pratyakṣa*.
,, as a proof, meaning of, 3.
,, distinguished from internal perception. See *Yogins*.
,, Existence of God by, not provable, 16.
Senses, number of, recognised in Sāṅkhya, 99. See *Active Senses, Cognitive Senses* and *Mind*.
Soul, difference between Sāṅkhya and Upanishad as to Prakṛti's capacity, for purposive creativeness independently of Iśvara, 70.
,, Liberation of, how effected according to Śvetāśvatara Upanishad, 72f.
,, Multiplicity of, whether warranted, 31.
,, Nature of, as described in the Bhagavadgītā, 47.
Stout, Prof., 101.
Sub-consciousness, attribute of Prakṛti and her evolutes, 137-38.
,, meaning of, 138.
,, relative, 139.
,, two stand-points, viewed from, 139.
Subject-object, Absolute Puruṣa is synthesis of, 54.
Subtle body (same as subtile body).
,, doctrine of, 102.
Subtle elements. See *Tanmātras*.
Super-person, personality of God described as, 74. See *Īśvara*.
Supreme Puruṣa. See *Īśvara*.
Supreme Soul. See *Īśvara*.
,, ,, defined, 66f.
Śruti, nature of God in, 55.
System of spirits, world regarded as, in Sāṅkhya, 132. See *Pan-psychism*.

T

Tanmātras, 101, 102. See *Pañcha Tanmātras*.
Tat, whether refers to Īśvara, or finite self, 4, 7, 12.
Tattvas, 98. See *Categories*.
Tattva-Samāsa, 18.
Testimony, proof by, 2-3. See *Āptavachana*.
Theistic Sāṅkhya, as the vedānta, 1.
Transcendency of Absolute Puruṣa over the evolutes of Prakṛti, 57, 68. See *Absolute Puruṣa* and *Release*.
Two texts, Sāṅkhya system to be read in, 96.

U

Unconsciousness, 136-37, 142. See *Sub-consciousness*.
,, two senses of, 136-37.
,, Prakṛti when regarded as possessing the element of, 133, 139.
Union between Prakṛti and Puruṣa, whether eternal and irresolvable, 76.
,, ,, Prakṛti and Puruṣa, cause of evolution of world, 85.
Unity-in-multiplicity, or a bare unity whether Absolute Puruṣa is, 54.
Unity of the Absoute Puruṣa underlying the plurality of the manifested world, 61.
Universal dissolution, 65f. See *Pralaya*.
Upādhi, 23.
Upanishad, differs from Sāṅkhya as to Prakṛti's capacity for purposive creativeness independently of Iśvara, 70.
,, metaphysics of, whether borrowed from Sāṅkhya, 51.
,, Śvetāśvatara. See *Aphorisms, Śvetāśvatara*.

V

Vāchaspati Miśra, 27, 28, 30, 82, 84, 92, 118.
Vaśiṣṭha, 4.
Vedānta view on pan-psychism, 132. See *Pan-psychism*.
,, Sāṅkhya system as theistic as, 1.
Vedāntin Mahādeva, 8, 22, 24. See *Mahādeva*.
Vices, Absolute Puruṣa devoid of, sense, 63, 64.
Vijñāna Bhikṣu, 2-5, 7-8, 11, 13, 15-17, 19-24, 35-36, 119.
Virtues, Absolute Puruṣa exalted above and beyond, 63, 64. See *Duty*.
Viṣṇu, 42, 43. See *Īśvara*.
Viveka-Śāstra, 17.
Vyāpti, essential condition of inferential reasoning, 13.
,, meaning of, 12. See *Sambandha*.
Vyāsa, 71, 74, 76, 110, 122, 123, 124, 125, 142-143.

W

Will, desires and actions, essential characteristics of, 62.
Wilson, Prof., 31, 100.
Witness of everything, Absolute Puruṣa in His essential nature is, 67. See *Parable of Two Birds.*
World, Absolute Puruṣa, whether a system or, 52.
,, conjunction of Prakṛti and Puruṣa, cause of evolution of. See *Creation.*
,, meaning of, 86.
,, nature of, whether materialistic or spiritualistic, xiv, 105, 149. See *Pan-psychism* and *Cosmos.*
,, object of Puruṣa's knowledge or consciousness, 140. See *Creation.*
,, pervasion of, by evolutes of Māyā, 72f. See *Māyā.*
World-illusion, release from, how effected, 72f,

Y

Yatis, 67.
,, apperception of God by, 67.
Yoga, 5.
Yoga-Sûtram. See *Aphorisms, Yoga-Sûtram.*
Yogin, 3, 5, 63, 104, 124, 138.
,, attains supersensible powers by yoga, 138.
,, not affected by Prakṛti's materials, 124-25.
,, perception of Brahman by, 3, 5. See *Brahman.*
Yājñavalkya, 4.
Yājñavalkya-Sûtram. See *Aphorisms, Yājñavalkya-Sûtram.*

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